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I am indebted to my participants for the selfless sacrifice of their time and energy on this project. 
This entirety of this research agenda is dedicated to the infantry men and women of the United 
States Army, for whom I have unending respect, and to the memory of Walt Whitman, that 
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This study explores the confluence of Narrative Inquiry's three commonplaces of temporality, 
sociality, and place on the experiences of five combat veterans with combat-designated Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS) across the lifespan. In particular, the study examines the 
longitudinal components of Moral Injury (MI) before, during, and after combat operations. 
Chapter 4 explores the individual narratives of the participants, Chapter 5 examines common 
narrative threads between participants, and Chapter 6 is the author's subsequent extrapolations on 





DAVID RICHARD GOSLING 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY AND COUNSELOR EDUCATION (SPACE) 
 
 










THE LONGITUDINAL IMPACT OF MORAL INJURY ON COMBAT SOLDIERS:  




CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
In the Book of Genesis, Cain infamously murders his brother Abel in a fit of jealous rage. 
As punishment, God casts Cain away from his family of origin, where he is destined to roam the 
unpopulated earth using the means at his disposal. This biblical story serves numerous purposes. 
First, it is an explicit teaching on the Ten Commandments to follow in Exodus; foreshadowing 
rules the Israelites must follow to maintain their sacred covenant with God. Second, it is a 
cautionary tale, which suggests that righteousness and effort are not always met with divine 
favor: Cain (originally) deserved the favor of God in equal measure to Abel but did not receive 
it; Abel received such favor but paid for it with his life. Third, the story tells readers that the 
worst punishment for the worst crime (i.e., the murder of a blood relation) is exile from one’s 
community and home. Fourth, it suggests that such a life, disconnected from community, is filled 
with hardship and heartbreak. Fifth, the story of Cain and Abel is an attempt by the early Jewish 
community to make sense of perhaps the most alarming reality of life: that humans purposively 
and willfully kill members of their own species and have since the dawn of time.  
Each of these allegorical lessons taken from one of the most ancient stories in Judeo-
Christian culture is ironically applicable to the postmodern state of American combat veterans. 
The first lesson reminds soldiers that to kill another human being is to break covenant with the 
divine according to the Christian values upon which American society is established. The ways 
and means by which killing is justified in war are not applicable when soldiers return home and 
reenter civilian life (Grossman, 2009). This reality has major ramifications for the way soldiers 
process their combat experiences, and may contribute to the fact that among wartime 
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experiences, killing is uniquely correlated to the progression of posttraumatic stress (PTSD) 
symptomology (Maguen, et al., 2010, 2011).  
The second lesson echoes the torment and guilt of those veterans who move through 
combat unharmed, while comrades who are sometimes considered closer than actual blood 
relatives are killed around them. One of the ugliest facets of industrialized warfare remains the 
arbitrary nature of mechanized (and now computerized) combat; a soldier’s skill, courage, and 
tenacity are no longer variables that hold much sway over individual fate. The prowess of an 
Achilles, the cunning of an Odysseus, or the equanimity of a Marcus Aurelius mean next to 
nothing when the bullets and bombs find their targets with indiscriminate efficacy; the historical 
qualities that make for renowned soldiering are dwarfed by the immensity of technologized 
combat.  
The third lesson establishes the sense of exile and disenfranchisement many combat 
veterans feel to some degree upon reentry to the civilian world. The fourth lesson reminds the 
reader that such exiles often lead to irrevocable loss. Taken collectively, Cain’s banishment and 
subsequent suffering are a model representation of how combat veterans either feel they are 
exiled by society writ-large or how they choose to exile themselves as a form of self-inflicted 
punishment for perceived transgressions or failures on the battlefield. This sense of abandonment 
is supported by the current literature on warrior reentry to the civilian world (See, e.g., Ahern, et 
al., 2015; Orazem, et al., 2007).  
The fifth lesson demonstrates how the act of murder, extrapolated and expanded upon as 
it has been over the millennia, remains an indelible image of horror and revulsion in the minds of 
human beings. Soldiers are just such human beings, before and after they wear the uniform, and 
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are no less impressionable than the rest of the species when it comes to the magnitude and 
implications of taking human life (Grossman, 2009). 
An Emerging Construct 
Research in the past decade has begun to hone in on the moral and existential struggles 
related to experiences of wartime service. Shay (1991, 1994), in his exploration of the 
experiences of Vietnam veterans, coined the term moral injury as a betrayal of what's right by 
someone who holds legitimate authority (e.g., a military leader) in a high stakes situation. More 
recently, Litz et al. (2009) defined moral injury as perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing 
witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations. This definition served 
as placeholder for the emerging construct over the course of the past decade, while other research 
(e.g., Drescher, et al., 2011; Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015) has expanded on the 
import of moral injury and narrowed its boundaries and limitations as a social construct.  
The result of such efforts implies combat-related moral injury is underestimated at the 
expense of those who served and fought. In an examination of the types of war-zone events that 
cause service members lasting distress, one study reported that 34% of service members believed 
their most difficult combat experience was an event of moral injury (Stein, et al., 2012). 
According to the National Health and Resilience Veterans Study (NHRVS, 2013), a significant 
minority of combat veterans experienced moral injury during wartime service, while Wisco et al. 
(2017) determined that 41.8% of combat veterans claimed exposure to at least one type of 
morally injurious experience (MIE) during their time in the military. 
Self-Directed Harm (SDH) 
In conjunction with the statistical likelihood of moral injury in combat, soldiers who 
experienced such events were also found to be at risk for self-injurious thoughts and behaviors 
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(Bryan, Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, & Ray-Sannerud, 2014), while the interaction of moral injury 
and PTSD was associated with significantly increased risk for suicide ideation and attempts, 
even among the subgroup of participants with a history of suicidal ideation (Bryan, Bryan, 
Roberge, Leifker, & Rozek, 2018). Other research indicates that exposure to potentially morally 
injurious events accounts for PTSD symptoms above and beyond combat exposure (Jordan, 
Eisen, Bolton, Nash, & Litz, 2017); moral appraisals of combat experience predict additional 
distress beyond exposure to combat (Lancaster & Erbes, 2017); and taking human life (e.g., 
Maguen et al., 2010, 2011) and acts of abusive violence (Currier, Holland, Jones, & Sheu, 2014) 
increase the risk for depression, PTSD, and suicidality among combat veterans (Currier, Holland, 
& Malott, 2015). 
These statistics connect more broadly to the suicide crisis among U.S. military personnel, 
the rate of which has more than doubled since 2002 (Bryan, et al., 2018; Schoenbaum et al., 
2014). A decade ago, the historical trend for lower suicide rates among military personnel ended 
when the military suicide rate surpassed that of the demographically matched U.S. general 
population (20.2 per 100,000 vs.19.2 per 100,000) for the first time in known history 
(Schoenbaum et al., 2014; Smolenski et al., 2014). Thus, it is self-evident that between the 
reported percentages of moral injury among combat veterans, the construct’s correlation to 
PTSD and suicidality, and the overall suicide rate of military members, there are major 
ramifications due to the lack of understanding and expertise among mental health professionals 
in identifying, addressing, and treating moral injury among American warriors.  
Theoretical Framework 
 Historically, narrative inquiry resists the reductionistic and formalistic boundaries of 
theory as prescribed by the “grand narrative” of positivist thought (Clandinin and Connelly, 
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2000). In contrast to what he deemed the technical rationalism of the scientific method, Schon 
(1983) coined the terms reflection-in-action and knowledge-in-action to denote an epistemology 
of practice, whereby thinking and doing are no longer separate and distinct. Reflection-in-action 
can proceed among uncertainties “because it is not bound by the dichotomies of Technical 
Rationality” (Schon, 1983, pp. 68–69). Narrative researchers have argued that the reductionism 
entailed by technical rationalism has taken the concept of professional memory and reduced it to 
a formulated set of rules regarding truth and untruth (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). In contrast, 
the narrative method attempts to put “the body back into the mind” (Johnson, 1987, p. xxxvi) and 
“wreak havoc with certainty” (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000, p. 37). As Clandinin and Connelly 
note: “Emotion, value, felt experience with the world, memory, and narrative explanations of 
one’s past do not stand still in a way that allows for certainty” (p. 37).  
 Comparable to reductionism, narrative inquirers also experience tension at the boundaries 
of formalistic thought that is, they assume a “view that things are never what they are but are 
rather what our framework or point of view or perspective or outlook makes them” (Clandinin 
and Connelly, 2000, p. 39). Where formalists begin inquiry in theory, narrative inquirers begin 
with lived and told experience. Rather than a formal literature review, for instance, many 
narrative researchers weave literature throughout a dissertation or book to create a seamless link 
between developing thought, theory, and practice as embodied in the inquiry (Clandinin and 
Connelly). This often results in a tension between literature reviewed as a framework versus 
literature reviewed as a conversation between theory and life. This tension, as well as the others 
created by reductionistic and formalistic boundaries, can bring vibrancy, authenticity, and depth 
to an adequately developed narrative project. After all, the anticipated result of a narrative 
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inquiry is not to prescribe general applications, but rather to create texts that allow readers to use 
their imaginative capacities to formulate their own uses and applications.  
 In response to criticism that narrative inquiry lacks structure, and that it is merely the 
telling of stories (Connelly and Clandinin, 2006), there are three “commonplaces” and eight 
elements that are given full consideration under the methods section below. Collectively, these 
components provide an adequate framework and structure to the professional narrative inquiry, 
while allowing for space to move forward without being confined by formalistic and 
reductionistic limitations.  
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the lived experiences of military veterans with 
combat military occupational specialties (MOS) who experienced moral injury during combat 
across generational and societal lines.  Specifically, it aimed to explore three groups of research 
questions: 
• How do experiences of moral injury differ according to the particularities of the war 
being fought, across generations, and between individuals? 
• In what ways does a combat MOS impact the perceived experience of moral injury 
among combat soldiers?  Does it make such experiences easier or harder to handle in the 
moment? More or less likely to have occurred in the first place? Does it make coping 
with the aftermath of moral injury easier or harder to handle down the line as civilians? Is 
a combat MOS a continuing source of pride for veterans who experienced moral injury? 
Does a combat MOS in any way bolster or limit their ability and/or desire to seek out 
support?  
 8 
• What are the longitudinal effects of undergoing combat MOS training across the lifespan, 
and how do the tenets of the warrior ethos permeate the lives and day-to-day experiences 
of such veterans? How do older generations perceive their younger warrior counterparts 
and vice versa? What are the generational differences between combat-MOS war 
veterans and their experiences of moral injury? 
Significance of the Study 
 The significance of the study, in alignment with the narrative inquiry process, was 
intended to lie primarily in its ability to weave a cohesive narrative from a number of disparate 
life perspectives and to offer this story up to the public for consumption, interpretation, and both 
meaning-making and paradigm-shifting purposes. A narrative inquiry study is not concerned 
with finding an objective truth, but rather with exploring and displaying one particular 
perspective (i.e., the researcher’s), intertwined among the perspectives of study participants 
through a research process that is honest, open, and expressive. The manner one chooses to 
interpret this exploratory process remains valid for the individual, and no two persons will (or 
should) come away from the project with the exact same response or reaction. 
Definition of Terms 
 For the purposes of this study, I have appropriated the most recent and salient definitions 
of moral injury-related phenomena as described by Farnsworth, Drescher, Evans, and Walser 
(2017). The authors approached said phenomena from a functional perspective, marking a clear 
divergence from prior syndromal definitions of moral injury. Important terms are defined as 
follows: 
Morally Injurious Experience (MIE): a situation occurring in a high-stakes 
environment where an individual perceives that an important moral value has 
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been violated by the actions of self or others. From a functional perspective, such 
values are related to behaviors and choices that enhance social collaboration and 
discourage selfishness. An MIE is a necessary but not sufficient factor for the 
development of moral injury (p. 392). 
Moral Pain: the experience of dysphoric moral emotions and cognitions (e.g., 
self-condemnation) in response to a morally injurious event. Once again, from an 
evolutionary and functional perspective, moral pain functions as a motivator for 
individuals within a community to protect and maintain group cohesion (p. 392). 
Moral Injury: expanded social, psychological, and spiritual suffering stemming 
from costly or unworkable attempts to manage, control, or cope with the 
experience of moral pain. 
Farnsworth, et al. (2017) point to three reasons why the functional approach to moral injury 
supersedes the aforementioned syndromal representation of the phenomenon. First, a functional 
approach makes it easier to distinguish between similar content based on the function such 
actions serve. For instance, running away from fear serves a different function (self-preservation) 
than running away from disgust (avoidance). Second, it allows for a non-pathologized approach 
to moral injury, in contrast with current treatments for PTSD. The authors note that moral injury 
is a painful but ultimately healthy attempt to correct one’s moral trajectory. Last, the authors 
claim that the functional definitions accommodate a variety of moral responses and contexts, to 
include longitudinal factors—a key component of the proposed study.  As such, I believe these 
are the most appropriate and well-defined terms currently available amidst the moral injury 
research for use in this study. 
Chapter Summary 
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 This chapter: (a) examined the emergence of moral injury as a new and exciting 
psychological construct; (b) outlined the purpose and significance of the proposed study; (c) 
explored the value of the narrative inquiry method as a viable methodology; (d) offered up initial 
research questions, and (e) proposed an ongoing definition of terms based on Farnsworth and 
colleagues’ (2017) recent work. The subsequent chapter will, in much more detail, explore the 




CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Research on morality in this century has been predominantly focused on differing aspects 
of individual morality and the point of moral origination (c.f., Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2015; 
Haidt, et al., 2001; Moll & Schulkin, 2009; Ugazio, Lamb, & Singer, 2012). A closer look at the 
origins of morality research is warranted, however, for an appropriate discussion of moral injury 
to subsequently take place.  
Moral Reasoning and Development 
  Although the study of moral reasoning can be traced back to Piaget's early work on the 
developmental conceptualization of moral judgment, it was Lawrence Kohlberg who generated 
substantial interest in the study of moral reasoning and development (Giammarco, 2016). 
Kohlberg's model of moral development attempted to explain how normal morality develops 
across the lifespan, with individuals progressing through a series of six stages of moral 
development, each with its own implications for individual and societal behavior. Progress 
through such cognitive stages was considered invariant and sequential—no person could skip a 
level, and each level could only be reached by a progression through all former stages (Rest, 
Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Kohlberg created and expanded upon the Moral Judgments 
Scale (MJS) over the course of his career as the instrument used to determine the given 
developmental stage (i.e. pre-conventional, conventional, & post-conventional) for an individual. 
However, due to the lack of basic psychometric properties (e.g., inter-rater reliability, construct 
validity, etc.), the MJS was limited in its ability to validate its creator’s developmental model 
(Giammarco, 2016).  
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A group of researchers known as Neo-Kohlbergians have since attempted to rectify some 
of the inconsistencies and concerns of Kohlberg’s model by: (a) switching from “hard” to “soft” 
stages of development (reformulated as schemas); (b) emphasizing automatic processes (vs. 
intentional reflectivity); (c) tending to the specific and concrete over the abstract; (d) arguing in 
favor of individuals retaining their ability to use reasoning in lower stages of moral development, 
and (e) a move away from the universality of moral reasoning toward a perspective of morality 
as a community enterprise, relative to situation and circumstance (Rest, et al., 2000).  
Despite the important contributions of the Neo-Kohlbergians, Giammarco (2016) noted 
that major issues remain concerning the overall utility of the moral reasoning model. In 
particular, related studies of both the MSJ and the Defining Issues Test–2 (DIT-2) failed to 
control for covariance between groups attributable to education, socio-economic status, and IQ, 
confounding the conclusion that morality scores increase as a function of age (Giammarco, 
2016). Researchers have found a significant association between moral development scores and 
IQ (See, e.g., Dawson, 2002), suggesting higher DIT scores may be achieved because of greater 
IQ and abstract reasoning abilities (Giammarco, 2016). In addition, there is the well-known 
critique of the model by Gilligan (1982), whose Moral Orientation Theory (MOT) distinguished 
the use of justice-oriented morality from care-oriented morality (largely) across gender lines 
between men and women, respectively. There is now partial evidence that pro-social dilemmas 
evoke more care responses, while antisocial dilemmas evoke more justice responses, supporting 
Gilligan’s original claim (Giammarco, 2016); yet both models rely heavily on dilemma-based 
assessments rather than real-life scenarios.  
Nonetheless, the DIT-2 has still been successfully implemented in a variety of research 
settings in the past decade. For instance, Caceda and colleagues (2015) found, in a stepwise 
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linear regression analysis, that functional connectivity between the salience and central executive 
networks of the brain, along with age and the DIT-2 personal interest schema score, significantly 
predicted reciprocity behaviors between two individuals performing a “trust” game with money 
(R2 = 0.498, p = 0.001). In other recent studies, the DIT-2 has been used successfully to 
determine connections between moral reasoning and: (a) noncriminal psychopathy (Heinze, 
Allen, Magai, & Ritzier, 2010); (b) narcissism (Traiser & Eighmy, 2011), and (c) longitudinal 
success in academia (O'Flaherty & Gleeson, 2017). Last, Bailey (2011) debunked prior research 
(e.g., Emler, et al., 2007) that claimed the DIT-2 had an inherent political bias toward the left. 
Taken as a collective, these studies suggest the DIT-2, a derivative of distilled Kohlbergian 
concepts, remains a useful measure in the sphere of moral reasoning, and one that could be 
utilized in pursuit of a deeper understanding of moral injury among veterans, in particular.  
An alternative in the dichotomous nature of the justice–care debate is the Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT) of Haidt and Joseph (2004). The authors identified five areas of 
moral regulation that persist across cultures and which have evolutionary roots: (a) Harm/Care; 
(b) Fairness/Reciprocity; (c) Ingroup/Loyalty; (d) Authority/Respect, and (e) Purity/Sanctity 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007). The authors claim that these areas measure and describe differences in 
moral concerns across individuals, social groups, and cultures (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Yet the 
MFT suffers from the same problems as the MSJ, the DIT-2, and the MOT in that they each rely 
extensively on dilemma–based scenarios to measure morality and are all based on self-report 
measures (Giammarco, 2016). And yet, value remains in the use of MFT and its subsequent 
offshoots, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ).    
In an oft-cited study, Graham and colleagues (2011) created the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ) to further solidify and expound upon the claims of MFT. Reaching a vast 
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network of participants (N = 34,476) via their own website and public following, the authors 
were able—given the large size of the study—to compare a variety of confirmatory factor 
analysis outcomes via structural equation modeling to demonstrate the superiority of a 5-factor 
model based on the aforementioned areas of moral regulation (in contrast to a hierarchical 
model, 2- and 3-factor models, and a 6-factor model). Convergent and discriminant validity was 
provided by contrasting each of the MFQ subscales with external scale sets (e.g., the Adapted 
Good-Self Assessment, IRI, Psychopathy Scale, etc.), and the original test-retest Pearson 
correlations were .68 (Fairness) and higher for all subscales (all p’s < .001). Significantly, the 
authors were able to adjust for geographical location and gender, suggesting the sameness of 
ideological patterns across cultures (liberals skew more towards Harm and Fairness, 
conservatives to Ingroup, Authority, & Purity), and that there were substantial differences 
between men and women, with the latter scoring higher on Harm (MD = .47, t (118238) = 99.16, 
p < .0001, d = 0.58), Fairness (MD = .16, t (118238) = 37.75, p < .0001, d = 0.22) and Purity 
(MD = .16, t (118238) = 25.10, p < .0001, d = 0.15). The magnitude of this study suggests the 
MFQ is a valuable resource in determining the origins of an individual’s moral foundation and 
regulation. 
The moral reasoning avenue of research—indispensable for the current research on moral 
injury—is nonetheless a victim of its own application by confounding what people should do 
versus what they actually would do in a real-life scenario. As there are no simple solutions to 
these research dilemmas, alternative perspectives on the conceptualization of morality are 





While neurocognitive and individualistic considerations are integral to the understanding 
of morality, the sociocultural and relational contexts from which morality is derived may be even 
more important to consider when working with a military population (Farnsworth, et al., 2014). 
In particular, Rai and Fiske (2011) proposed a theory of Relationship Regulation (RRT) that 
relies on four separate forms of social relationship, each with a singular moral motive, to predict 
moral actions and outcomes in a given sociocultural setting. This model is well equipped to 
accurately position the phenomenon of moral injury during and after combat service.   
According to RRT, the four forms of social relationship and corresponding motivations 
are: communal sharing (CS) motivated by unity; authority-ranking (AR) motivated by hierarchy; 
equality matching (EM) motivated by equality; and market pricing (MP) motivated by 
proportionality (Rai & Fiske, 2011). At any given time, several—or all—of these relational 
constructs may be in operation, thereby influencing the moral beliefs, actions, and consequences 
of the persons involved; any individual in a group may reach a different moral conclusion than 
another, based on which relationship constructs are activated. Likewise, different groups may 
(and often do) reach opposing conclusions on what constitutes a moral or immoral action based 
on sociocultural values. An oft-cited example of this type of socially regulated morality is the 
phenomenon of honor killings in certain societies. By western standards, an event where a 
woman is publicly murdered for adultery, for instance, would be considered a criminal act of the 
worst kind. According to strict interpretations of Sharia (i.e., Islamic) law, however, male kin to 
such a woman may be obligated to commit murder in order to maintain the cohesion and moral 
standing of the familial tribe; they are operating from a perspective of communal sharing (CS) 
where unity of the whole supersedes any interests of the individual. The sociocultural and 
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historical prism through which morality is interpreted has everything to do with how actions and 
their consequences are perceived.  
While Rai and Fiske (2011) emphasized the existence of distinctly immoral actions, they 
also asserted the value and importance of placing actions within an appropriate sociocultural 
context. Historically—in relation to moral injury—the military operates from an authority-
ranking (AR) construct where the rank structure restricts individual choice in the service of 
operational efficiency. By thinking less and doing more, soldiers learn to remain active amidst 
crisis and rely on their superiors to make command decisions (Litz, et al, 2009). This is reflected 
in the training undergone by recruits in boot camp, where individual characteristics are 
methodically stripped away and replaced by institutional values espoused by the military (Atuel 
& Castro, 2018).  
Concurrently, soldiers often operate from a sense of communal sharing (CS), where in-
group loyalty remains a preeminent component of the soldiering experience and a fail-safe 
against external threats. In postmodern warfare, relatively small units may operate in wide 
swaths of hostile territory, where outsiders are considered untrustworthy. A desire to reinforce 
the cohesion of an in-group against external threats—most often by virtue of physical violence—
is a form of morality-based action via the communal sharing (CS) model of social relationship 
and engagement. Tragically, many of the opponents U.S. service members face in the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) operate from exactly the same model, where threats to group identity 
take precedence over individual concerns and identities.  
Further research has identified the utility of the Relationship Regulation model. Simpson 
and Laham (2015) were the first to systematically explore the associations between moral 
judgments (based on the RM foundational concepts) and other relational factors. In two studies, 
 17 
using Australian undergraduates (N = 106) and American participants (N = 111), they used a 
variety of hypothetical moral violations (based on the tenets of both MFT and RR) to have 
participants judge the same violations according to different types of relationship construal, as 
well as according to the degree they were related to the four RM prototypes. Consistent with the 
Relationship Regulation model, individuals judged Care and Loyalty violations harshly when 
moving from the Communal Sharing (CS) modality, and Respect violations more severely when 
in the Authority Ranking (AR) modality.  The study demonstrated “convergence between 
relationship-specific analyses and analyses assessing individual differences, with results cohering 
with hypotheses derived from RRT and MFT” (Simpson & Laham, 2015).  
Likewise, Tepe and Aydinli-Karakulak (2019) recently added to the RRT literature by 
examining the functionality of “metarelational threats” that may serve as mediators between RM 
violation and perception of wrongness, such as severity and intentionality of a transgression, as 
well as the possibility for moral and emotional contagion (discussed briefly below). Across 6 
separate studies, the authors confirmed the tenets of RRT, which suggest that morality is indeed 
a form of relationship regulation. Furthermore, they also found that metarelational threat partially 
mediates RM violation and perceived immorality; transgressions committed intentionally were 
more threatening, for instance, because intentional acts are more likely to reoccur.  
RRT continues to be an important and relevant prism through which to view the meaning 
of morality, especially in relation to unique sociocultural factors, as may be seen in the military 
subculture, for instance. Two subsidiary considerations specifically related to RRT and the 
military population—emotional/moral contagion and situational morality—will be discussed in 




 The concept of emotional or moral contagion (Alvinius, et al., 2016; Johnson, 2008) is 
intimately connected to this latest notion of metarelational threat (as outlined above) within RRT. 
Defined as “the tendency to catch and feel emotions and/or behaviors which are similar to and 
associated with others” (Kemper, 2011, p. 163), examples of emotional contagion among 
military service members abound, from: (a) its culture that is complicit in the sexual harassment 
of female members (Antecol & Cobb-Clark, 2006), (b) based on the norms of hegemonic 
masculinity (Green, Emslie, O’Neill, Hunt, & Walker, 2010), to (c) occasions of civilian 
massacre (Shay, 1994), to (d) the fact that soldiers in units with 5 or more suicide attempts in the 
past year are more than twice as likely as their peers to themselves attempt suicide (Ursano, et 
al., 2015).  
Comparable to the notion of “group think”, the theory of emotional contagion suggests 
that individuals are much more susceptible to influence among peers and institutions than 
previously believed. Likewise, one danger within the AR framework utilized by the military is in 
executing orders considered immoral under different social circumstances (e.g., killing another 
human being). This may lead to a violation of what Park (2010) deemed an individual's global 
meaning system, and ultimately to situations that are fertile grounds for moral injury (e.g., 
betrayal by a superior; see: Shay, 1994, 2002).  
Contact does not have to be in physical proximity in order for an emotional contagion to 
be exploited, either, as indirect forms of contagion may result in similar outcomes (Eskine, 
Novreske, & Richards, 2013; Stavrova, Newman, Kulemann, & Fetchenhauer, 2016). As Tepe 
and Aydinli-Karakulak (2019) described in their study: the “perceived possibility of getting 
contaminated either through direct physical contact or indirectly via moral contagion leads to 
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perceived meta-relational threat, and thus, to severe condemnation”. Furthermore, becoming the 
target of a moral act is now linked to moral acts—whether good or bad—later on (Hoffman, 
Wisneski, Brandt, and Skitka, 2014). This may have significant ramifications for those service 
members who experience bullying or other forms institutionalized marginalization within the 
military: what happens to an individual can lead the same person to later do that very thing to 
others.  
Situational Morality 
Relatedly, while morality exists as a method for sustaining and strengthening 
interpersonal relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011), research suggests that situational factors also 
influence the extent to which a person does or does not identify with the moral self in a given 
scenario (Aquino, et al., 2009). This identification with a moral center (or lack thereof) 
contributes to the decision-making process of an individual faced with a moral dilemma or 
experience. Ugazio, Lamb, and Singer (2012) detailed how the motivational component of 
emotion plays an integral role in moral judgment. Anger, as an example, is an "approach" 
emotion that increases the likelihood people will judge a forthcoming action morally permissible 
or necessary. Conversely, disgust is a "withdrawal" emotion that has the opposite effect. In 
consequence, one begins to understand how scenarios entailing a strong action demand (i.e., 
combat) elicit strong emotions, which in turn influence or dictate moral outcomes (Ugazio, 
Lamb, & Singer, 2012).  
This finding is applicable after an event takes place, as well. One recent study (Jordan, 
Eisen, Bolton, Nash, & Litz, 2017) found that perpetration-based moral injury was mediated by 
guilt and shame in combat veterans, while betrayal-based moral injury was mediated by anger. 
There is evidence that morally injurious events committed by veterans themselves are associated 
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with the strongest forms of suffering, in contrast to the actions or omissions of others (Bryan et 
al., 2014). In short, the perspective taken by the veteran both during and after an event, including 
labels derived from context and content, may determine the manner in which that same veteran 
later responds emotionally and cognitively when recalling the past. 
The significance of situational context as it relates to moral injury can be further 
understood through Park's (2010) work concerning globalized versus situational meaning 
making: humans run the risk of experiencing moral injury when their global value system is 
compromised through a combination of individual and societal-relational factors. This process 
may lead to further moral injury if the person in question uses maladaptive, negative coping 
mechanisms (such as shame) that reinforce the wrongness of their actions or even their 
personhood. One of many problems related to placing moral injury beneath the diagnosis of 
PTSD is that the current DSM-5 parameters fail to properly account for such differences between 
fear-based and shame-based reactions (Bryan, et al., 2018). What follows is a discussion on the 
relationship in the literature between moral injury and PTSD.  
Moral Injury and PTSD 
Until recently, there remained only a partial understanding of where and how moral 
injury correlates with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Jordan, et al., 2017). Early literature 
in the field of moral injury concurred that mental health problems emerge from a more diverse 
set of warzone experiences than fear-based stressors alone (Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 
2011), and that moral injury contains a unique set of variables impacting the psychological, 
behavioral, social, and spiritual realms of veteran life (Drescher, et al., 2011). However, a lack of 
consensus on the definition or parameters of moral injury (Kopacz, et al., 2015) has remained an 
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obstacle to categorization and the development of instruments testing the components (and 
limits) of the construct.  
In the past year, Bryan et al. (2018) were able to run an exploratory structural equation 
model (ESEM) that confirmed the distinct and separate categorization of PTSD and moral injury 
(N = 930). Using social cognitive theory as a theoretical base (Resick, Monson, & Chard, 2007), 
the authors differentiated the two constructs according to the syndromal presentation of either 
natural or manufactured emotion in National Guard personnel: PTSD was aligned with “natural” 
emotions such as fear and anxiety; moral injury was aligned with “manufactured” emotions such 
as guilt and shame. The distinction between natural and manufactured emotions is concerned 
with whether or not emotions emanate directly from the trauma itself (i.e., natural), or are a result 
of one’s thoughts and interpretations about the event after the fact (i.e., manufactured; Bryan, et 
al., 2018). Other components of manufactured emotion include: spiritual and/or existential 
issues, problems with forgiveness, anhedonia, anger/aggression, embitterment, betrayal, and 
social dissonance—none considered central features of PTSD despite empirical examination 
(Bryan, et al., 2018; Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009; Shay, 2014).   
In the same study (Bryan, et al., 2018), depressed mood loaded onto both PTSD and moral 
injury, while the interaction of PTSD and moral injury was associated with significantly 
increased risk for suicidal ideation (B = -0.06, SE = 0.02, p = .020) and suicide attempts (B = 
0.11, SE = 0.05, p = .032), remaining a statistically significant predictor of the latter even among 
soldiers with a history of the former (Bryan, et al., 2018). These findings may be compared 
favorably to aforementioned data regarding suicidality among service members: the interplay 
between moral injury and PTSD creates a particularly vicious cycle of self-recrimination, regret, 
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and fear-based stressors that may often lead service members toward the path of self-directed 
harm (SDH).  
Indicator variables selected in the Bryan, et al. (2018) study to measure the hypothesized 
constructs and symptoms underlying PTSD and moral injury were from the following scales: 
PTSD Checklist for DSM–5; Differential Emotions Scale-IV; Patient Health Questionnaire-9; 
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test-Consumption; and the Insomnia Severity Index. 
Goodness of fit was assessed via a statistically nonsignificant chi-square test, root mean square 
error of approximately (RMSEA; < 0.05), comparative fit index (CFI; > 0.95), Tucker-Lewis 
Index (TLI; > 0.95, and standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR; < 0.05). A robust 
maximum likelihood estimation was used to specify all parameters. Results of the ESEM 
indicated the measurement model provided very good fit to the data when two factors were 
specified, as opposed to results in a 1-, 3-, and 4-factor model (x2 [37] = 44.92, p = .100; 
RMSEA = 0.02, 95% CI [0.00 –0.03]). In the aggregate, the ESEM model findings (Bryan, et al., 
2018) support other recent research that indicates: (a) the effects of moral injury on PTSD 
symptomology are mediated by moral emotions (Lancaster, 2018); (b) acts of personal 
transgression have an impact on the course of PTSD development (Lancaster, 2018); (c) moral 
injury may challenge a soldier’s basic sense of humanity (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2014); (d) 
moral injury may evoke a spiritual/existential crisis (Wortmann, et al., 2017); and (e) moral 
injury may result in negative changes in ethical attitudes and behaviors (Drescher, et al., 2011).  
One sees in the “manufactured” emotions of moral injury many of the components 
soldiers struggle with the most upon reentry to society. Orazem, et al. (2017), found the main 
struggles of post-service life to be: (a) the sense of being left behind; (b) the sense of not 
belonging; (c) the sense of missing the military culture; (d) the sense of lost purpose and 
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meaning; and (e) a negative perspective on civilians and the civilian way of life. As such, it may 
be said that emotions like enduring regret, guilt, shame, outrage, and anger, are more present and 
play a more significant role in the lives of combat veterans than the fear-based components 
traditionally conceptualized within a PTSD framework (Bryan et al., 2016; Farnsworth, 
Drescher, Nieuwsma, Walser, & Currier, 2014). While the fact remains that many changes 
following combat exposure do not necessarily indicate the presence of a mental health disorder 
(Castro, Kintzle, & Hassan, 2015; Hoge, et al., 2004), there are an increasing number of 
researchers claiming that moral injury, in point of fact, is not actually a mental health disorder, 
but rather “an experience of suffering that both transcends and overlaps with several mental 
health disorders, including PTSD, depression, and substance abuse” (Farnsworth, Drescher, 
Evans, & Walser, 2017, p. 392). Another recent study deemed moral injury “a descriptive term 
meant to reflect veterans’ own explanations of their postwar pain, confusion, and shame” 
(Purcell, Burkman, Keyser, Fucella, & Maguen, 2018, p. 646). Significantly, Farnsworth, et al. 
(2017) go on to state that contrary to the medical model of mental health—centered on the 
reduction of pathological symptomology—the functional approach to moral injury involves a 
shift in perspective, whereby morally injured soldiers change how they choose to relate and 
respond to their own moral pain.  
Treatment 
In the same vein, treatment for moral injury is less about specific modalities (although 
Farnsworth, et al., recommend Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, a.k.a., ACT) than an open 
invitation for combat soldiers to process their experiences in counseling, while also receiving a 
modicum of transition support (Castro, et al., 2015). Counseling has been proven effective and 
beneficial even in the absence of a mental health disorder (World Health Organization, 2002), 
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and especially when a problem exists that has not risen to the level of a diagnosis (Castro, et al., 
2015; Napier, et al., 2014).  
Moral Healing 
Farnsworth, et al. (2017) use the term moral healing to explain this process, which 
contains five steps:  
1) Acceptance of the reality of past moral wrongs. 
2) Openness to moral pain as an element of the human experience. 
3) Flexible consideration of moral rules in favor of underlying values. 
4) Awareness of a sense of self that is distinct from moral pain. 
5) Actively living values, including those previously violated, in the present moment. 
One sees in this approach a holistic perspective that takes into account the fact that most veterans 
want and need to remain responsible for past mistakes (Purcell, et al., 2018); many clinicians 
without cultural competency as it relates to the military subculture make the mistake of telling 
veterans that none of the things that happened were their fault (Schorr, Stein, Maguen, Barnes, 
Bosch, & Litz, 2018). This type of blanket absolution is anathema to the accountability and 
responsibility instilled in service members through hard months and years of training. A better 
response includes Farnsworth, et al.’s (2017) suggestions above, in which combat veterans are 
empowered to live more truly by their moral codes in the present as a means of recompense for 
the mistakes of the past.  
Impact of Killing (IOK) Treatment 
A developing treatment that appears to take the nuances of combat experience into 
account is the Impact of Killing (IOK) treatment, a 6- to 8-week program focused on the specific 
experience and psychological consequences of killing in combat (Purcell, et al., 2018). An initial 
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IOK trial helped veterans improve their quality of life and significantly reduced posttraumatic 
stress symptoms and other psychiatric symptoms (Maguen et al., 2017; Purcell, et al., 2018). 
Following evidence-based and trauma-informed practices (e.g., Cognitive Processing Therapy 
[CPT] & Prolonged Exposure [PE] therapy), the researchers ensured continuity of care for 
veterans already working through PTSD concerns, allowing them to move fluidly from treatment 
for other traumas onto the specific ramifications of killing in combat after their PTSD treatment 
was complete. Weekly sessions addressed, in order, the following related concepts: (a) pre-
treatment evaluation; (b) common responses to killing; (c) cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) 
elements; (d) becoming “unstuck”; (e) forgiveness; and (f) taking the next step (Purcell, et al., 
2018).  
 Instead of offering platitudes in an attempt to assuage guilt and displace blame, the IOK 
treatment purposively asks veterans to honor their moral convictions in the present and into the 
future as a form of recompense for past misdeeds; it is designed to create the possibility of a life 
beyond the confines of prolonged suffering and shame from moral injury (Purcell, et al., 2018). 
Across 5 domains (Impact, Effectiveness, Critique, Novelty, & Other Considerations), 
participants reported positive results from the treatment, with a further intention to continue 
working on the pieces of their experiences that still needed resolution. 
As the name implies, however, the IOK is only for those veterans who killed other human 
beings during the course of wartime service, and not for all service members suffering from 
morally injurious experiences. It is also meant to be follow-on after extensive PTSD treatment, 
and not something done concurrently with any other intensive mental health program. Despite 
these limitations, the IOK is a step in the right direction by taking actual combat veteran voices 
into account when designing and implementing mental health programming from a holistic 
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perspective. One of the major hurdles in the development of appropriate instrumentation remains 
the fact that veterans commonly report that moral injury is inadequately addressed in session by 
counselors (Schorr, et al., 2018), lending credence to the notion that if counselors to do not ask, 
then combat veterans will not tell, and the entire mental health community will thus remain 
ignorant of the particularities of the morally injurious experience from those who know it best. A 
brief examination of current moral injury instrumentation is thus warranted.  
Instrumentation 
Before the past year, two psychometrically validated instruments were available to assess 
moral injury exposure. They are the Moral Injury Questionnaire—Military Version (MIQ-M; 
Currier, et al., 2015) and the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2013). The MIES 
was developed using generic questions surrounding moral injury experiences with combat 
Marines, while the MIQ-M was based on the earlier work of Drescher, et al. (2011), one of the 
seminal works on moral injury. With a focus on events and symptoms, neither former measure 
has proven accurate in tracking changes among veterans in response to treatment or in assessing 
spiritual/existential struggles and changes in religiosity (Koenig, et al. 2018). Two new 
measures, however, have changed the landscape of moral injury inventory.  
Moral Injury Symptom Scale–Military Version (MISS-M) 
In response to the aforementioned limitations, Koenig et al. (2018) developed a new 
multi-dimensional measure of MI symptoms entitled the Moral Injury Symptom Scale—Military 
Version (MISS-M). This instrument includes items based on the 10 theoretically grounded 
components of moral injury as found in the most relevant and well-regarded literature. The 10 
components are: (a) shame; (b) guilt; (c) betrayal; (d) violation of moral values; (e) loss of 
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meaning; (f) difficulty forgiving; (g) loss of trust; (h) self-condemnation; (i) spiritual/religious 
struggles; and (j) loss of religious faith/hope (Koenig, et al., 2018).  
An initial Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), done in random halves of the sample for 
the instrument, revealed a single factor for each dimension/subscale of the MISS-M except for 
those subscales (i.e., forgiving and self-condemnation), for which two factors were identified 
based on the positive or negative connotation of the question. Of an original 54 items, 9 failed to 
meet the cut-off criterion, resulting in 45-item MISS-M in its final version. A subsequent 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) confirmed Eigenvalues for all factors making up the 
subscales equal to or exceeding 1.0 (range 1.55 to 10.94), with the exception of the faith/hope 
subscale. In the larger, overall sample (N = 427), the internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of 
the 45-item MISS-M was acceptable (a = 0.92, 95% CI = 0.91–0.93), as was the reliability of 
most of the individual subscales (a range: 0.56–0.91). Construct validity was indicated by high 
correlations between the total MISS-M score and the 10 subscales (Pearson r’s ranging from 
0.45 to 0.78). Discriminant validity was suggested by weak correlations between the total MISS-
M score and other social, religious and physical health constructs, while convergent validity was 
demonstrated by correlations with other mental health symptoms that might accompany moral 
injury, to include: PTSD symptoms (assessed by the 20-item PCL-5; r = 0.56); depressive 
symptoms (assessed by the 14-item Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HADS; r = 0.62), 
and anxiety symptoms (HADS; r = 0.59). The MISS-M is particularly useful in flagging those 
veterans who may be struggling with both PTSD and components of moral injury, as veterans 
with greater expressions of moral injury have simultaneously endorsed higher levels of combat 
related stressors (Currier, et al., 2018).  
Expressions of Moral Injury Scale–Military Version (EMIS-M).  
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At the same time, another group of researchers (Currier, et al., 2018) recently developed 
the Expressions of Moral Injury Scale—Military Version (EMIS-M) for assessing expressions of 
MI after the occurrence of the event. The EMIS-M items “capture possible cognitive and 
emotional consequences of MI events as well as maladaptive behaviors that often follow such 
moral reactions” (Currier, et al., 2018, p. 476). Following both an exploratory (Study 1, N = 286) 
and confirmatory factor analysis (Study 2, N = 624) with veterans of at least one military 
deployment, the instrument demonstrated excellent psychometric properties across a wide array 
of statistical analyses, with evidence supporting a two-dimensional solution on the basis of 
expressions directed at self and others (Currier, et al., 2018). For purposes of construct validity—
aside from the EMIS-M survey items—veterans also completed a battery of psychometrically 
validated measures related to moral injury, to include: the PTSD Checklist for the DSM-5 (PCL-
5); Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-8); Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT-
C); The Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS); Integration of Stressful 
Life Events Scale (ISLES-SF); forgiveness of self/other questionnaire; Adult Trait Hope Scale 
(ATHS), and the Gratitude Questionnaire 6 (GQ-6).  
In the first study, an EFA with principal axis factoring using direct oblimin rotation 
resulted in two factors collectively explaining 57.63% of variance in candidate items; a two-
factor solution was also supported by the scree plot analysis. The authors retained all items that: 
(a) loaded highly on their respective factors (i.e., .50 or above); (b) evidenced low cross-loadings 
(.30 or below); (c) had strong communalities (h2 < .50), and (d) avoided redundancy. Among 
reliability indices, the internal consistency of the two subscales exceeded 0.9, while test–retest 
coefficients over a 6-month waiting period between administrations of the instrument were also 
favorable (0.74 – 0.80). With a corrected alpha level of .005, EMIS-M subscales yielded 
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statistically significant correlations for convergent and divergent validity analyses (.17–.73), with 
the exception of total alcohol use assessed on the AUDIT-C (.09). Specifically, there was a 
positive link between EMIS-M subscales and the inability to make meaning of a potential trauma 
over their lifetime, and an inverse association between the subscale scores with social support, 
hope, and gratitude. 
In the second study, participants were asked to complete measures on combat exposure, 
guilt & shame, anger, and social desirability (in addition to all the measures asked of the first 
group of participants). The authors then tested differences in model fit between the hypothesized 
two-factor structure previously identified in the EFA with two alternative models: a bi-factor 
specification and unidimensional specification. CFA results confirmed that the EMIS-M is best 
conceptualized as two distinct but related factors, as evidenced by comparable loadings of each 
item on its respective factor and an acceptable fit of the common factors model, yet there was 
also support for a bi-factor model, suggesting an overall MI factor that encapsulates both 
subsidiary factors. In terms of reliability, internal consistencies of the subscales again exceeded 
the recommended level of .9, and in terms of validity, on a corrected alpha level of .004, the 
subscales again yielded statistically significant correlations in examining construct validity (.12 – 
.73). 
The EMIS-M helpfully corrects an inherent error within the MIQ-M, which intentionally 
conflated self and other types of transgressions due to a fear that respondents would be unwilling 
to endorse items about their own wrongdoings (Schorr, et al., 2018). Findings from the EMIS-M 
study were mirrored by the recent Grounded Theory (GT) work of Schorr et al. (2018), who used 
focus groups in the Veterans Administration (VA) system to come to the same conclusion: moral 
injury was endorsed by veterans as either being an issue of personal responsibility or that of the 
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responsibility of others (Schorr, et al., 2018). Such a framework suggests a qualitative difference 
between events where one violates their own beliefs versus having someone else do so for them, 
either willingly or unwillingly. These findings may help researchers understand how justified 
acts of killing still cause moral injury (Farnsworth, et al., 2014), and how soldiers need not feel 
they’ve failed their own moral codes in order to experience moral distress (Schorr, et al., 2018). 
The influences of varied institutions, the specificities inherent within different forms of service, 
and other related factors may all contribute to the actions of individuals and units leading to 
moral injury. A closer look at the structure and nature of the military institution is warranted in 
light of a lack of substantive research on the ways in which such military factors may play a role 
in the creation and sustainment of moral injury.  
Gaps in the Current Perspective 
 One gap in the current literature appears to be a lack of consideration in regards to the 
military subculture’s unique impact on the individual combat soldier, and how that influence is 
then expressed in their experiences and perceptions of moral injury. The United States military is 
unlike any other institution in the nation; it places extensive demands on members in terms of 
risking their lives, irregular working hours, unpredictable work tasks, longer absences from 
home, and continuous moves, among other frequently cited challenges (Alvinius, 2013). Such 
institutions “seek exclusive and undivided loyalty, and they attempt to reduce the claims of 
competing roles and status positions on those they wish to encompass within their boundaries” 
(Alvinius, Johansson, and Larsson, 2016, p. 313). Those who have served know there are no 
half-measures in the military, and that military identity remains a component of life well after 
service is complete. Alvinius, Johansson, and Larsson (2016) went so far as to deem the military 
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an ideal greedy institution in that it demands unconditional sacrifice, compliance, and 
cooperation from its members.  
While this term denotes a negative connotation, in fairness the military has a unique 
mission that requires organizationally specific training, maintains higher-than-average costs 
connected to turnover, suffers unique consequences associated with poor selection, classification, 
and training, and has to continually change operational focus, which often results in negative 
outcomes for its personnel (Dupre & Day, 2007; Tucker, Sinclair, & Thomas, 2005). This has a 
direct influence on military job satisfaction, deemed the most frequently studied attitude in 
organizational behavior research (Alvinius, et al., 2016).  
What follows is an interwoven consideration of the ways in which military culture and 
identity intersect with underappreciated factors related to moral injury; specifically, the concept 
of hegemonic masculinity and the import of an individual’s military occupational specialty 
(MOS) on their perception of self and other. Beyond the importance of doing the individual 
veteran experience justice via the narrative process, this study’s intent is to examine moral injury 
as a holistic phenomenon. As such, it will take a closer look than all previous studies at such 
subsidiary factors that have gone unreported or unexamined by previous research.  
Military Culture 
As noted, many researchers studying combat-related moral injury have failed to account 
for the power and dynamism of the military institution in terms of the norms, belief systems, and 
everyday attitudes of its members. Strategic-level leaders are tasked with recreating a “sense of 
oneness” between themselves and the organization that reduces their ability or desire to view 
themselves outside the confines of the institutional hierarchy (Alvinius, et al., 2016). Service 
members at all ranks find themselves similarly affected by their military experience, so much so 
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that they are often unable to view themselves as “normal” people afterward, but always as ex-
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen (Green, et al., 2010). Atuel and Castro (2018) used Sue’s 
(2001) multidimensional model of cultural competence (MDCC) to explain military culture via: 
(a) command structure; (b) military norms; and (c) military identity. A closer look at each of 
these is needed in relation to the military institution’s impact on the trajectory of moral harm 
amongst its members.  
Command structure. The military chain of command is both a hierarchy of power and a 
social network that determines authority, responsibility, decision-making, and communication 
flow (Atuel & Castro, 2018). Every service member is situated within this structure, and their 
identity as an individual will commonly be linked to job description, rank, unit, and branch of 
service. Due to the intense organizational demands placed on the military by the American 
government, military leaders at all levels are equally exacting in their expectations for adherence 
to this command structure; when the chain of command is usurped, or breached, then discipline 
fails and the consequences in real-world operations may be severe. Research indicates that 
soldiers in combat respond to orders that will risk their lives through a combination of factors, 
including a desire not to let fellow unit members down, and an adherence to orders that is 
expounded ad nauseam through the process of basic training (Grossman, 2009). This type of 
unquestioning adherence to rules (and the unquestionable power of leaders) plays a significant 
role in the occurrence of morally injurious experiences (MIE’s) by virtue of the simple fact that 
soldiers will follow orders in the military that they would not consider rational, prudent, or even 
morally just in the civilian sector. This may lead to moral injury after service time when 
individuals are able to give their experiences and actions more due consideration, thus feeling 
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intense guilt, shame, or other forms of self-condemnation for actions taken under duress of 
military obligation.  
Military norms. Military norms encompass the spectrum of values, traditions, beliefs, 
behaviors, and events connected to military life, including the language used to communicate 
within and without the chain of command (Atuel & Castro, 2018). In order for new members to 
learn these particular facets of military life, they undergo an indoctrination process through their 
training that engages them in a set pattern of regimented behaviors, where their perspective is 
shifted from the self to the collective; the identity of the individual is subsumed by the greater 
mission and purpose of the group. Simultaneously, they are taught to prioritize values such as 
integrity, commitment, honor, loyalty, respect, and devotion to duty, which have applicability to 
group cohesion (Atuel & Castro, 2018), an assumed factor in the success of all military missions 
(Atuel & Castro, 2018; King, 2006). As these norms are followed, members develop a sense of 
“we-ness” that begins in the immediate unit and eventually includes the entire military structure 
(Atuel & Castro, 2018; Siebold, 2007). Interconnected with the aforementioned elements of 
command structure, military norms are another form of societal reinforcement by which service 
members may feel trapped by circumstance into performing (or allowing others to perform) 
actions that have conflicting moral consequences or considerations.  
Military identity. Atuel and Castro (2018) argue that military command structure and 
military norms work in conjunction to form the military sense of identity, grounded in the 
traditional warrior ethos, but defined in its postmodern manifestation by an around-the-clock 
state of physical and psychological combat readiness (Castro & Adler, 1999). Despite the fact 
that individuals possess multiple identities (e.g., male, Latino, etc.), the military identity often 
becomes the distinct feature by which members see themselves, both during and after military 
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service (Castro, et al., 2015). This combination of identity influence and 24/7 preparedness, 
where service members are beholden to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) even 
when off duty or on vacation, lends itself to a powerful and complex form of self-perception. 
When the command structure, norms, and identity components of military culture are considered 
in the aggregate, one is struck by the pervasive power of this distinct subculture in its ability to 
transform the hearts and minds of its members toward a collectivist mentality (and communal 
sharing [CS] modality) that puts the good of the whole above the good of the individual. Such a 
conversion has obvious implications for the development of moral injury amongst its members, 
who—after all—will eventually leave the military and return to the individualistic purview of the 
dominant culture in the United States. And, comparable to the intricate complexities of a national 
government, the military contains innumerable checks and balances to maintain this mindsight 
amongst its members. Amongst the most powerful of these tools is the continued adherence of 
the American military subculture to the ideals of hegemonic masculinity. 
The Military and Hegemonic Masculinity 
Forms of masculinity are as varied as the types of men in the world; as a social construct, 
both men and women (and non-gendered individuals) deploy masculinity in a range of settings 
(Gillon, 2008). Traditional gender role theory highlights the processes of male socialization 
within a given sociocultural context that lead to gendered beliefs and practices, as well as 
subsequent normative constructs demanding adherence (Gillon, 2007; Levant, 1996). The 
normative male gender role is both associated with traditionally masculine values such as 
objectivity, rationality, and control (Edley & Wetherell, 1995) as well as with numerous negative 
consequences for the mental and physical wellbeing of men (Gillon, 2008). This is unsurprising; 
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given that an overreliance on rational, objective thought may limit an individual’s ability to 
perceive and process emotionality.  
One area of concern regarding gender role theory is the extent to which it fails to address 
within-subject differences in the masculinity inhabited by the same men at different times, that 
is: (a) identity is variable and contextual (Gergen 1999); and (b) men can engage in different 
behaviors associated with different ideologies depending on context (Gillon, 2008). This failure 
has major ramifications in the field of moral injury, where a soldier’s sense of masculinity may 
very well inform their actions, as well as their responses to emotional prompts following a 
morally injurious experience. The social constructionist perspective on masculinity proposes that 
men are able to construct their masculinity moment-by-moment, and in relation to one another 
and to the world (Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Gillon, 2008). This is accomplished through the 
process of discourse, in which individuals negotiate and renegotiate their identity according to a 
given cultural domain. As it relates to military service and moral injury, however, one form of 
socially constructed masculinity is of the utmost concern.  
Connell (1995) coined the term hegemonic masculinity to describe “the continued 
dominance within many Western cultural settings of a traditional mode of masculinity over 
others (which are subordinated) on the basis of its patriarchal function” (Gillon, 2008, p. 124). In 
its dominance, this form of masculinity forces all other forms and varieties of masculinity to be 
defined in relation to the hegemonic ideal. According to Connell (1995), the 4 components of 
hegemonic masculinity are: (a) power; (b) an ambivalence to femininity; (c) domination and 
objectification; and (d) avoidance of emotion. Power is concerned with the idealization of 
strength and invulnerability; a “tough guy” approach that often manifests through oppressive and 
violent methods (Gillon, 2008). Ambivalence to femininity may be seen as “an ongoing reaction 
 36 
to, and rejection of, the qualities and attributes associated with female and feminine ways of 
being (e.g. nurturing, caring, communalism)” (Gillon, 2008, p. 125). Domination and 
objectification gives primacy to logic and rationality, and places value on material gains as a 
means of control over others (Gillon, 2008). Avoidance of emotion, as the name implies, 
concerns the suppression of emotionality in favor of rationalism, including bodily experiences 
that must be controlled or avoided: “emotions serve little purpose in the acquisition of power and 
the manifestation of strength, and are to be denigrated or denied wherever possible” (Gillon, 
2008, p. 125).  
 As it relates to military service, Green et al. (2010) found that hegemonic masculinity 
was embedded in the construction of soldier identity, resulting in stunted emotional language to 
express distress, and a propensity to delay or refuse mental health treatment. This finding raises 
immediate and obvious concerns as to the impact of the hegemonic ideal in the military on those 
members who experience MIE’s and MI’s (or who later develop MI’s as a result of MIE’s). A 
pervasive ambivalence to all things feminine, to include the expression of emotions beyond 
anger/rage (which can suggest power, another hegemonic ideal), here has been demonstrated to 
directly impact the ability of service members to seek mental health treatment, or—failing that—
to even be able to articulate with emotional language what they are experiencing as a result of 
such injuries.  
Furthermore, while military masculinity does promote an equally important caring ethos, 
based on the strong interdependent bonds of camaraderie, it is only available to soldiers accepted 
and included by their peers (Green, et al., 2010). In other words, recruits or soldiers who exhibit 
behaviors that will be a liability on the battlefield, and as such represent a risk to the entire team, 
are not eligible for this special form of masculine care. As Green, et al. (2010) explain: “this 
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seeming paradox between hyper masculinity and caring masculinities appears to be embedded 
within military culture” (p. 1483). Again, the consequences in relation to moral injury are 
potentially catastrophic—those service members at greatest risk for MIE’s and MI’s at the hands 
of their own comrades (as outcasts or misfits) are also the least likely to receive care, concern, 
and support from the same larger group. The corrosive effects of the hegemonic ideal within the 
military—notwithstanding many of its positive attributes for the same—suggest that military 
members are at a unique disadvantage for coping with morally injurious experiences (MIE), 
moral pain (MP), and, ultimately, moral injuries (MI). One more facet of the unique military 
experience must now be included to the larger discussion; that of military occupational specialty, 
or “MOS”.  
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), Combat Arms, and Moral Injury 
Following World War I, during which the misuse of personnel was widespread, the 
United States military began a concerted effort to better categorize and define job positions 
(Mitchell & Driskill, 1996). By the end of World War II, the American military was at the 
forefront of occupational analysis, job classification, and testing methodologies related to task 
performance (Mitchell & Driskill, 1996). The end result of decades of work during the 20th 
century in the field of occupational analysis was the task-based approach taken via the creation 
of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB measures an 
individual’s ability to learn in relation to task-oriented measures (Mitchell & Driskill, 1996), and 
remains the gateway test to the wide array of jobs available in each branch of the Armed Forces. 
Given appropriate openings as older members of the military discharge from the service, a high 
score allows an individual to pick from hundreds of military occupational specialties (MOS), 
while a low score greatly reduces a recruit’s choices in the same regard.  
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 Given the diversity of jobs in the technologized military of the 21st century, there is 
surprisingly little consideration among researchers given to those individuals (formerly all men, 
now predominantly men) that join the military with the express purpose of taking on a combat-
arms designated MOS. These are specialties (e.g., tank, infantry, and artillery jobs in the Army 
and Marines) that simultaneously manage to combine a greatly enhanced risk of danger with a 
more physically demanding training process and a reduced ability to translate skillsets back to 
the civilian workforce. In other words, an argument can be made that combat soldiers voluntarily 
give more and risk more, while getting less back in return.  
 Research supports this assertion. An enlistment military occupational specialty (MOS) 
with a combat arms designation resulted in an almost 3-fold increased odds of TBI disability 
compared with other MOS categories after wartime service (Gubata, Piccirillo, Packnett, & 
Cowan, 2013), and a combat MOS was one of several risk factors associated with increased odds 
of accidental death among enlisted personnel during military service (Lewandowski-Romps, 
2014). As self-evident by their job descriptions, combat soldiers are more at-risk for combat-
related stressors, which results in greater expressions of moral injury (Currier, et al., 2018). Yet, 
moral injury literature is silent on such job distinctions despite the many ways that a combat 
MOS sets the individual soldier on a trajectory toward increased risk of PTSD and moral injury, 
as well as a reduced ability to use their skillset once back in the civilian workforce.  An enlisted 
intelligence analyst with a Top-Secret security clearance can walk into 6-figure employment; a 
rifleman who usually risked more, gave more, and lost more, has no such recourse.  
 Lastly, the culture of the combat arms is an important consideration when addressing 
moral injury among combat veterans. Infantrymen, in particular, pride themselves on being the 
“tip of the spear”, the first in and the last out during wartime conflicts. They include less than 1% 
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of the military’s fighting force, which in turn represents only 3% of the entire U.S. population 
(Atuel & Castro, 2018). This means that roughly 3 Americans out of every 10,000 people serve 
in the U.S. military as infantry soldiers, which does not even consider the number of infantrymen 
who actually fight in combat during wartime service. Justifiably, such soldiers and Marines take 
great pride in their job descriptor, and this esprit-de-corps is reflected in the increased level of 
physicality, discipline, and efficiency traditionally displayed by light infantry units (Grossman, 
2009). In relation to hegemonic masculinity, however, it is also important to note that the same 
culture can be detrimental to the mental health and wellbeing of its members (Greene, et al., 
2010). Whatever hold the hegemonic ideal has on the rest of the military, in the combat arms 
world it can be more accurately termed a stranglehold; there is little to no room to exhibit 
weakness, emotion, or other components of humanity considered superfluous to combat 
readiness. Take this in conjunction with the aforementioned power and pervasiveness of military 
culture, as well as the insidious nature of hegemonic masculinity within the military, and the 
resulting picture is stark. 
Chapter Summary 
The combat veterans of the U.S. military, with a designated combat MOS, have 
undergone the most intensive training available in the western world, which simultaneously: (a) 
eliminated emotional language from their vocabulary, and (b) trained them to perform acts of 
violence against other human beings with deadly accuracy and a minimal amount of internal 
dissonance. Add to this the up-tempo nature of the past 2 decades of fighting, the all-
encompassing power of the military culture, and a relatively insular, continuously deployed 
fighting force, and the result is truly alarming. The result has been an unprecedented level of 
exposure to MIE’s and MI’s among this distinct population, whose members are also distinct in 
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their inability to express themselves with the emotive energy needed to heal and make sense of 
such invisible wounds.  
The purpose of this study is to look closely at this intersectionality of factors that 
contribute so significantly to exposure to moral harm and the development of moral injury over 
time. To do the complexity of the issues justice, the narrative inquiry method was chosen to 
illustrate the depth and breadth of combat veteran experience over the lifespan. The next chapter 
will illustrate the power of this method, and the reasons for choosing an intergenerational group 
of participants. After all, much of what we can learn in the present has to do with the mistakes of 
the past. To the best of this author’s knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to consider the 
multifaceted extent of the military culture’s influence on its members in terms of their 
perceptions, experiences, and reactions to moral harm while in uniform. 
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CHAPTER III: METHOD 
Narrative Inquiry 
“She was just slightly disappointed when he admitted that he came to the nursery window 
not to see her but to listen to stories. 
‘You see, I don’t know any stories. None of the lost boys knows any stories.’ 
‘How perfectly awful,’ Wendy said” (Barrie, 1929) 
Humans think in metaphor and learn through stories (Bateson, 1994). In this sense, 
narrative inquiry is the form of research that attempts to most closely approximate the human 
condition. Each one of us struggles to make sense of our experiences, our purpose, and our 
impact on others. John Dewey (1938) believed that experience held both a personal and a social 
component, and pointed out that all experiences are the manifestation or result of innumerable 
prior experiences. Likewise, each future moment will be based in part on the experiences of both 
the present and the past. To make sense of this and other sundry human complexities, we have 
created stories full of analogies, metaphors, and other forms of powerful imagery to give voice to 
our lives, share them with others, teach and inspire future generations, and touch the 
transcendent.  
 Not all stories, however, lead to positive outcomes. Many stories we tell mislead 
ourselves and others, remain ambiguous and confusing, or contain multiple meanings that keep 
the truth muddled and hidden (Bateson, 1994). There are many such stories in society writ large. 
An example of the last would be the manner in which the entertainment industry weaves the 
fabricated narrative that a human being must look a certain way in order to be found attractive. A 
more positive example of a collective story would be the “golden rule”, which for millennia has 
dictated that we should treat others as we wish to be treated in turn. This simple rule, and the 
 42 
numerous stories expressing its message, have been created, refined, deconstructed, and 
recreated by countless societies; it remains a central tenet of civilized life today despite its 
ancient roots.  
 Proponents of literary theory claim there is no true difference between fact and fiction 
(Czarniawska, 1997); narrative itself is life and learning, regardless of its factual accuracy 
(Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). While a positivist perspective states there are objective truths in 
the world that can be known through the scientific method, and a social constructionist one 
claims relativism and the contextual nature of all phenomena, the narrative researcher is focused 
solely on the narrative itself, which is both phenomenon and method of the social sciences. As 
Clandinin and Connelly (2000) put it: “if we understand the world narratively, as we do, then it 
makes sense to study the world narratively” (p. 17).  
This does not mean narrative inquirers do not pay attention to their own experiences as 
researchers, but rather that they are able to weave such experiences, as well as innumerable other 
facets of their lives, into the very fabric of that narrative. No researcher remains untouched by 
her research, and no research remains uninfluenced by the particularities of the researcher. 
“Narrative can be used to highlight temporal fluidity and show change within time and can 
become a self-conscious text that continually flags whose perception is dominant, which 
environments made particular plots possible and whose interpretations are being offered” (Conle, 
p. 57, 2013). Narrative inquiry is a means to learn, to grow, to help, to teach, to reflect, to 
reconsider, to be challenged, to contribute, and to shift positions, all through the method of story, 
the oldest and most profound manner of human expression.  
While some researchers see narrative inquiry as an “easy” kind of research, it is a form of 
inquiry that requires particular kinds of wakefulness distinct from other forms of qualitative 
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research, and is much more than the simple telling of stories (Clandinin, Pushor, & Orr, 2007). 
Connelly and Clandinin describe story as a type of “portal through which a person enters the 
world and by which their experience of the world is interpreted and made personally 
meaningful” (p. 477). As such, narrative inquiry may be seen as the study of experience as story, 
while simultaneously remaining a methodology that seeks to “adopt a particular narrative view 
of experience as phenomena under study” (Connelly & Clandinin, p. 477, 2006). While narrative 
inquiry shares features with other forms of qualitative research, there are three distinct attributes 
(a.k.a., commonplaces) needed for genuine narrative research, the combination of which allows 
for the manifestation of a distinct contribution to the greater research community.  
The Three Commonplaces 
 Clandinin, et al. (2007) used the term “commonplace” to denote checkpoints or places to 
direct one’s attention while doing narrative inquiry. According to their analysis of prior narrative 
research, the three commonplaces that must be present to specify the dimensions of an inquiry 
space are: temporality, sociality, and place. Temporality reminds the inquirer (and the reader) 
that all events, people, and places are in constant flux, continuous motion. As sages took note 
through the ages, one of the few certainties in life is that it never stands still. Narrative inquiry 
must always strive to understand everything—including the research itself—as a transition point, 
always moving toward a different manifestation. Sociality refers to both the personal and social 
conditions of the participants, the subject matter, the location, and even the researchers. Personal 
conditions include “feelings, hopes, desires, aesthetic reactions, and moral dispositions (Connelly 
& Clandinin, 2006, p. 480), while the social includes the existential, the environment, and other 
contextual factors that influence the personal from a broader socio-cultural perspective. 
Importantly, Clandinin et al. (2007) remind us that inquirers are always in relationship with 
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participants’ lives, and cannot exclude themselves when considering the commonplace of 
sociality. Lastly, place refers to the physical and topological boundaries—either isolated or in 
sequence—through which the inquiry and its events unfold.  
 In specific regard to this study, temporality may equally indicate the time of an interview, 
the time of my written reflections following the interview, the time of my changed position 
months after the interview when scanning through fields texts, the time when events described 
during the interview took place, or an unknown time in the future when I am looking forward to 
a specific milestone in the research. Likewise, sociality may suggest my personal feelings about 
the subject matter, a participant’s feelings or thoughts about me, the changing feelings and 
thoughts we both have about each other over the course of the inquiry, or even the shifting 
political climate of the country as the inquiry unfolds. Place might refer to the specific place 
where a combat-related moral injury occurred, or to the imagery following the event, or to the 
broader region of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or elsewhere. It may mean a participant’s 
home, living room, or favorite easy chair. It may mean the swing set where a former combat 
soldier pushes his daughter while attempting to forget the war. It could mean the small foldout 
table with the rickety legs and the plastic, blue-and-white checkered cover where I currently 
write these words. It may—and will—mean all of these things and more as the inquiry unfolds. 
Taken collectively, the commonplaces allow for a three-dimensional understanding of time, 
place, and person that are richly detailed, nuanced, and complex; these are the hallmarks of the 
narrative process.  
The Eight Elements  
 Beyond the three commonplaces, Clandinin, Pushor, and Orr (2007) argued for a list of 
elements to consider when designing and implementing narrative inquiry that serve as a set of 
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questions for every phase of the inquiry’s development. In the aggregate, these elements guide 
the study according to clearly articulated principles, lending credence to the narrative 
methodology, and thereby to the significance of the study’s results. Each of the eight elements is 
outlined below.  
 Justification. According to Clandinin, et al. (2007), a narrative inquiry must be justified 
at three levels: the personal, practical, and social. Personal justification involves situating oneself 
(as researcher) within the context of the study. For my own part, it is self-evident that I’m a 
member of the particular group I’m studying, and that exploring the stories and life events of 
others will also be an avenue to explore my own life history. The practical justification of the 
study entails how it will provide insight into particularities of the human condition and how it 
will change the reader’s thinking about the issue at hand. In this case, the hope is that the depth 
and nuance of narrative inquiry will offer a unique glimpse at living through moral injury from a 
variety of perspectives, experiences, age ranges, and developmental levels amongst combat 
veterans. Lastly, social justification is concerned with the broader significance of the study to the 
public and the ways in which it may touch or alter the culture surrounding combat veterans. 
While it seems hubristic to state that my own study can impact anything beyond the immediate 
participants’ lives (and my own), there is also the hope that it may contribute in some fashion to 
the growing literature on moral injury from its unique vantage point, offering further thick and 
rich descriptions to the lived experiences of war.  
 Naming the Phenomenon. The second element outlined by Clandinin, et al. (2007) is the 
axiomatic need to name the phenomenon being studied. More than this, however, is the rejoinder 
from the authors that “a narrative inquirer always adopts a narrative view of the phenomenon” 
(Clandinin, et al., 2007, p. 25). This suggests that such naming must always take place while 
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accounting for person, place, and time—and that the narrator is also in a certain place, at a 
specific time, with a particular background and temperament, when the naming of the 
phenomenon takes place. The importance here is that the naming of things may change over time 
as the author considers and reconsiders the many meanings of field texts accumulated through 
research. The entire process of narrative inquiry is one of fluidity taking precedence over the 
concrete, and of context trumping the quest for certainty.  
 Choosing and Describing Method. Closely related to the naming of the phenomenon is 
the choice of narrative methodology invoked and implemented. Clandinin, et al., (2007) saw this 
as a process in their own work that “unfolded through imagining, and reimagining, a reflexive 
and reflective back and forthing as lives changed and the context changed” (p. 27). The inquiry 
itself is a puzzle to solve in an ever-shifting space, and the methods picked must match the intent 
of the inquirer. The first task of the researcher, then, is to begin thinking narratively; they must 
see that the topic, participants, and place exist in a multidimensional, ever changing life space 
(Clandinin, et al., 2007). The second task is to decide the types of field texts to be compiled and 
composed, always with consideration given to the commonplaces of temporality, sociality, and 
place. This process is aided by the use of imaginative thinking, in which metaphor, analogy, 
mythology, and other forms of creative thought can be used to reach solutions.  
 Analysis and Interpretation Processes. The fourth design element discussed by 
Clandinin, et al. (2007) encourages the use of the commonplaces to scaffold the study from field 
texts to research texts and to find the appropriate balance between the three that will best serve 
the study and its participants. It is important for the researcher to recognize that the transition 
between field and research text is most often not smooth or linear, and that by moving to-and-fro 
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in time, or between people and places, the researcher finds the appropriate forms to translate 
their field work into more tightly organized and ordered data.  
 Positioning Research. It is incumbent upon researchers to “position their studies in 
relation to other research on a particular phenomenon, to related programs of research, and to 
research undertaken using different epistemological and ontological assumptions” (Clandinin, et 
al., 2007, p. 29). The three components of positioning research mentioned may be viewed in 
sequence from most specific to most broad. Positioning my study in relation to other narrative 
accounts of moral injury is simple—none have yet been done. Positioning my study within a 
program of research is more challenging. Conceptually, I will adhere to the Deweyan view of 
experience, which “acknowledges the embodiment of the person in the world and that focuses on 
not only the individual’s experience but also on the social, cultural, and institutional narratives in 
which the individual’s experiences are constituted, shaped, expressed, and enacted” (Clandinin, 
et al., 2007, p. 29). In addition, the gathered data will be viewed and analyzed by an expert in the 
field of combat-related moral injury, for his feedback and commentary. This will be an important 
comparison point between my own work and that of someone who has extensive experience in 
the field.  
Lastly, the literature review is generally viewed as the means to position a narrative 
inquiry against research of a phenomenon using other epistemological and ontological 
assumptions (Connelly & Clandinin, 2006). While I have done my best in the preliminary steps 
of this study to examine all of the meaningful research done to date on moral injury and the 
experiences of combat veterans, it should also be noted that the essence of narrative inquiry 
resides in the rejection of clearly defined boundaries and foundational assumptions (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 2000). A narrative inquiry’s epistemological and ontological base is best described by 
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its very name: it is dedicated to a thorough, unadulterated exploration of story, without boxing 
the narrative into the confines of a prescribed theory or construct.  
 Uniqueness. The sixth element outlined by Clandinin et al. (2007) is the researcher’s 
responsibility to “offer some sense of what it is that can be known about a phenomenon that 
could not be known, at least in the same way, by other theories, methods, or lines of work” (p. 
30). As noted, the current study will be the first of its kind—a longitudinal study of the combat 
veteran experience of moral injury through time, place, and sociality. Due to the newness of the 
moral injury construct, there is limited knowledge related to how it manifests over time, what 
differences are experienced between generations of combat vets, and how the changing nature of 
military training and American society have in turn impacted combat veterans’ perceptions of 
themselves and their experiences of moral harm. This study is the first of its kind to address these 
dimensions of the moral injury (MI) in relation to wartime service. 
 Ethical Considerations. As Connelly and Clandinin (2006) note: “ethical considerations 
permeate narrative inquiries from start to finish: at the outset of the study; as inquirer-participant 
relationships unfold, and as participants are represented in research texts” (p. 483). Due to the 
intense and in-depth nature of narrative work, researchers cultivate relationships with the 
participants that must be continuously navigated and monitored. Furthermore, the research that 
we do must be presented and “re-presented” to the participants as we move through the weeks, 
months, and even years of field text accumulation. The good and bad of such presenting must 
also be included in the narrative; a participant’s poor reaction to a transcribed conversation, 
remembered differently, might provide context and depth to the study that would otherwise be 
omitted. In sum, the healer’s motto of “Do No Harm” is applicable to all narrative studies at all 
times, and ethical actions related to the study itself may prove a valuable addition to the inquiry 
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as the study unfolds. Special consideration must also be given to the delicate nature of moral 
injury and traumatic experience…not all participants may be willing to fully disclose their 
experiences, and as the researcher I must remember my obligation to protect the participants if 
and when the dialogue becomes emotionally charged. 
 Representation. The final element consists of six separate considerations regarding 
representation, which “require evidence, interpretive plausibility, and disciplined thought” 
(Connelly & Clandinin, 2006, p. 485). The first of these is to think narratively, meaning that 
temporality, sociality, and place must always be considered when constructing story. The second 
is to consider the range of textual forms available; narrative may take on a variety of shapes, 
sizes, or symbols, and the broader the measure given to this reality at the outset, the stronger the 
final product. The third consideration: writing research texts is in and of itself an act of 
narrative; the experience of authoring a narrative does, in fact, become part of the story. The 
fourth is to remember there are several layers of audience to consider in the creation of a 
narrative: the self, the participants, and the wider public. To omit any of these, or to unbalance 
the story in favor of one or the other will lead to a flat, incoherent storyline or even to unethical 
practice when it comes to the absence of the participants’ own voices. Fifth is the reminder to 
write with the awareness that there are definitive criteria by which the work will be judged by 
other researchers: authenticity, adequacy, and plausibility. Last, narrative inquiries must be 
constructed with social significance in mind; how will this study impact the field and contribute 
to the greater body of literature? These six subcomponents of representation must be considered 





• How do experiences of moral injury differ according to the particularities of the war 
being fought? How do they differ across generations, and as the veterans themselves age? 
• In what ways does a combat MOS impact the perceived experience of moral injury 
among combat soldiers and Marines?  Does a combat MOS make such experiences easier 
or harder to handle in the moment? Are MIE’s more or less likely to develop into MI’s 
among those combat veterans with a combat MOS? Does a combat MOS make coping 
with the aftermath of moral injury easier or harder to handle down the line as civilians? Is 
a combat MOS a continuing source of pride for veterans who experienced moral injury? 
Does a combat MOS in any way bolster or limit their ability and/or desire to seek out 
support?  
• What are the longitudinal effects of combat MOS training on an individual across the 
lifespan, and how do the tenets of the warrior ethos permeate the lives and day-to-day 
experiences of such veterans? How do older generations perceive their younger warrior 
counterparts, and vice versa? What are the generational differences between combat 
MOS war veterans and their experiences of moral injury? 
Study Design 
 The study design follows the tenets of narrative inquiry as described in the previous 
methodology section, particularly in relation to the use of the three commonplaces and eight 
elements identified by Connelly and Clandinin (2000). Creation and documentation of field texts 
began immediately upon IRB approval, while continuous editing and reshaping of the narrative 
with the intent to best tell the larger story of the participants has continued up to submission for 
final review and defense.  
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Study Context and Intervention 
The study is grounded in the social constructionist paradigm, which asserts that meaning 
and value are created in relationship and are situated according to context and culture (Gergen, 
1999). The form of narrative inquiry used is based on the work of Dewey, for whom “education, 
experience, and life are inextricably intertwined” (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. xxiii), and 
who believed experience was both personal and social (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).  
Participants 
 Participants were selected via snowball sampling, from a number of my personal 
connections with military veterans and professional connections in counselor education. I had a 
passing acquaintance with one participant, who I met briefly on two occasions but did not know 
in any real capacity prior to the start of the study. All others were strangers to me, introduced by 
intermediaries who knew of my research interest and history in the military.   
Data Sources 
 Data sources included my own thoughts, behaviors, and experiences—as related to the 
project—as well as those of the participants I was lucky enough to share time with and get to 
know. Historical documents, geographical locations, personal artifacts, photos or videos, and any 
number of other miscellaneous items were included as data with the permission of the 
participants and their families. 
Data Collection 
 Data collection began immediately via the creation of a field journal upon approval by 
the university’s Internal Review Board (IRB) in the summer of 2019. This journal documented 
my own timeline through the process and allowed for me to create, review, and reevaluate the 
project as it moved forward and my perspective deepened and shifted. Further field texts were 
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created via interviews and personal experiences with participants and through my own 
investigations into related matters such as my interviews with two subject matter experts on 
moral injury.  
Data Analysis  
 Data was compiled into organized computer files backed up and password-protected on 2 
separate storage devices. All field texts were transformed into research texts for the purposes of 
write-up, review, and reflection. Transcripts of interviews, as well as my personal reflections of 
the interviews, were shared as requested with participants for further reflection and review. 
Secondary and tertiary meetings were also documented via field text and transcribed into further 
research text material. The most important component of the research process was that 
participants felt a sense of ownership within the study as related to their own contributions, and 
that their voices remained at the forefront of the narrative throughout the temporal, spatial, and 
social progression of the project.  
Ethical Considerations 
 All participants consented to the study, and retain the right to revoke any material as it 
pertains to their own experiences at any time, up to publication of the manuscript. The 
participants remained anonymous throughout the study, and were only identified if they 
explicitly made such a request. As noted, I made strenuous efforts to accurately portray the 
participants’ unique experiences of moral injury and of life in a post-combat world, to include 
continuous and consistent member checking, and the purposeful cultivation of genuine 
connection, care, and concern over the course of the year.   
Assumptions, Delimitations, and Limitations 
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 By virtue of its methodology, this study rejects the assumption of objective truth as 
delineated by positivist theories. It is concerned with the particular experiences of a subset of 
individuals, where truth and purpose, good and evil, right and wrong, are all uniquely related to 
the one person whose experiences are being expressed and explored in the moment. 
Generalizability of this study to the larger population is thereby limited, although it is my hope 
that some of the data that comes forth from this study will be noticed among others who are 
researching the phenomenon of moral injury, and perhaps motivate them to perform further 
studies that take into account the multiplicity of factors inherent within such a complex 
experience of the human condition. 
Timeline 
 The proposal for this research was defended at the beginning of the summer, 2019, with 
IRB approval arriving midsummer. Solicitation of participants began via snowball sampling in 
August, 2019, and continued into September and October, 2019. As noted previously, all of the 
eventual participants in the study were found via snowball sampling from faculty and military 
connections. Collection of field texts continued into the mid-fall of 2019, with all interviews and 
journal entries being completed around Thanksgiving, 2019. From that point forward, all field 
texts were transcribed to research texts, with additional member-checking. The target date for a 
full draft of the dissertation to be submitted to the committee for preliminary review and revision 
is March 6th, 2020.   
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter has outlined the utility, uniqueness, and beauty of the narrative method as a 
form of genuinely valuable research. Narrative inquiry is neither simple storytelling nor 
extremely precise, quantified data analysis. Yet, it contains elements from both ends of the 
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experiential spectrum, and much more in between. The storytelling elements inherent to a strong 
narrative inquiry allow for a depth of exploratory conversation between narrator, participants, 
and audience that is unmatched among other methodologies. Likewise, the quantifiable 
guidelines through which the narrator is expected to conduct the study, interact with participants, 
record and recount conversations, and ultimately make meaning of the project, lend themselves 
to a coherent, clear analysis of the inquiry’s subject matter. In common parlance, the narrative 
method offers up the best of both worlds.  
 Equally important is the oft overlooked significance of matching one’s individualized 
proclivities and predispositions to a methodology capable of maximizing the author’s enthusiasm 
and passion for a project. After all, common lore in academia suggests that the dreaded “All-But-
Dissertation” phase of doctoral work (a.k.a., “ABD”) is where most students flounder and, 
ultimately, fail. The best piece of advice I received during my first semester of doctoral work—
by two separate members of my eventual dissertation committee, no less—was to follow my 
passion when considering a potential line of research. What took me longer to realize was that 
such passion should not be reserved only for the subject matter, but also for a chosen 
methodology, when possible. This makes sense given that many early-career researchers invest 
an equal amount of time in becoming experts at one or two methodologies as they do in 
understanding their research topics. Much as in writing literature, knowing and appreciating the 
forms through which people do their best work matters in equal part to the subject material that 
elicits the selfsame level of craftsmanship. 
 For my own part, it was a gift of previously unimaginable scholarly proportions to 
discover the existence of narrative inquiry research. A lover of literature, an individual with an 
insatiable desire to read (and unfortunately, purchase) a diverse array of titles, and a man who 
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enjoys both the art and science of literary composition, this discovery was a rare moment of 
propitious happenstance in my life as a student and nascent researcher. Furthermore, as the 
common saying urges us to go where our great passion meets the world’s great need, the 
confluence of my passions for storytelling and military identity have met—here in this study—
on the larger crisis of moral injury amongst our warrior caste. The next chapter will tell the 
individual stories of such injury among a group of participants willing to share their time, 
energy, resources, and memories with me on occasion after occasion. It was a privilege I will not 
soon forget, and my hope is that the stories will linger in the minds of the readers for the duration 
of subsequent discussion and analysis, and perhaps beyond into a future where veterans are 
neither vilified nor deified, but rather seen as the complex, fully human people they are, with a 




CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS 
Introduction to Findings 
 This chapter is concerned with telling the stories of the men who participated in this 
study, with as much detail and nuance as possible. Each veteran is given an introduction, which 
specifies how I came into contact with them, my first impressions, and other details that might 
aid the audience in understanding these individualized histories and worldviews. Subsequently, 
the storyline of every participant is broken into three categories: (a) training; (b) deployment; and 
(c) life after combat. This format was amenable to my aim of providing an accurate, longitudinal 
depiction of the particularities of each story given a worthy frame of reference to time, place, and 
person. The stories end with an epilogue on the journey of the veteran, which continues in the 
present. At times, I included anecdotes from my own history in the narrative, but only where I 
believed it would serve the purpose of accentuating participant voice and story. Likewise, at 
times passages of poetry or other literature were included to speak to components of experience 
better than I could with my own words. The end of the chapter summarizes the content and 
prepares the reader for commonalities and disparities among stories, which will be discussed in 
Chapter V. I hope that you are moved by these stories as much as I was listening to them. 
Aaron’s Story: A Complicated Legacy 
Introduction 
 Given the metaphorical use of Cain and Able’s saga to open this endeavor, it is fitting 
that the first participant introduced in the narrative itself is named Aaron, another biblical 
reference. Similarities between the two of us are extensive. We are of an age, both coming into 
manhood at the precipitous moment of 9/11, with vivid memories of that day, its portent for the 
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world, and a prescience concerning our own future roles in the wars to come. We both have roots 
in Pennsylvania—he in western PA, and I in the eastern part of the State where my Quaker 
family originated. We both originally joined Army National Guard units as field artillerymen, 
although I transitioned out of that position into the active army as an infantryman and infantry 
officer later on. Aaron was given notice of deployment on his birthday, and I flew into Iraq under 
combat conditions on mine. Both of us spent time at in-patient facilities when suicidal. We both 
held sacred the notion of a career in the military, and both of us left the service disillusioned by 
our experiences. Likewise, both of us sought redemption through the healing arts in general and 
clinical mental health counseling, in particular. Like me, Aaron is a doctoral candidate in a 
Counselor Education and Supervision program.  
 At a deeper level, it seems that Aaron and I also share an understanding of the world; one 
in which asking questions, looking past the surface value of statements and ideologies, and a 
self-reflectivity that acknowledges and embraces personal flaws all have a place and power to 
transform. Speaking with Aaron on the phone was, at times, like speaking with myself in the 
mirror. He struck me as earnest, idealistic without being naïve, forthright, articulate, wounded, 
and deeply empathetic to the “otherness” that so many military members either do not, or choose 
not, to see in their comrades and (especially) in the enemy. For these reasons, I will open his 
story with a quote from Henry Nouwen, the famed Catholic priest and author of The Wounded 
Healer among other well-known spiritual tomes. On my mother’s fridge, my step-father, who 
knew Henry Nouwen as a ministerial acquaintance, keeps a signed note from the author. It 
pleases me to connect that note, 30 or more years old, to the present moment and to my reflection 
on Aaron’s journey and character in the following Nouwen excerpt: 
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“Through compassion it is possible to recognize that the craving for love that people feel 
resides also in our own hearts, that the cruelty the world knows all too well is also rooted 
in our own impulses. Through compassion we also sense our hope for forgiveness in our 
friends' eyes and our hatred in their bitter mouths. When they kill, we know that we could 
have done it; when they give life, we know that we can do the same. For a compassionate 
person, nothing human is alien: no joy and no sorrow, no way of living and no way of 
dying” (Nouwen, 1979).  
Training 
Aaron developed an interest in joining the military during his junior year of high school, 
when his father informed him there would be no money forthcoming to support a college 
education. Prior to this, thoughts of military service were only passing in nature. His best friend 
at the time was joining an Army National Guard unit and had an uncle in the same unit who was 
a recruiter. This friend put Aaron in touch with his recruiter uncle who delivered to Aaron all the 
requisite half-truths and quarter-promises that constitute a touchstone of the military recruitment 
process in the United States Army. Aaron watched 9/11 happen on the television during his 
senior year of high school and joined his National Guard unit the following January. He had no 
particular interest in field artillery; it was simply the type of unit that existed in his area. Nor did 
Aaron possess an abiding interest in overseas combat, although he admitted to a certain form of 
patriotism influencing his decision to join following 9/11. Additionally, situated in the early 
2000’s as he was, Aaron was unable to gain much knowledge of what to expect in his training, or 
even in his job in the National Guard following training. While the internet did exist, a person 
was limited in their ability to garner information by slow connections and limited websites.  
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 Aaron did his Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 
known in certain military circles as the “armpit of the Army.”  Aside from the foul taste of the 
water, the most uncomfortable part of Aaron’s training was being forced to adapt to the change 
of being away from home and suddenly alone and vulnerable around a group of strangers for the 
first time in his life. His Drill Sergeants spoke freely and continuously about the realities of 
wartime service; how all of the young soldiers could expect to be overseas shortly following 
their training. Despite these dire warnings, Aaron believed he would be able to return to normal 
life, attend college, and move forward with his plans beyond the military. When asked, he did 
affirm that his training in field artillery was a type of crucible experience, a way in which he 
started to make his own way in the world after being given the news that he’d have to pay for 
college himself. It was a first and powerful step along the lines of individuation needed by young 
men moving into adulthood. This sense of stepping into and owning his life circumstances 
helped buoy Aaron when he was inevitably harassed by his drill instructors or came into conflict 
with other recruits.  
 Aaron believed that his parents were proud of him for joining the Army, although his 
mother was worried, and his father—an alcoholic—often seemed indifferent to the choices his 
son made. His father never served in the military, coming of age at the tail end of the Vietnam 
era. However, both of Aaron’s grandfathers served in World War II, and he had several uncles 
who served in the military as well. His one sister seemed oblivious to his choices, as she was 
embroiled in her own private affairs at the time. Yet, Aaron does seem to have an historical sense 
of a familial legacy in the military.  
 Aaron finished his training, came back to Pennsylvania, and enrolled at Slippery Rock 
University in the fall of 2003. At this time, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) had been going 
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for nearly 2 years in Afghanistan, and the first wave of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was 6 
months old. It only took until December of that year for his unit receive its notice of imminent 
deployment; it was delivered on his birthday. Aaron’s reaction to this news was one of turmoil 
and dismay, given his fresh enrollment in college and building momentum in the civilian world. 
However, he also recognized that many of his fellow guardsmen were worse off, having to leave 
established careers and large families to fight in the war. Furthermore, he was still in shape from 
his training, his “boots still shiny”; many of the older Guard members were drummed out of the 
unit when they failed their deployment physicals. In some ways, Aaron believes, the war was the 
best thing to happen to the National Guard, as the deployments culled the ranks of those blatantly 
unfit to serve in our Guard and Reserve units.  
 Additional training occurred for Aaron’s unit at Ft. Pickett, VA, and Ft. Dix, NJ, prior to 
deployment. National Guard and Reserve units were doubly burdened by deployments in the 
OIF/OEF theaters. Not only were they part-time soldiers, Marines, sailors, and air personnel, 
with livelihoods well beyond the military; but as such, they were often required to do stateside 
deployments as “train-ups” prior to the actual deployments themselves. This meant that many 
guardsmen such as Aaron were away from home an additional 2-6 months beyond the actual 
deployment phase, albeit in a stateside location and in relative safety.  
In Aaron’s unit, the soldiers gathered on the mandated date/time at the armory and took 
buses in an escort across the State to Ft. Dix. He described the mood of the unit as “scared 
shitless” despite their combat-arms designation as field artillerymen, and he thought that the 
bravado some members put on only confirmed his belief that most of the unit was indeed 
frightened for what was to come. The train-up itself was a joke, wildly out of touch with the 
reality of desert warfare; it was described by Aaron as “in a foot and a half of snow watching 
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Army cartoons”. The unit received no training for the realities of Iraq, such as close-quarters 
battle training (CQB). Instead, they were forced to watch a replaying video of the twin towers 
falling in New York set to a death metal playlist by some of the training staff as a form of war 
propaganda.   
To make matters more complicated, the unit was click-ish, as many of the members had 
either grown up together or served together in the unit for years prior to deployment. The platoon 
sergeants, in particular, seemed to bond over an identity as old-hands in the artillery world, made 
more pronounced by the unusual fact that many of them were ex-Marines.  It was during his time 
at Fort Pickett that Aaron was given a nickname so painful and derisive, that 16 years later, he 
was still unable to speak it aloud to me. This moniker followed him throughout his time in the 
Army and has complicated the relationship he feels with his honorable and worthy service 
record. At its nadir, Aaron felt that he ceased to have a real name, even amongst the officer 
corps. In his own words:  
“I didn’t have a name. I had a nickname and it was a terrible nickname at that... I was 
reminded constantly that I wasn’t the same as everybody else. So, I started looking for 
other people who were like me, and the closest I could [find] were the people we were 
over there supposedly trying to help and/or fight...this really strange experience where I 
think I empathized more with the Iraqi civilians than I could some of the guys in my own 
unit.”  
One of the strange little ironies in Aaron’s heartbreaking story: this occurred at a military based 
named after a Confederate civil war general given the derogatory label of the “goat” after his 
time at the United States Military Academy for finishing dead last in his class. Additionally, 
Pickett’s name later became forever tied to the ill-fated and eponymous charge at Gettysburg, for 
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which he was blamed and derided yet had little control over the course of the catastrophe’s 
outcome.  
Deployment 
Like virtually all units moving into the OIF theater, Aaron’s field artillery group stayed 
first in Kuwait for approximately two weeks, where they were surrounded by soldiers from 
countries as diverse as Japan, Russia, Germany, and Australia. Once in Iraq, Aaron and his 
colleagues conducted the “right seat, left seat” transition with the outgoing unit they were to 
replace. The new soldiers first drove with the seasoned unit (i.e., in the passenger seat, a.k.a. 
“right seat”) across their sector, learning the ins and outs of the neighborhoods, etc., before 
taking over the wheel (left seat) as the old hands began to step away from ownership of the AO 
(Area of Operations). Aaron considered this his best training, especially given the fact that their 
Field Artillery unit was being asked to step into a Military Police role while in-country. This type 
of transition was unfortunately common among National Guard and Reserve units deployed to 
the Middle East; whatever job they were supposed to do was often superseded by the needs of 
the military in the moment. Thus, the specified artillery training Aaron received prior to 
deployment would prove largely pointless in his time in the war, working instead as a “utility 
knife” for the needs of his unit and the Army.  
 To make matters worse, Aaron’s unit came to the war at a time when the Humvee 
vehicles were not yet “up-armored” to protect against the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s), 
Explosively-Formed Projectiles (EFP’s), and small-arms fire of the Iraqi resistance/insurgency. 
Aaron described the vehicles they were gifted as “zombies with sandbags on the side”. There 
were bullet holes in the engine blocks and doors, with some having fractured windows from 
explosions or rifle fire. While the sandbags were an improvisation used to protect soldiers from 
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being shot through the sides of the vehicles, they overburdened the engines of the Humvees, not 
yet designed to take the additional weight. As a designated driver, Aaron was often and routinely 
relegated to the motor pool between missions to try and fix the constantly malfunctioning 
vehicles.  
 Aaron described his unit’s in-country function as “just numbers and bodies”. They 
provided security details, convoy escorts, and innumerable other functions as needed, driving all 
over the countryside despite being stationed on the outskirts of Baghdad. Serving as a 
Specialist/E4, Aaron developed the following mentality to the war: 
“For me it was taking it at face value. I really was just trying to keep it simple. There 
were a lot of guys over there that were asking too many questions. and I learned from the 
kind of shit that happened to them not to ask them any questions. Do what you're told... it 
just made me more miserable to start asking questions about the people that I was serving 
with and their competencies.” 
Due in part to some of his experiences as an enlisted soldier, Aaron developed an ambition to 
become a commissioned officer, where he believed he could do a better job than many of the 
officers he was forced to take orders from during the war. Unsurprisingly, given his high level of 
self-awareness, Aaron knew this was a clichéd type of enlisted ambition, and yet knew it to also 
be a factual reality that he could do a better job, all the same.  
Without going into too the specified details of his combat experience, Aaron described 
the war in terms known intimately by veterans of previous generations: “a lot of really dull, 
boring moments of monotony interrupted by periods of chaotic disaster.” To complicate matters, 
his unit was in the difficult position of having to remain mission-flexible at all times. Regular 
Army units (such as mine) were usually given a more-or less definitive sector and mission; it was 
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rare to be called away for additional duty beyond a one-off request every few months unless 
one’s platoon or company was “loaned out” to another battalion or brigade (as in Joe’s story, to 
follow). Many Guard units, however, were forced to constantly shift their locale and duties to 
accommodate an ever-changing agenda from higher command. This sense of constant change 
proved difficult for Aaron and his fellow guardsmen throughout the duration of their combat 
tour. 
Life After Combat 
Aaron’s dream to become an Army officer ended abruptly during a training accident 
following deployment. This was, perhaps, the most pronounced moment of moral injury he 
experienced in the military, along with the bullying he received early on; neither incident was 
directly tied to combat. In 2007, his Guard unit went to Fort Drum, NY for summer field 
training. Home of the 10th Mountain Division (LIGHT), this was my home base, although I was 
deployed in Iraq with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) when Aaron was present. 
Nonetheless, I am intimately familiar with the field setting in which Aaron’s unit found itself. Ft. 
Drum, like most major army installations, is a conglomerate of unit structures, family housing, 
and auxiliary needs buildings (commissary, hospital, etc.) attached or surrounded by vast swaths 
of untamed land used for training purposes. Unpaved and unmarked fire roads crisscross the 
dense brush of the upstate New York flatlands leading every which way to firing ranges, artillery 
sites, field camps, land navigation courses, and others. It was quite possible to take a wrong turn 
and pull on to a firing range in use despite signage and warnings posted with relative frequency.   
It was in this setting that Aaron suffered a major training injury. Trying to unload a heavy 
piece of weaponry from an overhead turret by himself (it was a 2-person job), a fellow soldier 
lost his grip on the weapon and dropped it on Aaron, who was standing below and facing away 
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from the vehicle. It struck him on the head and back, flattening him on the ground. Aaron 
experienced tremendous pain, was in and out of consciousness, and was unable to use his legs 
due to shooting pain up his back whenever he tried. Instead of calling for an emergency Medevac 
via helicopter, however, his commanding officer (CO) placed him in the back of an open-air 
Humvee while he dallied on the radio, attempting to find his own position on the map. Aaron 
was given a saline IV by a medic, but the fluid ran out after half an hour; he had a dry line that 
was moving air bubbles toward his bloodstream and which would nearly kill him before an 
ambulance arrived on scene an hour later and rushed him to the hospital.  
More than the physical injury, the emotional impact of this incident left a deep, abiding 
imprint on Aaron’s psyche and soul, something he aptly described as the loss of an ideal. The 
utter incompetency displayed by his CO during the incident was a revelation to Aaron; he grew 
embittered with the military knowing that these types of officers were in charge; men who would 
risk a soldier’s life and well-being so not to lose face, or who were too stupid to find their way 
out of the woods without help. In Aaron’s retelling of the incident, I was reminded of countless 
experiences of my own where superior officers put their career interests ahead of their soldiers’ 
lives. Instead of hardening his resolve to push into the officer ranks, this incident pushed Aaron 
permanently away from his military aspirations along with the long healing process required 
from his injuries. To give something his dream up was a devastating loss, a form of 
disenfranchised grief, through which Aaron took years to process and come to a space of 
acceptance. In his own words: 
“I didn't feel like I could talk to my wife about it because I felt... I just couldn't, I didn't, 
didn't know who to talk to about it. I didn't know how to relate it to anybody because I 
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didn't know if anybody really understand what it's like to lose that type of ideal. I don't 
know. I think it's because, it's like popping a balloon, I guess”.  
 Instead of allowing the loss of his military ideal to derail him, however, Aaron left the 
service driven to succeed, diving headfirst back into his academics. While the military served 
him well in his new-found abilities to remain focused and disciplined in his pursuits, Aaron’s 
unresolved issues from the war continued to linger and disrupt his life. Like many combat vets, 
Aaron struggled to find a professional footing that spoke to him after the service, working in 5 
jobs over 7 years, in nearly as many places. By 2013, Aaron bottomed out with a stay in a 
psychiatric ward for suicidal depression, which was the turning point when he began to realize 
how many things demanded address from his wartime (and non-wartime experiences) in the 
military. Beyond his actual combat experiences, Aaron still needed to work out his relationship 
to the bullying and harassment he’d received by his own comrades, the meaninglessness of the 
war itself, his affiliation and empathy for the Iraqi people—sometimes above and beyond any 
connection with his own unit—and where he wanted to move into the future from a professional 
and personal perspective.   
 One memorable moment came when a State Trooper arrived at his house for a wellness 
check on a suicidal Aaron. A fellow vet, the officer told Aaron how he became a Trooper to feel 
like part of a team again, which resonated deeply and made Aaron realize how much he had 
missed the camaraderie and larger mission of military life. Listening to this part of the story, I 
was shocked by how closely the officer’s story resembled my own reasons for joining the State 
Police-- to be challenged again, to live on the edge again, to find a team and live for a cause 
bigger than individual gain and advancement... it was as if I were the Trooper who had come to 
speak with him, and we were having the same conversation.  
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 Part of what complicated Aaron’s return to civilian life and, perhaps, contributed to the 
fact that he had a delayed reaction to his wartime experiences, was that he did not know how to 
speak to people about his complex experiences or even what to say. Despite his intelligent, 
articulate, easy-going style of conversation, as well as his eventual inclusion in the mental health 
workforce, this was nevertheless the case. As he succinctly put it: “When it’s your stuff, there’s 
no way to be objective... I didn’t realize how bad I was fucked up until I realized how fucked up 
I was.” Reading the book Matterhorn, the author Karl Marlantes’ harrowing account of his time 
serving in Vietnam as an infantry Marine, helped Aaron realize that others had similar 
experiences in warfare. 
Even now, in his mid-30’s, Aaron is still processing his experiences and finally beginning 
to understand the wide-ranging implications and consequences of his military service. A natural 
giver, he’s gravitated toward counseling work as a means of expressing his innate empathy for 
the condition of his fellow human beings. However, as time goes on, he’s now wrestling with the 
reality of having given too much of himself, to too many, for too long. Like many counselors 
following the initial years of their careers, Aaron is left wondering where to go next for a person 
who may not be able to continue in the same selfless capacity forever. With five children and a 
spouse to care for, as well, there will always be a large part of Aaron’s life that revolves around 
service to others, and yet his future hopes are ones that foresee less direct counseling work and 
more innovation in terms of working with multiple platforms—speaking, writing, online—to 
reach a new audience and expand his professional horizons.  
Aaron’s Epilogue 
The word that comes to mind for me when reading through Aaron’s story is redemption. 
If one pays close attention, it’s clear that there is a thread of ownership to the story that was first 
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embraced, then perhaps lost (though never gone), and eventually found again much later. Like 
many young men and women in the early 2000’s, Aaron’s military service was a way of stepping 
into ownership of his life and story—he could pay for college and further his life ambitions, 
while simultaneously serving the country in a moment that, for all of us, appeared to be 
generationally significant.  
As in so many stories, however, Aaron’s trajectory was thrown off course by the 
unexpected and the unforeseen. He could not anticipate, for instance, that he would be bullied 
and ridiculed by his fellow soldiers at the outset of his service. The damage this caused to 
Aaron’s psyche and well-being should not be underestimated. While schoolyard bullying is 
unquestionably serious and damaging, there is an additional layer of sadness or dissonance to 
what Aaron experienced, because the events disrupted what should have been the important 
process of joining a team, becoming a family, within his military unit on the eve of a combat tour 
in wartime. Instead, Aaron was left on the outside looking in, while entering the intimidating 
portal of combat through which no one returns unchanged; he was denied the birthright of the 
young warrior—to be finally and irrevocably included in the group despite (or even because of) 
the dangers ahead.  
There is little an enlisted soldier can feel in charge of during combat operations, much 
less, one who is ostracized by many of his peers. Add to this the catastrophic training accident 
following deployment, and Aaron was left with a period of military service neatly bookended by 
two rarified examples of moral injury related to belonging, betrayal, and the loss of deeply held 
ideals. Unsurprisingly, what followed for Aaron was a long stretch of time that was unbalanced, 
dark, and confusing.  
Thankfully, this is not where his story ends.  
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Returning to the thread of ownership, Aaron repeatedly spoke in our interviews about 
owning his own choices and decisions and of not speaking for others, but only himself. The same 
burgeoning sense of accountability and self-propulsion that led Aaron to enlist in the Army is 
still present today, as he clawed his way through a period of suicidal depression, all while raising 
a family with his wife, and now moving forward with renewed vigor toward goals that are self-
affirming, powerful, and unique to his life history, skillset, and innate talents.  
As in so many facets of life, there are no clear-cut answers to what happened to Aaron, or 
how his experiences then impacted his life and character after the fact. For his story, in 
particular, I believe there is a “chicken and the egg” component that makes clean, easy answers 
all the more elusive. For instance, did Aaron’s innate sense of empathy contribute to his bullying, 
or did a dormant empathy suddenly take root because of the bullying which occurred? Would 
Aaron have connected so deeply to the suffering people of Iraq if he, too, were not also suffering 
alongside them as an outsider in his own unit? Would Aaron have pursued a career in the healing 
arts had he not been so deeply wounded himself? The last question is one I often ask of myself, 
and have yet to receive a complete and unqualified response.  
In any event, it is not hyperbole to state that Aaron is a man of courage and resolve, who 
has overcome incredible obstacles to remain a productive, thoughtful, and contributing member 
of society today (although he would certainly not put it in those terms... but I do). As such, I end 
his story with a tribute to Aaron’s character from the book that helped him see his experiences 
anew, Matterhorn: 
“He ran as he'd never run before, with neither hope nor despair. He ran because the world 
was divided into opposites and his side had already been chosen for him, his only choice 
being whether or not to play his part with heart and courage. He ran because fate had 
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placed him in a position of responsibility and he had accepted the burden. He ran because 
his self-respect required it” (Marlantes, 2009). 
Rich’s Story: It’s All in the Game 
Introduction 
Rich is a PhD student in higher education at a school in the southern United States. He 
was introduced to me by a veteran friend, who described Rich as an Army vet who had done 
logistics and “been through some shit”. In person, I noticed Rich had some of the defining 
features of the combat veteran... he was watchful, guarded, profane, and personable. I 
immediately liked him. When Rich and I began to talk, I discovered—as is so often the case—
the many profound layers to his story which lay beneath the surface.  
If conversing with Aaron was like speaking in the mirror, talking to Rich was akin to 
experiencing a dialogue with the angel and devil on one’s shoulders, representing the higher and 
lower impulses of human nature. If anything, Rich’s journey is one that resembles a 
rollercoaster—the highest of highs and the lowest of lows, often turning so suddenly and moving 
so swiftly such that one can barely keep track of where they are on the ride. Through it all, 
Rich’s sense of humor remains intact, along with a call to selfless service manifesting in both his 
professional pursuits and family life. Like so many veterans with stories to tell, you would never 
hear it from Rich without first asking. What follows is brief summation of his time before, 
during, and after combat. I have found a quote I find appropriate to Rich’s history, where living 
on the edge was a way of life for him as well as so many others who have faced death time and 
again, yet chosen to live.  
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“The Warrior lives a life full of adventure, living on the edge of opportunity. Life on the 
edge keeps him in a space of heightened awareness and totally in the moment; therefore, 
no matter what comes his way he is always prepared”. ~ James Arthur Ray 
Training 
Rich was surrounded by signs and symbols of the military his entire life. To begin with, 
he lived in Washington, D.C., where the nexus of power in the country was outside his door at all 
times; the Pentagon was straight across the Potomac from his home in Georgetown, with the 
grounds of Arlington National Cemetery running adjacent to the DOD building. Were you to 
follow M Street from Rich’s neighborhood east, you would run right into the White House, and 
further beyond that, the Capitol building. The military was in his house, too, for both Rich’s 
mother and father were veterans, still working at the Navy Yard and Pentagon respectively when 
he was growing up. Rich’s father enlisted to avoid the draft during the Vietnam war, served 
briefly in Southern Vietnam, and then spent the remainder of his wartime service stationed in 
Korea doing intelligence work. Rich’s mother was a career Marine Corps Officer who served in 
Desert Strom and retired at the rank of full Colonel (O6).  
Rich was an only child, and no doubt, was left with a strong impression of military 
service from an early age. While his mother’s family had immigrated to the United States in the 
1930’s (she was also adopted), his extended family had a long and proud tradition of serving in 
the military since WWII; his maternal grandfather (“Pop”) served in the Army on Okinawa, 
where he was shot and also lost most of his hearing, while his maternal uncles served in 
Vietnam. As Rich put it: “I think with the exception of Grenada, we've knocked everything out 
since the forties... we've covered it all.” He went on to express the opinion that, in his family, 
military service was not an option... it was mandatory.  
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Still, Rich did not immediately join the service upon reaching adulthood. He excelled in 
high school and started college at a small, private institution in Virginia. Due to a sheltered and 
strict upbringing, however, Rich’s first taste of freedom led him down a path where he was 
partying more than studying. In his own opinion, he was not yet mature enough to launch himself 
professionally. When he called home to talk with his parents about leaving college and joining 
the military, “the conversation was great... ‘pack your stuff, you’re coming home and you’re 
joining’”. Asked about 9/11’s impact on his decision to join, Rich stated that it was definitely a 
catalyst and part of the reason he decided not to stay in college; he knew people personally killed 
in both New York and D.C. during the attacks. Even 20 years removed, you can still hear the hint 
of anger in Rich’s voice when he talks about 9/11 and the ramifications of that day.  
Despite their unconditional support (one might say insistence) for Rich to join the 
military, his parents were unsurprisingly selective in terms of the type of service they might 
foresee their only child performing. His mother wanted him to join the National Guard, for 
instance, which (up until that point) largely kept its part-time soldiers out of harm’s way. 
Without going against his parents’ wishes, however, Rich made other plans. He did join the 
Army National Guard, yet insisted on taking an 11-Bravo (light infantryman) MOS despite 
scoring well enough on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Batter (ASVAB) to gain any 
job he wanted. Furthermore, he did join a Divisional Headquarters unit at Fort Belvoir as his 
mother wished... only to jump ship onto a deploying Guard unit several months later. This theme 
would repeat itself in the future: Rich hopped units again while in-country in order to stay in the 
Area of Operations (AO) with an active unit (AC), versus a reserve component unit (RC), and 
then tried a third time (albeit unsuccessfully) to further extend when that unit redeployed to the 
States many months later. The major difference between active and reserve component units was 
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that active units were “active” 365 days a year. That is, they were the units where people’s full 
time jobs were to be in the military. Reserve component units—including the National Guard—
were part-time soldiers with other careers outside the military, only recalled to “active” service 
for the duration of their deployments.  
 For his infantry training, Rich went to Ft. Knox, KY. The year was 2002. When asked if 
this was a crucible experience, he simply stated: “Frankly, going into Ft. Knox makes you a 
man.” During his training, Rich felt that he finally grew into adulthood. In one strange scenario, 
he was nearly kicked back to another class when he contracted pneumonia, but he was ironically 
saved by the infamous gas chamber experience, where the poisons cleared out his sinuses and put 
him on the path to recovery. He did both basic and advanced training at Ft. Knox and would later 
make it through Pathfinder school at Ft. Benning, GA; 1 of 6 to graduate from a class of 60, and 
the only enlisted man to make it.  
 Like fellow participant Aaron, Rich clashed with the older, more established members of 
his National Guard unit. Despite their infantry status, the guardsmen that Rich encountered were 
a far cry from the physically fit, well-trained, killer infantrymen that Rich had expected. As part 
of the 116th Infantry Regiment out of Winchester, VA, many of the members were “good ol’ 
boys” who were there for an additional paycheck and had no incentive or desire to fight in the 
wars. Rich, on the other hand, was “ready to go into the desert and kill everything I saw”. To 
make matters worse, Rich was an outsider to the area, a city kid joining an established unit from 
the backwaters of Virginia and West Virginia, where many members knew one another, had 
family connections, and enjoyed a style of life and livelihood that was slower paced and rural, 
when compared to his mode of being. As Rich puts it now: “I was very unhappy with my 
leadership. I was unhappy with the people, because I saw fat undisciplined soldiers, whereas I 
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should have looked at it as these are the boys that are in my life for the next 12 months”. Rich 
understood only in retrospect how much the soldiers in his unit were sacrificing, the types of 
burdens they bore: leaving families and careers behind to take on a task that was not within the 
realm of possibilities when they joined the military. In this sense, there was a sharp distinction 
between service members joining pre- and post-9/11... the former had thought it would be an 
easy way to make additional income, pay for college, and have some fun; the latter were joining 
knowing they were deploying to fight. Despite these many differences, however, Rich was soon 
embraced by the unit and made several good friends.  
 When Rich reported, the unit was already at Ft. Bragg, NC, for their train-up phase; he 
was forced to take military transportation down to the base and report to a group of strangers, 
where he trained for an additional 3-4 months before deploying to Afghanistan on what was 
supposed to be a year-long tour. Two months into the “train-up” phase, “Dear John” letters 
began to arrive. Rich was incredulous that women couldn’t wait to break up with their boyfriends 
or divorce their husbands until they were at least fighting in the war. While at Ft. Bragg, the unit 
went through Airborne School, and Rich described the esprit de corps of the unit as “shit”: “It 
was chaos. It was Lord of the Flies... everybody was fucked up and demoralized, one way or 
another.” The unit finished its train-up phase and deployed to Afghanistan in 2004, one of the 
first National Guard units to be deployed on either Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF)—a distinction I’m sure Rich’s mother found comforting not in the 
least.  
Deployment 
Rich’s unit flew into Bagram Air Base outside the ancient city of Bagram in the central 
highlands of Afghanistan. The base is located in Parwan Province, which in its long history as a 
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site of military expedition has seen campaigns from the likes of Alexander the Great and 
Genghis Khan, and in which Americans, Soviets, British, Arabs, Turks, and Indians, among 
others, have all taken their turns fighting and dying thousands of feet above sea level... and 
thousands of miles from home. The Air Base itself was originally designed and built by the 
USSR in its unsuccessful campaign to quell the Afghan people in the 1970’s and 80’s.  
Rich’s unit was split in two, with one portion staying in Bagram to provide base security, 
while the other half moved into Ghazni Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Ghazni Province, 
southwest of Parwan. Unlike its neighboring province to the northeast, Ghazni remained an 
active hotbed of Taliban activity throughout the continuing war. Indeed, in or around the time I 
first met Rich in the summer of 2018, the Battle of Ghazni commenced between Taliban and 
Afghan security forces, a full decade and a half since Rich stepped foot in the AO. The FOB 
itself, like many such small outposts, was nothing to write home about. Rich notes: “Calling it a 
FOB was a full robbery. [Saying it was made of] masonry was a pretty generous description. I 
mean, there were no walls. We were in the middle of nowhere, and it was pretty gangster... 
dangerous for sure”.  
 The Army National Guard unit took over for a contingent of west coast Marines and was 
soon in contact with the enemy. However, before too much fighting occurred, the severe winter 
weather of the region arrived pushing the operational tempo to a screeching halt. Comparable to 
Aaron’s experience with Humvees in Iraq, there was no snow gear available for the Humvees in 
Afghanistan for Rich: they were unable to do more than sit in their FOB and wait for the weather 
to turn, while Taliban fighters did much the same in their enclaves. In an interesting twist, my 
own experiences were the same—only reversed in terms of the weather—during operations in 
Iraq. Rather than winter conditions impacting up tempo, it was the blazing summer heat that 
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halted all daytime operations beyond the minimum necessary in the Iraqi river basins. Likewise, 
enemy fighters would not, as a general rule, choose to engage at midday. Dawn and dusk were 
the most dangerous times, since insurgents also preferred to avoid the nighttime, where they 
knew our night vision capabilities would prove a tremendous advantage. The heat was so 
extreme that even civilian farmers did not work under the noon sun; it was unbearable.  
 Following the winter months, Rich experienced two devastating moments of combat 
which forever altered the trajectory of his life. First, he was in the lead Humvee of a convoy 
when they struck an IED. The explosive was “double-stacked” one on top of the other (meaning 
a large charge), buried on the right side of the road. For whatever reason, the Rhino Passive 
Infrared Defeat System (or simply “Rhino”) attached to Rich’s Humvee triggered the device 
when it was essentially on top of the vehicle. Rich’s two closest friends—Craig and Bobby—
were both killed in the blast. Additionally, their interpreter, who Rich had allowed to sit in the 
front seat so he could enjoy watching the Blue Force Tracker screen (a type of early GPS 
module), was killed in the seat where Rich should have been sitting. Rich himself broke four 
ribs, his collarbone, orbital bone, had several fractured vertebrae, a traumatic brain injury, and 
hearing loss. He was evacuated to Germany for medical treatment but did not rotate all the way 
stateside as happens with the severest injuries. During his time in Germany healing, Rich grieved 
the loss of his friends and replayed the incident over and over, holding himself accountable 
especially for the death of his interpreter who would normally have been in the backseat where 
Rich miraculously survived the attack. It was not until years later that Rich was able to make his 
peace with the situation, knowing he was not responsible for anyone else’s death in the vehicle. 
In the interim, he began to suffer nightmares of the attack later on as he rejoined his unit. When 
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the medical team in Germany attempted to discharge Rich based on the severity of his wounds, 
“I told them to go fuck themselves”.  
In the second incident, with Rich only recently back in-country, a CH-47 Chinook 
helicopter was shot down by the Taliban. This happened in Rich’s AO, about 10 clicks (or 
kilometers) from FOB Ghazni, with all lives lost onboard. The CH-47 is often likened to a flying 
school bus, due to its elongated, ungainly fuselage. Unbeknownst to many outsiders, the Chinook 
is deceptively fast; the fastest military helicopter, in fact, of the American fleet. Unfortunately, it 
is highly vulnerable to rocket attack and small arms fire when hovering stationary or gaining 
speed; hundreds of U.S. lives have been lost in both OIF and OEF due to Chinook mass casualty 
incidents (“MassCas”) where they were shot from the sky—a simple RPG (Rocket Propelled 
Grenade), well-placed, was (and still is) enough to take dozens of lives.  
In a nightmare scenario, Rich and his fellow soldiers were assigned to “bag and tag” the 
remains of the dead soldiers in this crash, which he approximated at around 26 service members 
Killed in Action (KIA). Rich felt a sense of betrayal at this order, since the NCO in charge did 
not participate, and there was no help given from mortuary affairs soldiers; in his mind, it was 
not right to ask infantrymen—fighting soldiers—to pick up the pieces of the dead on their own. 
This incident, more than any other in the war, came to haunt Rich. In a comparable experience, 
my unit experienced a “MassCas” incident in which a children’s soccer game was accidentally 
mortared by the insurgency who were targeting our FOB but had no baseplates on their mortars 
to stabilize the trajectory of its launched rounds. Dozens of wounded, dying, and dead children 
were brought into the Patrol Base. Likewise, a retired Coast Guard NCO and friend, who I’d 
assumed had never seen combat nor anything combat related, once admitted to me that he 
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suffered from nightmares after having to dredge dead bodies out of Iraqi waterways. My friend 
didn’t have to be under fire to be forever altered by a wartime experience.  
Although he never said so directly, I would hazard a guess that the cumulative 
psychological damage of these incidents was equally responsible for Rich’s hard times following 
the service as his physical wounds themselves. Following these events, he became more 
fatalistic, developing that strange soldierly sense of detachment that helps human beings endure 
and inflict great suffering upon their fellow creatures under wartime conditions. Rich also 
admitted—like Aaron —to a delayed response to these immensely complicated traumas that did 
not hit him until after his time in the service was complete. 
 The 25th Infantry Division (ID), known as the “Tropic Lightning” for their lightning 
patch identifier, arrived in Afghanistan midway through Rich’s initial deployment. Still 
harboring aspirations to move from a reserve component to an active duty infantry unit, Rich 
volunteered to join the 25th ID in order to stay in-country and continue the fight as an active duty 
soldier. He wanted to be around more genuine infantry types, and had little incentive to return 
stateside without having settled down yet, or with an alternate career waiting. His original unit in 
the National Guard redeployed back to Winchester, VA, the soldiers returning to their lives and 
their families. Later still, Rich attempted to jump ship from the 25th ID? to the 82nd Airborne 
(“Eighty Deuce”) when the 25th was rotating back stateside. However, by this point the Army 
was not having any more of his attempts to fight an eternal battle in Afghanistan.  
To add insult to (literal) injury, Rich was reclassed out of the infantry due to his wounds 
suffered in combat... he was no longer fit for combat service. As he put it, “I guess I wasn’t good 
enough for the infantry no more.” This would be yet another psychological wound that would 
fester over the coming years. In the meantime, Rich found an active National Guard (AGR) job, 
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where he worked full-time for the Guard in a logistics capacity. He was forced to retrain in a 
“Loggie” (Logistics) MOS, a dramatic shift away from his infantry roots. He deployed in a 
support unit to Kuwait in 2008, where he worked for nine months moving supplies across the 
border into Iraq. Occasionally, he would hop onboard a helicopter flying supplies north, just to 
feel like he was back in the action, but the deployment was otherwise a dull affair. Rich 
described the threat level of the deployment “as dangerous as being white in Atlanta”.  
Still, Rich expressed gratitude in the present for the gift of being re-classified in an MOS 
that gave him a real-world skill set, although it wounded him deeply at the time to be let go of 
the infantry. Becoming a logistician turned out to suit Rich’s growing interest in business, and he 
considers the switch a blessing that he took a decade to finally and fully appreciate. As Rich 
knows all too well, most soldiers with an infantry MOS return stateside and have no reasonable 
skillset to transfer toward civilian employment, at least not on the surface. For combat soldiers 
coming off active duty, where the genuine purpose of their everyday life was to learn how to win 
missions by killing efficiently, staying alive, and protecting their comrades; there was no (and 
perhaps never should be) one-to-one adaptation of the infantry subculture. Rich was lucky 
enough to have not one, but two skillsets to work with, and the latter non-combatant role turned 
out to be the propitious one in his post-combat life.  
Life After Combat 
Rich returned from Iraq in 2009, was admitted to Walter Reed hospital for care of his old 
wounds in 2010, and was medically retired by the Army in 2011 at the rank of Staff Sergeant 
(E6). In the span of three years, he went from a coveted AGR position to out of the service 
altogether with little direction or purpose. To make matters worse—foreshadowing one of the 
most troubling developments of the decade to come—Rich left the military addicted to the opiate 
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painkillers he was given without restraint or restriction by Walter Reed and VA administrators. 
In his own words, Rich described the scene in the early 2010’s: 
“It wasn't a thing back then, man, the opioid crisis really hadn’t been noticed; people 
didn't start giving a shit until, you know, ‘14 or ‘15 and the VA wasn't no better. I would 
walk out of the VA with like five grand to purchase. And then when they finally woke up 
to the fact that, you know, ‘we’re fucking people’, you know, no one gave a damn, you 
know, there was nothing, you know, they stuck me in the psych ward, they'll let you 
withdraw and then if you wanted rehab, they pay for rehab and then you're on your own, 
you know?” 
By his own admission, Rich was a serious drug addict from 2011 straight through 2014, 
despite growing (if tenuous) success in the civilian world. He moved to West Palm Beach, where 
his parents owned a condo that they only used a few weeks each year. He enrolled in a nearby 
college and proceeded to plow through his undergraduate studies in 2½ years. Rich followed that 
up by getting an MBA at the same school, and he became a commodities trader with series 6 
license and making a large amount of money. Unfortunately, most of that money went to feed his 
growing addiction, as did any and all of the financial support his parents offered. Like virtually 
all addicts, Rich learned to cheat, steal, and lie his way into getting what he needed to continue 
using. Eventually, he quit his trading job before he was fired, knowing that trading commodities 
high would lead to the loss of his license. At this point, Rich either overdosed or blacked out on a 
particularly frenetic drug binge and was found by the condo association supervisor in his parents’ 
house the next day. He was held at the hospital under legislation that prevented his discharge 
without his parents’ consent, while they traveled back from a trip in China to see him. Soon 
thereafter, they broke contact with their only child and refused to support him further. Rich 
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admits this was the best thing that could have happened, for he went into rehab, and followed 
that up with time in a halfway house as he regained his sobriety. Eventually, his brain 
functioning returned to normal after approximately 6 months sober, and he was able to make 
financial and emotional restitution to his parents.  
In the time following, Rich’s mother was told she had Stage 4 breast cancer. Surgery and 
chemotherapy followed, and the cancer went into remission. When the cancer returned, however, 
Rich took matters into his own hands, helping his parents sell their house in Washington, D.C, 
and moving them further south. Wryly, both of them expressed a desire “not to die in traffic.” 
Rich also made the momentous decision to go back to school to learn how to teach, and is now 
pursuing his doctorate at a nearby School of Education. He described the move from the business 
world to academia thus:  
“I still wasn't happy. It wasn't enough money. No matter how much money I made, it 
wasn't enough. You know, I just never sat down and thought about what I want to do in 
life, to be happy. So, I wanted to teach college. I always wanted to be a teacher”.  
Now, Rich is a caretaker for his parents and a full-time student, assisting in veterans’ issues on 
his campus. When asked whether or not what transpired with his parents during his drug use 
affected his decision to take care of them now, Rich provided an unequivocal and emphatic yes. 
He stated many reasons to be elsewhere, if he so chose: 
“I could probably make at least 250 K a year back in Atlanta, and now I make $375 every 
two weeks. I'm a conservative in a liberal school, in a liberal college and a liberal mother 
fucking town. And you know, also single. That don't make it any better”. 
And yet, he persists in staying, both for his education and for the larger purpose of honoring and 
caring for his parents.  
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Rich’s Epilogue 
“It's fucking hilarious. If nothing else, at least you got to laugh at it... you gotta laugh at 
the combat shit. You gotta laugh with the drug shit because you know, what else are you 
going to do, you know?” 
As clear from the above quote, it is obvious that Rich maintained his sense of humor 
throughout his many ordeals. Like many combat soldiers, he has managed to fit into half a 
lifetime what many fail to see, experience, and accomplish in a full 80 or 90 years. Unlike many 
of his fellow National Guardsmen—whom he recently saw at a unit reunion—Rich is not 
embittered by his experiences and does not hold a grudge against the government for sending 
him to war. As he described it: 
“It was a shit show. It was early in the war. No one knew who was on our side or what 
the fuck we were even doing there. There was no large operational plan that anybody 
knew of. It's not like they got a report, there was an IED coming up, you know, and they 
said, fuck it, let's get some medals... it was all in the game, at the end of the day”.  
Rich’s words remind me of my own realization during the war that I couldn’t be upset about 
getting hurt or killed, because I was out there trying to hurt and kill, too. It was a true “live by the 
sword, die by the sword” moment. It was fair to be killed when you were yourself a killer; it 
was—as Rich says—all in the game.  
 Rich’s sense of fair play and reciprocity are most clearly defined now in his devotion to 
his parents. Given the many reasons he would choose to live elsewhere, his actions strike me as 
having an almost sacrificial tone, akin to the note many combat soldiers willingly strike under 
wartime conditions. Perhaps, as for so many other warriors, Rich is merely trying to find his next 
mission, and what could be more honorable a mission than to care for one’s parents in their old 
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age? He is the only one who can do so and, caught between dueling forces, Rich seems not to 
have hesitated in making his choice—no more than he hesitated in his desire to fight in the wars.  
 One thing I noticed with Rich is that he still has an edge, a sharpness that comes into 
focus when he talks about certain events, certain groups. As a self-described conservative, Rich 
is at odds with the liberal-minded world of academia. He also exhibits some of the common 
disdain for civilians and out-of-shape soldiers that infantrymen often possess. Lastly, Rich 
seemed to think poorly of many of the other drug addicts in rehabilitation, who were (by and 
large) less educated, with long criminal records. While a judgmental perspective is often viewed 
as a character flaw by the public, it should be noted that Rich’s sense of judgment might very 
well originate in his identity as a combat soldier and infantryman. Or, if it is a natural attribute, 
perhaps it was exacerbated by the rigors of training and combat that constantly inform combat-
trained soldiers that they are different—and better—than not only civilians, but also all other 
classes of soldiery. In my own experience, it has been a continuous challenge to let go of the 
many prejudices that are built into the warrior caste subculture. Even now, it can be difficult to 
offer non-combat MOS veterans the same level of respect and appreciation as those who served 
in the frontlines. Perhaps that is as it should be, or perhaps not.  
Joe’s Story: Doing a Lot with a Little 
Introduction 
 I was put in touch with my third participant, Joe, through a student veteran connection at 
the University of Wisconsin–Whitewater. Our mutual associate told me that Joe had served as an 
infantryman in the same unit as me, the 10th Mountain Division. Furthermore, we also shared the 
commonality of doing police work after our time in the military. Joe still works as a cop, and 
seems to enjoy the profession much more than I ever did. In person, he is a large, strong-looking 
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man in his mid-30’s with a friendly disposition, and with whom I felt immediate rapport. He was 
courteous, soft spoken, and direct in all our interactions. Every time we met, Joe drove 30 mins 
from his house over to the UWW campus to meet with me privately and never seemed to think 
twice about it. I think that sums up Joe’s disposition toward life: one of humility, hard work, and 
taking everything in stride.  
Like many veterans, Joe had a strong family tradition of military service to pull from 
when he decided to join the Army; one grandfather served in World War II, and the other during 
the Korean war, while his father was drafted and trained as an artilleryman before fighting in 
Vietnam. In 2000, Joe’s older brother joined the Army on a Ranger (RIP) contract, essentially 
coming in as an infantryman with the guarantee that he would get a shot at joining the 75th 
Ranger Regiment.  
However, during his infantry training an Old Guard recruiter came to the unit, and Joe’s 
brother volunteered and was chosen for this selective duty in lieu of his Ranger contract.  
The Old Guard is a specialized unit headquartered in Washington, DC that is responsible for 
guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and whose members perform various and sundry 
other ceremonial duties and drills. Two of the requirements of the Old Guard are: to (a) have an 
infantry MOS; and (b) to be at least 6 feet tall. Joe’s brother met these and all other requirements, 
and shipped out for his new duty station. On the way, he was granted a two-week furlough to 
visit his family in Cleveland, OH. It was during his time at home that he convinced his younger 
brother, Joe, to join the Army and go the same route via the Old Guard. It didn’t hurt that he 
would get an Army Achievement Medal (AAM) out of Joe’s recruitment, either. Joe’s brother 
ended up serving out his active duty contract with the Old Guard, performing funeral services, 
doing a stint at the Pentagon, and later again at Walter Reed hospital. After leaving active 
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service, he initially joined the National Guard but later transferred back on to active duty with 
the Coast Guard, where he remains employed today.  
 In contrast, Joe’s father served around two years in the Army, including his tour in 
Vietnam, and rarely spoke about the conflict or any issues he had related to the war. Still, Joe’s 
mother recalled how in the early days after the war her husband would wake up and grab a knife 
from under his pillow, calling her “Charlie” in the dark. These frightening experiences grew less 
frequent through the years. Joe stated that his father is much improved now, and never let his 
experiences in the war effect the way he interacted with his sons. One can see in his father’s 
example how Joe himself seems to present with his own children; he is an active and engaged 
father, and has no expectation that his kids serve in the military.  
Training 
Up until joining the Army, which occurred in May, 2002, Joe had enjoyed college, where 
he played tight end at a small school in the Midwest. However, something felt missing for him. 
In our first interview, he recalled a story with his mother: “When I was like 13, 14, I told my 
mom... I think there's going to be a World War Three. I’m gonna fight in that one. So, the 
military was always there in my mind, and I didn't have any reservations about going to serve my 
country when I joined up.” Especially after 9/11, it seemed only a matter of time before Joe 
followed in his brother’s footsteps. The brothers planned for Joe to also join the Old Guard 
during his infantry training, and the two could room together in D.C.  
Joe left home in the summer of 2002 for a 36-month active duty Army stint. Like his 
brother, Joe went to Fort Benning, GA, the “Home of the Infantry” for his basic and advanced 
training. Joe did well in training, mainly because he was a large, strong, and in-shape young man 
from his time on the gridiron. Like many other future infantrymen, Joe had scored well enough 
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on the ASVAB to have any job he wanted. He told the recruiter he either wanted to be a 
firefighter or an infantryman. When asked why he chose infantry, Joe said: “you join to go serve 
and fight for your country.”  
During his time at Ft. Benning, the Old Guard came recruiting as expected. While Joe 
met all the criteria for selection, the fact that he chose a 36-month contract (versus 4 years, for 
instance) proved to be a disqualifier, as at that time he only had 32 months remaining on his 
contract, while the Old Guard required a full 3-year tour of duty from its members. Thus, Joe 
found himself—instead of going to the nation’s Capital—heading to the 10th Mountain Division 
and the frozen tundra of Ft. Drum, NY: home of the most deployed light infantry unit in the early 
parts of the OIF and OEF operations. As befits such a reputation, the 10th Mountain battalion that 
Joe joined, 1-32 Infantry (IN), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), was fresh off a rotation in 
Kosovo when he arrived in November, 2002. While members rotated out of the service, the unit 
was already ramping up for its next deployment, slated for Afghanistan in the summer of 2003. 
Almost immediately upon his arrival the unit went to the Joint Readiness Training Center 
(JRTC) at Ft. Polk, LA, for their train-up to the war.  
Comparable to his time in basic and advanced training, Joe was accepted quickly and 
unconditionally by his peers due to his size, physical abilities, and friendly demeanor. When 
asked about hazing (or the lack thereof in his case), Joe spoke about a well-known fact in combat 
arms circles: if you’re in shape, fit in, and do your job, nobody tends to mess with you. 
Accordingly, when Joe arrived at 1-32 IN, his team leader had some of Joe’s fellow members 
help him pick up clothes and toiletries at Walmart, since he’d arrived with only one set of 
civilian clothes, his military issue items, and little else. Like elsewhere in his life, Joe was used 
to doing a lot with a little. 
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Deployment 
When the 1st BCT, 10th MTN Division (LIGHT) deployed in the summer of 2003, the 
majority of units went to Afghanistan for a 1-year combat tour. 1-32 IN, however, was sent to 
Iraq with the promise of only a 6-month tour based on their recent time spent in Kosovo. 
However, as any military member, veteran, or family member can attest; what the military 
promises isn’t necessarily what it delivers: the battalion would end up spending an entire year in-
country, with Joe’s Alpha Company being loaned out to other units for a majority of that time. 
The second Iraq war was less than 6 months old.  
The bulk of 1-32 IN moved to Iskandaria, south of Baghdad, where they were tasked with 
constructing a Patrol Base from scratch. Alpha Company, however, was loaned out to a larger 
unit that was part of the 82nd Airborne (“The Eighty Deuce”). They went to a little-known city 40 
kilometers west of Baghdad in the sleepy Al-Anbar Province—its name was Fallujah. Joe and 
his company would assist the 82nd Airborne in combat operations there for approximately six 
months, before returning to their unit. However, the entire battalion of 1-32 IN would relocate to 
Fallujah in the second half of their combat tour when the “First Battle of Fallujah” occurred in 
April, 2004. This fighting—some of the ugliest in the war—was the result of an infamous 
ambush where Iraqi insurgents targeted a Blackwater contracting team on what became known 
as “Blackwater Bridge” in Fallujah. Four American civilian contractors were dragged from their 
vehicle, either shot, beaten, or burned to death, and then their corpses were strung up along the 
bridge. Video footage of the incident spread around the globe, reaching American outlets like 
CNN and FOX News. Public outrage dictated that the in-country coalition forces do something 
about the unruly citizens of Fallujah.  
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As in many lower-level unit “loans,” Joe’s company was not given the choice 
assignments by its step-parent battalion at first. They would provide cordon coverage for 
operations, or go searching for insurgents among goat herders, or be stuck at a Traffic Control 
Point (TCP) for an entire shift. After a month or two, however, they started to win the trust of 
higher command and were giving consistently more respectable missions. Between Joe’s first 
and second stints in and around Fallujah, he estimated that he was in around 16 IED explosions, 
most of which were followed by an ambush-style fusillade of small-arms and Rocket-Propelled 
Grenade (RPG) fire. These were short but intense firefights, where a huge amount of ordinance 
was thrown out by both sides. Sometimes Joe would shoot, and other times not. While he stated 
that he never knowingly killed a person in combat, he did relate the following story:  
“And then some RPGs came at us and small arms, and I just started shooting back into 
the fields, not knowing what was out there—it was the first time we went through this 
area. And then during the daytime we go back and we drive through the same area. And I 
see there's farm houses and stuff out there and, you know, that creeps into your mind. 
Like, ‘okay, could I have killed somebody that was just in their house?’ I think it’s kind 
of good that you don't actually know, because then you don't have the sorrow or the guilt 
of knowing if you did hurt somebody”.  
 Miraculously, Joe’s company did not lose any KIA in the entire combat rotation, despite 
numerous folks being wounded (WIA) along the way. Joe estimated that in his platoon alone, 
among 40 soldiers, there were approximately 15 Purple Hearts awarded during their combat tour. 
A practicing and devout Catholic, Joe credited his unit’s safety, in part, to the prayers he said for 
the unit while he was overseas fighting. Additionally, Joe received a container of holy oil from a 
Lebanese family friend in Cleveland that he used to anoint himself and any willing buddies 
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before missions. As time would tell, the hardest parts of the war for Joe were to follow his actual 
time in combat.  
Life After Deployment 
Joe returned to the U.S. in June, 2004. Following his leave, Joe reported back at Ft. Drum 
and was immediately transferred to 1-87 IN (DEFINE). As he put it, “I think their hopes were 
‘we need bodies, so we're going to ship these guys out to units that are deploying soon and they'll 
just get stop-lossed’ because that happened to quite a few people”. The infamous stop-loss policy 
used in the OIF/OEF conflicts dictated that a soldier with less than a year on their remaining 
contract—if assigned to a unit deploying for a year-long combat tour—could be “stop-lossed” 
past the point of their original discharge date in service to the higher mission of the unit. This 
meant many soldiers were kept in the service well beyond the time they were signed up for 
contractually in order to serve additional time in a combat zone. More than a few people were 
killed during stop-loss time in the wars when they should’ve been home already. My entire 
Brigade, for instance, was prevented from rotating home after a year-long tour due to the troop 
surge of 2007 which dictated we spend another 6 months in-country; as many or perhaps more 
soldiers were wounded and killed in that six months than in the entire first year of the tour. 
Fortunately for Joe, his new First Sergeant pulled some strings, and he was able to leave the unit 
just short of being stop-lossed for another combat tour with the 10th Mountain. In the 2000’s, the 
10th Mountain Division (and most other infantry divisions), were on a constant up-tempo 
deployment schedule, where as soon as a unit returned stateside, replacements were brought in 
and training immediately resumed for the next deployment.  
 Joe returned to Cleveland to visit his family and then moved to Wisconsin to pursue a 
relationship with a woman he’d connected with while on leave during his combat tour. They later 
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married and had two children. Joe worked first at a factory, making $14 an hour. After this, 
seeking a piece of the camaraderie he felt in the military, Joe became a prison guard, where he 
had better and closer relationships with his peers. Finally, he moved on to his local police 
department, where he has worked ever since. While Joe claimed he never wanted to be a cop, it 
somehow worked out to be a job he both enjoys and is good at doing; Joe stated that 90% of his 
vehicular stops end with the driver thanking him, a mark that any good cop would be challenged 
to reach.  
 In 2006, 1-32 IN redeployed to Afghanistan. One of Joe’s good friends from the unit was 
Killed in Action during this deployment. This friend happened to be from Wisconsin, so Joe and 
a number of their fellow Army buddies attended the funeral. The group of veterans was asked if 
they wanted to see the body, despite the fact that their friend was shot in the head and it was a 
closed casket funeral: “We all went back and saw the body. I regret that because he didn't look 
like himself and they never do. I was angry then, and I was angry that I got out and I wasn't…, 
that I didn't stay into fight with the guys that did stay. I was just angry at the fact that he was 
gone”. It took several years for Joe to deal with his anger and guilt over not being present for his 
friends during the next deployment. Yet, as he put it, “there's so many deployments too. You 
know, it's like they just keep hammering away. At some point you say, ‘no, it's enough’ and just 
get out when you can get out.” When asked, Joe did concede that he thought part of the reason 
the unit wasn’t protected in Afghanistan was because he wasn’t there to pray for them, and that 
whatever protection they were granted in Iraq had somehow evaporated in the next deployment.  
 Joe’s marriage fell apart after 7 years, although the couple stayed married for 10. The 
entire split came as a surprise to him; his ex-wife started to go out to random places and was at 
one point arrested on a DUI charge before suddenly telling him one January that she was moving 
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out that week. The two now share custody of their children—Joe gets them on his days off, and 
before and after work he helps them come and go to school, since he works nights on a 5 –on-2-
off/5-on-3-off biweekly rotation. Joe clearly makes every effort to be present at his kids’ sports 
games and school events.  
When asked further about his police work, Joe admitted that it isn’t what he thought it 
would be, though he still finds pride in his work. For starters, he wasn’t prepared for the political 
components of the work—a sentiment with which I can heartily empathize. Furthermore, Joe felt 
as if the culture shifts around policing in the past 5-10 years have dramatically changed the way 
in which police departments treat their own people. As he put it: “It seems like anytime 
somebody makes a complaint, whether it's valid or not...it’s almost like a guilty until proven 
innocent situation”.  
For better or worse, the manner in which departments used to police their own has given 
way to societal demands to make examples out of officers publicly. Despite the immense 
difficulties of policing, Joe’s experience echoes sentiments of police around the country, in that 
they are often asked to do the impossible, understaffed and underpaid, while any mistake is 
immediately thrown back upon the individual and not the department or the administration. On a 
staff of 104 officers, Joe stated that the department was usually about a dozen officers short, 
meaning that required overtime shifts for those working, especially the less senior members such 
as Joe. While he has not had any run-ins with his bosses, Joe expressed some bitterness at the 
way that he saw several fellow officers being treated by the departmental higher-ups and the 
manner in which it now seems that everyone in public assumes he is racist as a cop.  
Still, because Joe moved into police work with zero expectations and came from a 
humble background, he still finds the work meaningful and worthwhile. Financially, he 
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explained that “my dad never made over $17 an hour growing up. So... I think $30, $31, $32 an 
hour now that's a lot of money for me. I'm happy. I don't expect anything more for the 
compensation of it.” Despite the drawbacks, police work is still a respected profession. While 
missing the camaraderie of the military was part of Joe’s reason for joining the police, he 
admitted that it has never come close to the same degree of togetherness expressed in combat. 
For starters, all the officers drive solo and go home to their families at night. They have busy 
lives and many other obligations. While there are a few barbecues or get-togethers in the summer 
months, it pales in comparison to what the infantry life offered in terms of brotherhood, 
camaraderie, and esprit de corps.  
Joe had a single incident of PTSD related symptoms, where he was the first responder on 
a “shots fired” call: 
“I just had this adrenaline going where my hands were shaking and I'm like, ‘Why am I 
doing this right now?’ Like, I couldn't understand it... I didn't feel like I was scared. I just 
like, I couldn't control my hands from shaking... Even after the call was over, like that 
adrenaline was still dumping. Kinda like, ‘dude, just get ahold of yourself, calm it 
down’... I didn't understand it because I've been in firefights over in Iraq and like, I don't 
really remember being that scared or that amped up though. I was shaken by that”.  
When pressed further on why he thought that singular call elicited such a powerful response, Joe 
stated bluntly that it was because he was alone, while in the war he was always with his buddies. 
This makes good sense, given that police academy training constantly hammers into recruits the 
reality that there is nothing more dangerous than a vehicular stop by an individual officer during 
nighttime hours. Doing these calls myself, I recall having PTSD symptoms of my own creep up; 
you can’t see anything from a dark car on a dark night except the silhouettes of heads and 
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shoulders, anyone could point a gun and fire at you in a second, and you have no defense against 
it until you approach the car and see the passengers for yourself. Given the further fact that it was 
an intense “shots fired” situation, it is easy to see how and why Joe’s physiology reacted as it 
did.  
Joe’s Epilogue  
Joe is now happily re-partnered with a fellow officer and veteran. Following a visit to her 
native Puerto Rico after a devastating hurricane, Joe’s partner inspired him to create a nonprofit 
that they now run together. Their mission is to take wounded veterans out on expeditions to hunt, 
fish, or camp. When asked why he continued to do this work on behalf of his fellow vets, Joe 
responded: 
“It's sad to see for me that these guys who were so tough over overseas, they come home 
and they just, for whatever reasons, they fall into hard times that they just feel helpless in 
life to the point where you know, that they just either sit around and do nothing and drink 
or they actually hurt themselves. And if I can help prevent that and have some good times 
with people, then that's what drives me”.  
I believe Joe’s cheerful, courteous disposition, and relatively smooth adjustment to the many 
adversities of civilian life have much to do with his humble blue-collar origins, including a 
Catholic faith that dominates his perspective on the war and the purpose of his life in all the 
years that have followed. Joe has done a great deal of good for others with limited means, time, 
and resources of his own. He seems the very antithesis of me in terms of his disposition for 
police work, and I have little doubt he will continue to be an exemplar of that profession in the 
years and decades to come.  
Ken’s Story: A Man of his Time 
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Introduction 
 Like other participants, I was connected to Ken through a mutual acquaintance. Ken and I 
met three times, in-person, over the fall of 2019 at his home in Milton, Wisconsin. His house was 
a modest, one-story rancher on a quiet side street in town. His wife of 30+ years, Karen, kept up 
decorative themes related to the seasons and holidays in and outside the home; on our first visit 
summertime emblems, flags, and kitsch items of all sorts were on the lawn and in the house; in 
the second visit it was Halloween, and in the third it was Thanksgiving. These displays of 
neighborly and communal welcome seemed extensions of Karen’s warm personality, where she 
attended Ken and I during our talks with an alarmingly continuous supply of food and drinks, 
and also added richness and color to his stories by giving her opinions in passing.  
In contrast to his wife, Ken was most often dour and humorless. As I would come to 
understand, this had everything to do with his ongoing medical calamities—all of which Ken 
believed were the result of his exposure to Agent Orange in the Vietnam war. In short, Ken was 
miserable and misery loves company, as the saying goes. The faculty member who referred me 
to Ken would later be flabbergasted at the discovery that they were nearly the same age...Ken’s 
body had deteriorated so thoroughly that he resembled a man of 92 more closely than his actual 
72 years old. He needed a walker to move, and once settled in a place, it was likely he would not 
get up again for hours. Ken suffered from drop foot, with one leg essentially immobile. He had a 
number of heart surgeries including a triple bypass. He went to the VA in Madison—a full hour 
away from his home—three days a week for medical assistance. At our last visit, he was 
scheduled for an upcoming ablation process, where the medical staff would use electrical charges 
to put his heart back on to the appropriate beat. Additionally, one of Ken’s sons and one this 
son’s own daughters (i.e., his granddaughter) were born with a massive hole in the heart that 
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required immediate surgery as infants. Ken was convinced that this was not a hereditary issue 
but, rather, one that stemmed again from his exposure to Agent Orange in the war.  
Ken’s prickly demeanor, understandable as it was when considered in light of his 
physical condition, set the tenor for our time together. The greatest difficulty turned out to be 
scheduling. The first two times I called Ken and scheduled an appointment to meet, he confused 
the dates and times, switching Thursdays for Tuesdays, and became upset when I didn’t show up 
to his house on the erroneous dates. Both times, Ken said he wasn’t going to meet after all, 
because he couldn’t be put out like this with his busy VA schedule. Both times I talked him back 
into meeting again and apologized profusely despite the fact that I had scheduled the meetings 
for alternate dates. Following these mishaps, I made a point to call Ken every Tuesday before we 
met in order to reconfirm with him the fact that I wasn’t showing up that day but would be by the 
house on Thursday instead.  
The meetings were also uncomfortable, as Ken sometimes refused to turn off the loud TV 
in the background, making it impossible for me to record. He tired quickly and became cranky 
when he thought I was asking too many questions. When his wife was not present, Ken also told 
lewd, misogynistic jokes, and once used the “N word” to describe the degree of black shine on 
his uniform jump boots. At the end of our third meeting, when I asked Ken if he wanted to talk 
again, he said: “What the hell for?,” This was a good summation of our time together, in which 
Ken often seemed like he wanted to share his story, only to turn quickly resentful when thinking 
about his service and all the after effects of his exposure to Agent Orange.  
Thinking reflectively about these experiences, I believe Ken is, more than any other 
participant, what one might refer to as “a man of his time,” meaning that the way he makes sense 
of the world is through the lens he used as a young man. Passing judgment on Ken in 2020 is as 
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pointless an exercise as passing judgment on the founding fathers in 1800...; what they were and 
who they were cannot be extricated from the time and place in which they existed. While still 
existing in the 21st century, much of what Ken thinks and believes belongs to an earlier time, one 
in which he was still able-bodied, vibrant, and full of life. What follows is a story arc that I 
believe encapsulates many Vietnam experiences. It is one that touches not so much on broken 
dreams as on dreams that were diminished by the war, and which turned into a reality that 
reflects the smallness of the dreamer’s later ambitions.  
Training 
Ken graduated from high school in 1965, the same year that troop levels began to 
skyrocket in the Vietnam war, going from approximately 20,000 to 180,000 by year’s end. 
Nineteen sixty-five in Vietnam was bookended by Operation Rolling Thunder in the spring and 
the battle of the Ia Drang Valley in the late fall; the war reached a turning point in 1965 and 
would never be the same.  
 Sensing the inevitability of the draft, Ken attempted first to enlist in the Air Force. 
However, due to the increased number of applicants—also, one might assume, attempting to 
evade the perilous destiny of the Army infantryman—Ken was put on a waiting list for 
enlistment. In the interim, his draft papers arrived from the Army which superseded his previous 
orders to join the Air Force. Ken left his home in Illinois, boarded a train in Chicago, and headed 
due south to Fort Polk, Louisiana for his basic training. Following this, he was redirected to Fort 
Benning, Georgia, “Home of the Queen of Battle” (i.e., the infantry), where he trained as a 
mortar man. This military occupational specialty (11-Charlie) is still an infantry-designated job, 
but with the additional duty of learning how to operate the company-level mortar, a 60mm tube 
connected to a heavy baseplate, easily manipulated by a group of 3-4 soldiers. There are 
 97 
additional? mortar units (albeit requiring more soldiers) at the battalion (81mm) and brigade 
(120mm) levels that can also direct fire onto enemy positions, comparable to outside artillery 
units. At the lowest level, the mortar squad remains attached to the company command element 
during combat operations directing fire onto enemy positions as needed, while the line platoons 
engage the enemy in small-arms fire on the line. Within the world of the infantry, 11C was 
considered a slightly safer job than 11B (basic rifleman). However, this safety was offset by the 
significant strain put on a mortar squad by having to constantly carry the mortar components 
with them wherever the company roamed; Ken was not the first former mortar man I’ve met 
whose first comment about the job was the weight of the mortar base plate he had to hump in the 
bush.  
 In another missed opportunity, Ken was designated for Officer Candidate School due to 
his outstanding test scores, but again he waited and never received a start date. Part of the 
expectation was that he would serve an additional 2 years in the Army, which he did not want to 
do, and therefore was never reassigned to OCS. Ironically, Ken would sign on for additional time 
before leaving for Vietnam, but this was from the perspective of staying with his friends and unit 
and not for his personal advancement.  
After his Advanced Individual Training (AIT), Ken worked odd jobs around base waiting 
for an assignment. During this time, he spoke of an incident with a fellow soldier that left a 
permanent mark on his memory. This man had already been to Vietnam and was a “Spec-5”, a 
rank that no longer exists in the Army but which was equivalent at that time to E5 “Buck” 
Sergeant without the leadership component inherent in the non-commissioned Sergeant rank. 
This soldier befriended Ken and plied him with stories from overseas. They rode into town 
together in the man’s convertible Chevy Impala, getting ice cream and scanning for girls. One 
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day, this Spec-5 assigned Ken to Kitchen Patrol (KP) duty, knowing the duties were light and 
would only take a short while to complete. After he was done, the older soldier invited Ken into 
a closed barracks room where he had a projector screen displayed on the wall. Ken, having just 
showered, was only in a smoking jacket and underwear. The other soldier began playing film 
he’d recorded during his time in Vietnam. What started as benign footage of the man coming off 
the plane, etc. soon morphed into strange sexual territory, with several local women engaged in 
acts of bestiality on the recorded tape. At this point, the Spec-5 reached over and grabbed Ken’s 
crotch, asking him if he liked what he saw. In Ken’s words: “And I said, ‘Whoa. Big mistake. 
And I about killed him... didn't even show up for roll call the next morning. He was in the 
infirmary. Nobody knew what happened. He wasn't gonna tell.” 
 Sometime after this incident, Ken finally got orders to report to the 101st Airborne 
Division “Screaming Eagles” at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Instead of being assigned to a line 
unit, however, Ken was tagged to become a clerk based on his typing proficiency. Thus, he 
worked on bulletins for the unit that often shared the names and home towns of the men killed 
overseas which left an imprint on his psyche. Nevertheless, when the unit went to deploy, Ken 
was outraged that he was to be reassigned to the 82nd Airborne Division stateside because he 
didn’t have enough time left in the service to go overseas: “I said, I'm 101st all the way... these 
are all guys I slept with, lived with, eat with, you know, for so long.” He voluntarily added six 
months to his service obligation in order to deploy with his friends; a fitting tribute to the bond of 
military life shared by members of the same military division on which the acclaimed “Band of 





Ken arrived at Bien Hoa Airbase near Saigon but was disappointed yet again to be 
assigned to a personnel office rather than a line unit; his Top-Secret clearance was a barrier for 
reentry to a rifle platoon, as he was seen as too valuable to be so summarily doomed to 
wounding, death, or—at the very least—the drudgery of a year humping the jungle. Still, Ken 
was to learn that no one in Vietnam was truly safe. The base where he lived, for instance, was 
routinely shelled by enemy forces with mortars. During one such alert, Ken continued to type at 
his desk in a Quonset hut while the rest of the staff went to a protective bunker. Seconds later, a 
mortar round pierced the metal roof and landed directly in Ken’s filing cabinet, right in front of 
his face. It failed to detonate. Shaken, Ken asked for a reassignment to a line unit, as most of his 
buddies were already there, and he figured if he was going to die, at least he could do so fighting 
rather than typing. Instead of another flat refusal, Ken’s higher command struck a compromise 
with him; he would become an air courier for the entire unit, a dangerous job that required him to 
fly via plane or helicopter to all the remote outposts where 101st soldiers were stationed, 
delivering mail, messages, orders, and the like. Most often, because he was a lower enlisted 
member, Ken would show up at a patrol base, perform his duties, and immediately be reassigned 
to line duty for the duration of his stay: guarding patrol bases, exchanging intermittent fire with 
the enemy, and taking on outpost duties as required.  
 On one such trip to the Phu Bai combat base, Ken fell asleep the morning after an 
overnight guard shift and missed his transport back to the airfield. When he woke up and walked 
outside, a nearby Sergeant exclaimed, “You’re alive!” in bafflement. It turned out that the deuce-
and-a-half truck carrying the entire contingent of soldiers to the airfield struck a landmine that 
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resulted in a mass-casualty (MassCas) incident, claiming the lives of all occupants. This was the 
second incident—along with the dud mortar round—in which Ken narrowly escaped death.  
 While in and around the province of Hue, Ken was sometimes ordered to clear out the 
infamous tunnels built by the Viet Cong (VC) for underground maneuvering, safety, and 
transport. He described the abject terror he felt during these moments in the dark. While he never 
found anyone living or dead in the tunnels, he was constantly thinking about an Italian platoon 
he’d heard about that was wiped out when they unknowingly set up camp on top of a VC tunnel 
system, allowing the enemy to crawl out at night and kill the entire group in their sleep.   
 Many of Ken’s friends with whom he’d originally been assigned were killed or badly 
wounded during the year-long tour of duty. He recalled one instance when he heard a good 
friend from a line unit was wounded at the small patrol base where he was delivering mail and 
was awaiting medical evacuation (Medevac). Ken went to the see the young man at the 
impromptu medical station, but when he found him he grew sick at the sight: the boy’s intestines 
had been blown out of his stomach and were being held in by several layers of transparent saran 
wrap as he slowly died awaiting his Medevac. Ken’s guilt around not being on the line with his 
friends never fully dissipated during his time in the war.  
 Back at Bien Hoa near the end of his tour (being “short” in military parlance), Ken was 
part of the most pivotal battle of the entire war: the Tet Offensive. On January 31st, 1968, a large 
number of VC and VC sympathizers from the South Vietnam population launched coordinated 
attacks against the major US and ARVN (i.e., South Vietnam military) bases—many of which 
were thought to be completely secure. Scantily clad and poorly armed, these Vietnamese 
nonetheless managed to briefly throw the entire South Vietnam landscape into chaos. At the time 
of the attack, Ken was off duty at the major American airbase. When the alert sirens launched, he 
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dutifully reported to a trench line with his M16 rifle and .45 caliber pistol. The VC came hurtling 
out of the undergrowth, attempting to breach the concertina wire perimeter in vain. As Ken put 
it: “I don’t know if I killed anyone...but it was impossible to miss”. The Tet attacks were a 
catastrophic failure from a military perspective—essentially eliminating the VC as a fighting 
force from the war—but it was a tipping point in terms of public sentiment for the Vietnam 
conflict back in the United States. This would play an important role in Ken’s return from the 
war.  
 Before leaving for? stateside, Ken was in for two more memorable experiences, both 
connected to the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. First, he and his compatriots where shocked to 
find their “Mama-san” among the dead in the wire after the firefight. She was the middle-aged 
Vietnamese woman who did the unit’s laundry and folded their clothes. Ken remembered giving 
her extra money to buy additional laundry detergent a number of times. It was a moment of 
realization for many of the soldiers, Ken included, that the influence of the North Vietnamese 
extended well beyond the superficial boundaries of temporary nation-states to a deeper sense of a 
unified Vietnamese identity. Second, and related to the first, Ken was left with the lasting trauma 
of being ordered to peel the dead VC bodies off the wire outside the airbase. Due to the chaos of 
the battle, this did not happen for perhaps two weeks, leaving the bodies to rot and stink in the 
sun. Ken explained that anytime he tried to grab an arm or leg, it would come unattached from 
the body. Engineering units dug giant trenches with bulldozers and backhoes, where the enlisted 
men would roll or throw the decomposing bodies into a pit grave. For Ken, it was a lasting 
tribute to the futility and ugliness of the war, as he rotated home shortly thereafter.  
Life After Deployment 
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Like all Vietnam veterans, Ken returned home to a land divided between support and 
dissent for the war. Coming into San Francisco, several war protesters greeted the plane, 
shouting epithets at the off-loading soldiers. Ken was stunned into a dumbfounded silence by this 
treatment. When he landed in Chicago, a woman with a baby in her arms asked him point blank: 
“How’s it feel to be a baby killer?” right before he reunited with his family outside the airport. 
Once home, the reality of this pervasive anti-war sentiment truly set in: “You get back here and 
you listen to all the news and stuff going on. That Lieutenant Calley that killed all of them in the 
My Lai massacre, and [the photo of] that little girl running on fire. It was just so many bad things 
happened over there that you know, I tried to forget”.  
Ken threw himself into civilian life, and yet, the war never truly left him. For starters, two 
of his best friends from home were killed in the war. In addition, Ken worked for a Vietnam vet 
in a carpet company who used to hit the deck and crawl beneath tables anytime a loud noise 
occurred. Still, Ken married, had children, and built his own house by 1972. Unfortunately, and 
as is the case in so many instances amongst combat veterans, Ken’s marriage fell apart. It wasn’t 
until years later, in the early 80’s, that he met his current wife Karen. They met in a bar, where 
Ken recalled that this “little short shit” came over and asked him to buy her a drink. They bonded 
over a shared sense of humor and of having already been married with kids previously. Karen 
became the most positive influence in Ken’s life, reengaging him with church activities—in 
which he is still deeply committed—while they rebuilt a life together than now involves eight 
children and innumerable grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Family and community are at 
the center of their universe; Karen was unwilling to move from her small Wisconsin hometown, 
and Ken has now adopted it as his hometown, too.  
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 Unfortunately, more than anything else, Ken’s experience of Vietnam is directly tied to 
his exposure to Agent Orange and its devastating aftereffects. Almost from the moment he 
returned to the States, Ken began to experience the strange and terrible impact of this poisonous 
substance. In his own words: “Well, then they dropped this Agent Orange, which killed the 
foliage, the trees. Monsanto made it all. And Johnson said, ‘Go ahead’. If he [LBJ] was alive 
today, I’d kill him”. Ken began to experience problems walking, and by the late 80’s had 
developed drop-foot. Additionally, one of his sons was born with an abnormal heart defect which 
Ken now says has been linked to the impact of Agent Orange. This son’s daughter, Ken’s 
granddaughter, was born with the same defect. Both required surgery as infants in order to 
survive, and bear the scars today. Ken’s heart functionality was also impacted, as he 
continuously experienced arrhythmic aberrations in his heart beat and eventually needed several 
heart surgeries of his own.  
Today, Ken is practically immobile, and spends the majority of his weekly schedule 
either commuting to or at the Madison VA hospital, where the medical team is constantly 
treating him for Agent Orange-connected problems. Fluids are so prevalent in his system that he 
is 25lbs heavier simply due to water retention. He now has uncontrollable shaking, and was often 
at odds attempting to raise a glass or can to his mouth. Right before I met him, Ken fell from his 
front porch and landed in the bushes. He was unable to extricate himself and was saved only 
when one of neighbors noticed the soles of his shoes sticking out from the ground cover. As Ken 
stated to me in our final meeting: “If I break anything, I'm in a nursing home, because Karen 
can’t take care of me. She can’t lift me up if I fall. I mean, it's bad enough that she's got to put on 
my shoes.” Ken displayed a continuous—and understandable—bitterness about his physical 
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deterioration at the hands of the U.S. government, whose officials knew the side effects of the 
spray but chose to use it on and around U.S. ground troops anyway.  
Ken’s Epilogue 
When asked about his wartime experiences, Ken was more positive than I would have 
believed, given the myriad reasons for him to be bitter. He said: “At first I couldn't even talk 
about it, but now it's been so long and it's not so hard.” Ken joined both the Veterans of Foreign 
War (VFW) and the American Legion later in life and began to embrace his veteran status once 
the public acrimony over the Vietnam war had dissipated. Like many men of his generation, he 
did not have the luxury of coming home and lingering endlessly on his experiences—there was 
work to be done and a family to raise. Ken also brought several instances up where his wartime 
exposure to death was of benefit to the community. In a bizarre confluence of coincidences, Ken 
was present on four separate occasions where someone lost their life in an accident. Several of 
these people were his friends, yet, Ken was able to maintain his composure and assist in the 
recovery of bodies. In one detailed and graphic account, a friend left a bar right before Ken one 
night and got into a fatal accident where his car caught on fire. Following shortly from the bar, 
Ken was on the road when he saw the burning vehicle. Another friend who was on scene as a 
police officer told Ken it was the same buddy he’d just been with in the bar. Ken volunteered to 
help recover the body. He described it to me as:  
“He was in the car, yet there was nothing but charcoal pieces, a charcoal figure. His arm 
was caught between the shifter and the console; it was stuck down there, and the firemen 
got him loose and put him in this bag and were gonna carry him and put him in the 
ambulance. But all the fluids started coming out again. This guy [the EMT/Firefighter], 
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he puked and he lost it. So I said, ‘I’m here, let me help you do it’. I can do stuff like that. 
So yeah, it's come in handy a little”.  
Ultimately, Ken was able to find some of the positives in his experiences, even while 
remaining angry about his generation’s mistreatment both in the war by the government and after 
the war by the public. None of this seemed to impact his ability to move forward and get the 
business of living done. To me, Ken illustrates the blue-collar mentality of so many draftees in 
the Vietnam conflict who had no time to sit idle and reflect on the existential realities of their 
experiences post-combat. There were bills to pay and children to feed, and the meaning-making 
component of combat would have to wait for a later day and time when there was less urgency to 
make one’s way in the world and where, perhaps, there would be more understanding from the 
world in regards to this lost generations’ experiences of war.  
Dick’s Story: If at First You Don’t Succeed 
Introduction 
 My first encounter with Dick was in a newspaper clipping handed to me by a faculty 
member at the University of Wisconsin–Whitewater. Dick had received praise for his work in 
creating a substantial veterans’ memorial on town property and was also active in the local 
chapters of the VFW and American Legion. I reached out to Dick directly, and after several text 
messages, we were able to arrange our first meeting at a small diner near his home. Dick later 
confided in me that part of the reason he agreed so readily to the study was because of my own 
background as a combat infantryman. 
I knew when Dick arrived, because he drove an SUV with a Purple Heart specialized 
license plate, and there was a Vietnam Veteran campaign sticker on the back window. He was 
using a cane and only had partial abilities with his right arm and hand; I made the mistake of 
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squeezing too hard when we shook hands and nearly injured him. Dick was short and squat, with 
a full head of white hair in a neat crew cut, and a square face that seemed to be perpetually 
smiling. In contrast to his Vietnam-era counterpart Ken, Dick was easy-going, affable, and 
seemed near-impossible to offend. 
 Dick opened up immediately about many of his most harrowing experiences during that 
first hour together, and in all our subsequent meetings—done in a private room in the local 
library—he displayed this same sense of transparent honesty about his combat experiences and 
the tumultuous life that followed. In fact, Dick spoke so openly about his experiences during our 
first meeting, that I became worried other customers would hear some of the details and grow too 
sick to eat their food! Dick’s personal magnetism was such that it was difficult eventually not to 
view him as a type of surrogate uncle. This was borne out by many of his stories related to 
former wives and step-children (there were many of both) who remained in his life well after any 
formal or legal connections were severed. Dick told one story in which, at his retirement 
ceremony, all four of his ex-wives got up together and did a skit about him in good humor while 
the crowd roared and Dick laughed his approval. At the end of our final meeting together, Dick 
gifted me with the photo of him receiving his Purple Heart from General Casey while in the 
hospital. On the back of the photo is an inscription with the date of his wounding... it will be 50 
years ago this May. 
Training 
Dick grew up in small town Wisconsin, the son of a WWII veteran who received 5 battle 
stars while serving in the European theatre. His dad was the jeep driver for an Anti-Aircraft 
battalion commander and saw virtually all parts of the European battlefront, although he was 
never wounded himself. Dick and his father had an especially close bond that deepened 
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following the former’s experiences in war. Unlike some fathers who had seen service in WWII, 
it appears that Dick’s dad understood and appreciated what his son had gone through, without 
conflating his son’s honorable service with the many unsavory political and military components 
of that particular conflict.  
Dick was a natural entrepreneur as a youngster; he opened up a pizza shop with his best 
friend straight out of high school. In the midst of struggling to succeed in their business 
endeavor, both young men received their draft notices on the exact same day. They went to the 
recruitment office together to try and make a deal for non-combat duty. Dick’s friend was able to 
join the Air Force. Dick, on the other hand, was fed a line by the Army recruiter telling him he’d 
be able to join the Engineers and avoid all the fighting. Like so many other young people who 
have joined the service under false promises made by recruiters, Dick signed on the dotted line 
and was soon on a train to Fort Polk, Louisiana to train as an infantryman just like his fellow 
participant Ken several years before.  
 Also like Ken, Dick was offered a slot to go to Officer Candidate School but turned it 
down in favor of NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer) school, because he’d made a promise to his 
dad that he would get home in two years to help the old man with his construction business. 
Thus, Dick went to Fort Benning, Georgia and then through the NCO academy, graduating as a 
“Shake-n-Bake” Sergeant (E5). The term “Shake-n-Bake” was a pejorative term based on the 
famous chicken seasoning product, because it made “instant” NCO’s with little time-in-service 
to warrant their rank. These men were nonetheless thrust into noncommissioned leadership 
positions when they deployed to the war. Following this training, Dick was shipped to Vietnam 
as a solitary individual, headed to the 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav) that became famous in this 
war for being “air cavalry” traveling via Huey gunship in a modern-day replication of the horse 
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charges of yesteryear. In the well-known scene of Apocalypse Now where Robert Duvall and his 
men assault a beach via Huey chopper formation, they are meant to belong to the 1st Cavalry 
Division, with its distinctly large badge and unique shape being clear for audience members to 
see on the GI uniforms.  
Deployment 
Upon landing in Long Binh, Dick was in-processed and assigned to a combat unit 
stationed at a remote patrol base near the border of Cambodia. When he arrived via gunship, the 
unit was out on a week-long patrol. This Area of Operations (AO) was extremely hostile with the 
small, poorly defended garrison coming under daily mortar and small-arms attack from North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) stationed in and around them in the jungle. Members of the 
engineering unit responsible for the upkeep and defense of the outpost learned that Dick had 
experience operating heavy machinery. They ordered him out into the open on a bulldozer to 
create defensive berms for the base’s defense. When he started out, NVA began to take pot shots 
at Dick in the cockpit of the machine. After a few failed attempts this way, Dick and some others 
welded giant metal plates onto the sides of the operator’s seat to protect him from enemy fire. 
Additionally, two “Kit Carson” scouts—former North Vietnamese soldiers turned to the 
Southern cause—jumped onto the dozer without protection and returned fire the entire time that 
Dick built the berms. The bravery displayed by these scouts would have an impact on Dick later 
in tragic circumstances when they were killed. Ironically, Dick’s “trial-by-fire” introduction to 
warfare came performing some of the very engineering duties he’d hoped to be doing in lieu of 
frontline duty when he originally enlisted.  
 When Dick’s company eventually returned to the patrol base, he was assigned as an 
assistant squad leader—his E5 rank dictated a leadership position, while his status as a “Shake-n-
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Bake” warranted an interim period in which he was first an assistant leader,. At this time, in 
1970, the 1st Cav was doing covert operations across the border of Vietnam into Cambodia as a 
deterrent to NVA troop movement into South Vietnam; the North Vietnamese smartly used the 
roadways of neighboring Cambodia and Laos to move its troops, knowing they were technically 
off limits from U.S. involvement in foreign lands. At the very least, it was more difficult for the 
Americans to justify bombing campaigns that crossed international borders. However, the US 
leadership in Vietnam continued to send ground troops across at various intervals and on varied 
missions in order to stem this never-ending flow of troops and material to the combat zones of 
the south. What this meant, in reality, was that Dick’s unit was highly isolated, and up against 
superior numbers in the NVA regiments and brigades that were streaming through the 
Cambodian jungle and highlands. 
 Within days of leaving the patrol base, Dick had undergone a true baptism of fire, 
experiencing several firefights and the innumerable booby traps set up by the NVA in and 
around their Area of Operations (AO). In time, Dick became acquainted with “walking point” as 
the lead soldier in the column and was one of the rare men who learned to enjoy this hazardous 
duty. In his mind, it was safer to be in the front, because he always knew where the fire was 
coming from; in the middle of the company, it often felt as if small-arms fire was coming from 
all directions at once. Thus, Dick earned the respect of his compatriots in short order by taking 
on what was widely considered the riskiest position in the company (minus, perhaps, Platoon 
Leader and Radio Operator, who were often targeted on purpose). Other experiences that Dick 
talked about during this time included being hemmed in on all sides by superior NVA forces one 
night and having to call in “danger-close” artillery missions from far-away batteries that included 
naval support ships in the South China Sea as well as napalm bombing missions from scrambled 
 110 
Air Force jets. Dick expressed deep gratitude for the Air Force and Navy for their role in saving 
his company more than once. That night the rounds were landing as close as 40 meters away 
from their tightly huddled company perimeter. Additionally, Dick related that sometimes when 
he was walking point, and the jungle terrain broke up, he could see lines of NVA soldiers 
moving parallel to his own company to the left and right, tracking the American force like 
bloodhounds—a disconcerting sight to say the least.  
 It was in the midst of this chaotic scene that Dick’s battalion launched a “hammer and 
anvil” operation, with several companies moving in a large sweep of Cambodian jungle (the 
“hammer”) with the intent to flush out NVA soldiers toward Dick’s waiting company serving as 
the “anvil” component on which the NVA would be trapped and destroy themselves. The 
problem, as Dick described it, was that the NVA force coming down on the company would be 
an entire brigade of regular NVA troops—several times again the size of Dick’s battalion, much 
less his company of 120 men. The fact that they were operating illegally in Cambodia made 
intelligence gathering on the enemy that much more difficult, leading to a deadly 
underestimation of the forces in the area. During this operation, Dick spoke about how it truly 
became only a matter of days before it was your turn to get hit—every single day brought further 
casualties in the unit, to the point that as an up-jumped squad leader (all the original squad 
leaders were KIA or MIA), he barely attempted to speak to new members, as he knew they 
would soon be evacuated as casualties or in body bags.  
 True to his instinctual feel for the moment, Dick’s turn came quickly enough. In a 
particularly intense firefight, Dick was blown by a mortar round into a nearby tree. As American 
forces pulled back from their position, he was initially left for dead. However, a brave assistant 
machine gunner ran back out under cover fire from their fallback position and dragged Dick to 
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relative safety. Unfortunately, one of Dick’s most damaging memories was of laying prone and 
awaiting Medevac with the body of one of his closest friends right next to him, staring at him 
with dead eyes.  
Later, in an emergency hospital unit, a surgeon told Dick he’d have to have his right arm 
amputated at the shoulder. Dick threatened to kill the man, and said he’d rather die with his arm 
then live without it, due to the fact that he was a blue-collar guy and would need both his arms 
and hands to do the work back home. The surgeon conceded, and attempted an operation to 
maintain the arm. Dick would remain in the hospital for 13 months, and would never regain full 
use of his right arm or hand. Significantly, he was also never able to say goodbye to his 
comrades in the field... he had only been in Vietnam a few months.  
Life After Deployment 
Dick’s life after the war has spanned five decades, five marriages, six children, and a 
lifetime full of stories. Much like his Vietnam counterpart Ken, Dick felt that he did not have the 
luxury of dealing with his psychological wounds after the war...there was too much work to be 
done. When he returned to Wisconsin following his medical discharge, Dick fulfilled the 
promise he made to his dad by working alongside him in his construction company. The two 
men, father and son, grew closer due to their shared combat experience. Dick maintains that his 
father shared things with him that no one else in the family—not even his mother—has ever been 
privy to hearing. Their bond would last up until his father’s passing, and Dick still recollects 
memories of his father with clear enjoyment and pride.  
 As a burgeoning family man himself, Dick enjoyed less success, at least in the early years 
and decades following the war. He had three biological children and eventually adopted three 
more with a later (but not the last) wife. While he has maintained close relationships with his 
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kids and grandkids, Dick was much less successful at making romantic connections work. He 
became a functioning alcoholic and workaholic, burying himself in the all-too-common mixture 
of work and drink that consumed so many 20th century American men.  
 One of the reasons that Dick struggled in his personal life was a “live-in-the-moment” 
attitude he’d cultivated since surviving the war. One of the medics who looked after him in the 
hospital told Dick he likely wouldn’t live past 40 years old, which flipped a switch in his mind 
about how to go through the rest of life. In his own words:  
“When I came back, I had this thing in my head: ‘never look back’. I mean, you might be 
here today, and you're gone tomorrow, and never look back, because what you did the 
day before, you don't want to remember. So never looking back... was a big problem in 
my marriages. I mean, every time there was a situation, whether I brought it up or my 
wife at that time brought it up, my idea of fixing it was just, ‘let's end this marriage’. And 
that's why I've been married so many times”.  
The tally of this attitude began to pile up over the years and not only in relation to romantic 
partnerships. Dick was also busy stuffing down his negative memories and experiences from the 
war, plugging the hole in his heart with alcohol. While he stopped having nightmares in his late 
20’s (they would resurface in his 50’s), his temper became a thing to behold, especially when 
drinking. He related one incident during a time period in which he actually owned and ran a bar 
(not the best work for an alcoholic), when a young man spit tobacco juice on the bar floor. Dick 
grabbed the boy by the throat, dragged him to the door, and smashed his head into the pane 
where the bar rules were posted. Then, he hurled him out of the bar by his belt loops. Strangely 
enough, this man later apologized for his behavior and became a good friend, which is perhaps a 
testament to other side of Dick’s nature that is so joyful and welcoming.  
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 In the early 2000’s, things came to a head. Dick got in a fight with his co-supervisor 
during a highway construction project and tried to drag the man out of his car by the head. He 
finally sought treatment at the local VA and began working with a female psychiatrist to find 
medications that would help him calm down. Additionally, Dick did some group work at this 
time with other Vietnam veterans that helped him tremendously. Before treatment, he was 
experiencing bouts of both suicidal and homicidal ideation with frequency. 
 In a piece of rare good fortune in his life, Dick reconnected with a woman whom he had 
fallen in love with 25 years before while he was a married man of 34 and she was a 19-year-old 
girl. The brief relationship had been the scandal of their small town. Dick went on to get 
divorced, and the girl grew into adulthood, was married, had children, and then was later 
divorced, herself. When they met again, Dick had been married four times. This time, however, 
was different: when the two were married, it stuck. Dick is still happily married to his wife 
Deborah to this day, 14 years later. In a humorous twist, Dick was named the Town Marshal of 
the 4th of July parade in recent years, which meant that he and his wife rode in the parade on the 
back of a convertible waving to the crowd. At one point during the day, his wife leaned over to 
him and said, “30 years ago we started as a scandal, and now we’re at the head of the parade. 
Can you believe it?” 
Deborah was also instrumental in getting Dick sober. In Dick’s words, she gave him the 
following ultimatum: “It’s either me or Jack [Daniels]. You can’t have both.” Since getting 
sober, Dick is now able to drink in moderation when on vacation or celebrating a special event, 
but gone are the days of grabbing and throwing people by their necks. At his wife’s 
encouragement, Dick also went to visit one of the movable versions of the Vietnam Memorial. 
He had originally been suspect, knowing that it was designed by an Asian woman, and that it 
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was supposedly partially “underground.” However, he changed his mind after seeing the 
movable memorial, and the pair made plans to visit the actual memorial site in D.C.  
When Dick and Deborah went to Washington, they had to start at the Korean War 
Memorial (in which Deb’s uncle had fought) and then work their way toward the Vietnam 
Memorial, because it was so hard for Dick to approach it. When he was finally able to go up 
close, Dick looked for the name of his friend he had lain beside all those years ago—a Sergeant 
Blue. To his horror, Dick discovered that five other members of his unit had been killed in the 
same engagement that day; he never knew what happened after he was medevac’d. Dick broke 
down and was unable to breath. In what must have been a poignant scene, two kindly National 
Park Rangers came and helped carry Dick away from the Memorial, where one of them simply 
sat with Dick on the grass while he sobbed and tried to catch his breath, saying nothing.  
It was after visiting the Memorial that Dick’s nightmares returned. He dreamt often of the 
devastating aftereffects of Claymore mine ambushes which sliced human beings apart at waist 
level with thousands of tiny metal balls. He also began keeping a shotgun by his bedside, afraid 
he would be attacked in the dark. Finally, his psychiatrist put him on a powerful sleeping 
medication that he still takes to this day—20 minutes after swallowing it he will be lights out, 
with no dreams, for eight hours.  
 Unfortunately, the sleep medication is not the only medicine Dick needs to survive. In 
constant pain since his wounding, Dick has remained on pain meds for the past 50 years. To 
make matters worse, Dick—like Ken—now suffers from the horrific consequences of exposure 
to Agent Orange. He has Leukemia and heart disease, both traced back to the effects of the toxin, 
and he once had to have his jaw wired shut due to a painful inability to swallow. He received all 
his foods and liquids via a stomach tube for half a year. At our first meeting, Dick put a single 
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pill case on the diner top and opened it, pointing with a crooked finger at truly gigantic pill. 
“$2500 a pop,” he said. It was a chemotherapy pill he takes every single day, the price of which 
outside the VA system would be astronomical. Like so many other Vietnam vets, Dick’s 
thoughts and feelings about the war will forever be tied up in his unending health problems. As 
he once said to me regarding any guilt and shame he still feels from the war:  
“The pain never lets you forget”.  
Dick’s Epilogue 
 During one of the bouts of illness that kept Dick out of work, the construction company 
he’d loyally served for decades attempted to let him go. Barely able to walk—his wife had set up 
a walking course around lawn chairs for him to practice at intervals in the garage—Dick 
nonetheless found the wherewithal to drive down to the company building and confront his 
employers. When they reached an impasse, Dick insisted on resigning his position rather than 
being given a severance package, as he’d never been fired from a job in his life. Afterward, he 
had to ask one of the men to take him home, as he could no longer stand up or see straight. 
 In retirement, Dick has thrown himself into the creation of an entire park dedicated to 
American veterans. With his construction background and connections, he was instrumental in 
the design, contracting, and construction of the park. Dick and I went to see it one day, and I 
must say that it’s one of the better-looking Veterans parks I’ve seen anywhere in small town 
USA. There is a gigantic memorial with flags, a brand-new pavilion and lavatory for summer 
picnicking, and substantial grounds full of trees and well-manicured flower beds. It is a testament 
to Dick’s commitment to the veterans’ cause, and perhaps to the unforeseen reversal of life’s 
fortunes that has gifted him so much in the autumn of his life. To close his chapter, and in honor 
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of Dick’s experience at the Vietnam Memorial, I now include the following stanzas from 
Vietnam medic Penny Kettlewell, written in 1990: 
But the war’s been done for twenty years, 
Their faces blurred by long dried tears 
As I find their names upon the Wall 
Fading and forgotten through the pall 
I hold them. 
Endless bodies that once held life 
Corpses produced by appalling strife 
Through hopeless days and nights of pain 
As I seek a way to feel life again 
I hold them. 
They have become such a part of me 
When you look at me, who do you see? 
Can I live if I set them free? 
Who will hold them 
And salvage me? 
Chapter Summary 
 You have now read the stories of these five men, all of whom were combat veterans of 
the United States Army, but whose individual experiences were so diverse, so expansive, as to 
make them almost alien to one another at certain times. Yet, there are in equal proportion a 
number of commonalities among their stories that resonate across time, place, and person. All of 
this, as well as the subjective realities of my own combat story, must be further inspected for 
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elements of intersectionality and nuanced consideration. The following chapter will discuss these 
many elements in further detail. I hope that in telling these stories I have done justice to the 
experiences of my participants, each of whom deserves much more than was given to him on 
these pages. Still it is a strange token of admiration for my fellow soldiers that I know how little 
each of us expects in return for what has been given to the cause:  
Was there a man dismayed? 
Not though the soldier knew 
Someone had blundered. 
Theirs not to make reply, 
Theirs not to reason why, 
Theirs but to do and die 




CHAPTER V: NARRATIVE THREADS 
Telling the stories of participants is only a starting point in narrative inquiry. Within 
those life experiences are a multitude of intersectional and divergent considerations that demand 
consideration, deliberation, and expansion. A good researcher will attempt to build a truly three-
dimensional worldview of participant life, one that encapsulates the whole of experience related 
to the subject matter, not only a narrow categorization of data.  
Throughout the many hours spent both with these five participants and their stories, a 
significant number of commonalities and disparities crept to the forefront of the larger narrative 
body. What follows is an attempt to acknowledge the universal experiences of combat while still 
parsing out the particularities of generational and individual experience. To hold firm to the 
qualitative distinctions of the narrative inquiry study, which does not typically seek out themes 
or categorizations (as in, e.g., phenomenology), I will use the Three Commonplaces of 
Temporality, Sociality, and Place to help establish the flexibility and nuance that are the 
hallmarks of narrative study.  
To further emphasize certain points, I will include quotations from interviews with Dr. 
Edward Tick, best-selling author on moral injury among combat veterans. Dr. Tick has worked 
treating vets in private practice for the past 35 years and was gracious enough to speak with me 
on a number of occasions regarding my research. The inclusion of Dr. Tick’s expertise is another 
form of layering to add breadth and depth to the exploration of these narrative threads, and his 
commentary was invaluable in helping me frame my own thinking on the subject matter 





 While all three commonplaces were integral in understanding participant experience, 
temporality contained the starkest divides between members. Among them was not only the 
generational divide, but more subtle components related to the unfolding of time, such as 
comparison points between former generations of combatants and the mythos surrounding the 
“good war” of WWII, experiences of moral injury before and after combat, and the devastating 
longitudinal impact of Agent Orange on the Vietnam generation. Last to be discussed among 
temporal factors, there will be a consideration regarding the unreliability of memory as a 
narrative device despite its necessity in telling any and all stories from the past.  
The Generational Divide 
 The most obvious distinction between participants was their age, as two separate 
generations of veterans were represented in the study; they could well have been fathers and 
sons. In fact, the generational component of military service was a factor for almost all of the 
participants who had fathers, mothers, grandfathers, and uncles who served in the military both 
in peacetime and in war. All three modern-day veterans were influenced in their joining the 
military due to a family tradition of service, and while Ken and Dick were both drafted, they 
each spoke separately about the impact their own fathers’ service in WWII had on them as young 
men. Dick, in particular, held his father in high esteem as a soldier who managed to survive (and 
was somehow never wounded) throughout the entire European campaign of WWII. While it 
remains unspoken, perhaps some of these familial sentiments regarding honorable military 
service influenced those participants who made the deliberate choice to deploy (Ken) or redeploy 
(Rich) with the express intent of serving with their peers. In any event, there are particularities 
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related to military service among all the participants that can be traced back at least two 
generations to the last world-wide war.  
The Greatest Generation Dilemma. When I (the author) worked in veterans’ advocacy 
on Capitol Hill, my boss was a former Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter pilot who had flown 
(and crashed) in Afghanistan. We had a tense working relationship as befits a former 
infantryman and pilot working in close proximity. One day this animosity spilled over into 
physical confrontation when he asked me: “How’s it feel to know you served in the wrong war?” 
I was incensed by the question, not only because I deemed it disrespectful to the memory of my 
friends who died in Iraq, but also because it erroneously presumed (as he well knew) that 
soldiers were free to choose when and where they fought American wars. Thus, even within the 
last generation of combatants, there is sometimes a sense of rightness or wrongness in relation to 
the particular war that was fought and the reasons for so doing according to the government and 
the public.  
The fact remains, however, that the reasons cited for each of the major (and minor) 
conflicts initiated by the United States since World War II—in retrospect—remain alternately 
confounding, questionable, or criminal... depending on who is doing the explaining. The 
Vietnam and Iraq veterans are not alone in questioning the necessity of their sacrifice among 
American combatants; it is a sentiment ubiquitous among our entire veteran population. The fact 
that this includes some WWII veterans did not prevent subsequent generations from using the 
last World War as the standard bearer by which all other wars were (and still are) measured. The 
members of the “Greatest Generation” remain the placeholders for conducting war according to 
American ideals: (a) with righteous cause; (b) against a mighty opponent; (c) in a world-wide 
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conflagration; (d) with the ideals of democracy at stake; (e) and winner-takes-all stakes, (f) in a 
scenario where only the might of America stands in the way of an objective evil. 
The problem then is axiomatic: there has never again been a war that even remotely 
reached these heights of collective power and expectation and perhaps never can be in the future 
due to the destructive capacities of modern-day technological warfare. While political rhetoric 
and public sentiment favor bold proclamations that echo the grandeur of WWII, the reality of 
what warfare has become in the decades since the last world-wide conflict leaves a chasm 
between expectation and reality.  
Components of this disconnect were on display by all the participants at different times. 
Ken and Dick, for instance, both suffered from the feelings of inadequacy that lingered for many 
Vietnam vets when they were inevitably compared (and did their own comparing) to the previous 
generation of combatants. The “3rd Gen” veterans—the grandchildren of the WWII survivors—
compared themselves and their wars to both the last World War and to the Vietnam war. 
Ironically, they did not experience the Vietnam veterans as any less established in their bona 
fides as combat soldiers than the WWII vets, despite the former group’s collective sense of 
inadequacy or dysfunction when compared to their parents’ generation. For instance, both Joe 
and Rich took pride in having dads and uncles who fought in Vietnam, while Aaron seemed to 
think less of his father for evading military service during the draft. This could be due in part to 
the many war films that often inadvertently glorified the Vietnam conflict for the next generation 
of warriors through brutal depictions of combat, such as Platoon, Apocalypse Now, Hamburger 
Hill, Casualties of War and, even the seemingly benign Forrest Gump.  
Another explanation could hinge on the notion that three decades elapsed between major 
American wars; there was ample time for public sentiment to change regarding Vietnam 
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veterans. They went from being ostracized and condemned for their part in the engagement to the 
subject of much public support and sympathy, when it became clear how many ‘Nam vets were 
dying on the streets from substance use, exposure, or suicide. After the tumultuous anti-war 
movement of the 1960’s dissipated and dissolved, the young men and women who shouted at 
people like Ken and Dick, calling them baby killers, had much accounting to do for their 
behavior in later life. The Baby Boomer generation moved into middle-age, and many took on 
the mantle of responsibility they had previously spurned. For some, this no doubt included a 
reckoning with their own actions against Vietnam veterans, which targeted lower-working-class 
citizens lacking the ability to avoid conscription through a deferment in college or serving in a 
National Guard unit. Hindsight seems to have opened the eyes of many Boomers to the 
disparities inherent in the draft system and to the injustice many veterans received at the hands of 
their government and their fellow citizens.  
The standard set by WWII continues to pervade public discourse and private sentiment. 
Combat veterans since WWII have not only had to defend their actions to the public in real-time, 
but—it could be argued—are also held accountable by themselves and others for the ways in 
which they were unable to scale the heights of greatness set by their WWII forebears. Yet, 
according to Dr. Peck, the glorified soldiers of WWII were no less disillusioned by their service, 
despite the supposed rightness of their cause: 
“Many American soldiers during World War Two were also demoralized and 
disillusioned and thought that this was a European conflict and an American shouldn't be 
in it. Eisenhower viewed and heard that disillusionment and loss of purpose... [that is 
why] he ordered all American units within 50 miles of any concentration camp to redirect 
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and walk past them through the camp and see it. His purpose was to restore the fighting 
purpose [of the men]”.  
Thus, Dr. Peck corrected me on one of my assumptions--namely, that the retroactively perceived 
justice of a cause (in public hindsight) does not necessarily translate to less moral injury or 
dissatisfaction with the war as it was fought by individuals at that time. It is important to 
remember that while WWII is the “Great War” to many of us now, this was by no means the 
comprehensive understanding of it to those who did the fighting in that era, many of whom were 
also conscript soldiers the same as those who would fight in Vietnam 25 years later.  
This notion—of how we perceive the justness of a cause in hindsight—may be 
tangentially connected to the early 20th century combat experiences studied by Grossman (2009) 
in his seminal work, On Killing, in which many WWI and WWII veterans admitted to firing over 
the opposing soldiers’ heads in lieu of taking human life. It is safe to say that some component of 
disillusionment was present for these soldiers, even if it wasn’t written about with the same 
vehemence as in later generations.  
Taken on the collective, the results of the current study highlight some of the ways that 
the WWII generation—while not represented directly in these pages—contributed to the 
mentality and self-perception of the next two generations of combat veterans. Victors write the 
history books, as the saying goes, and it may be that WWII was the last moment when America 
was fully in control of our collective narrative as a “Global Force for Good” (one of the U.S. 
Navy’s most recent mottos).  
Public sentiment concerning American wars continues to be influenced by this 
perspective despite diminishing returns on its accuracy, veracity, and relevance. Service 
members are often the ones who continue to struggle with the implications of this false standard 
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well beyond time in uniform. The Vietnam generation bore the brunt of these unfair 
comparisons. Modern-day vets are in the unenviable position, meanwhile, of comparing 
themselves to service members in the opposite theater of war, to their parents’ generation of 
Vietnam veterans, and to the grandparents now mythologized into the pantheon of American 
lore. It is in this WWII generation where we perhaps last believed in our inherent superiority, 
based on a moral righteousness as the leading democracy of the world. Everything since has 
suggested otherwise.  
Time Heals and Time Hurts 
 Related to the generational divide between participants was the following observation: 
the Vietnam veterans appeared to have firmly made their peace with participation in the war, 
while at least two of the modern-day vets seemed to still be grappling with many of the issues 
they encountered in the service. While 10 or 15 years may seem a lifetime since the war to those 
of us who fought in Iraq or Afghanistan, 50 years actually is the lifespan of humans in some 
harder parts of the world. Both Vietnam vets Ken and Dick went through significant upheaval in 
their personal lives past the longitudinal point at which OIF/OEF veterans are now living. Dick, 
in particular, had several divorces and bar fights ahead of him when he was in his mid to late 
thirties; one might drolly observe that Dick was only getting started on creating the chaos that 
would mark his passage into middle age. This was an important distinction in the study: while 
none of the men were serene in their recollections of combat, the distance from those experiences 
was more pronounced in the older veterans, the memories more granular and faded.  
 Still, there were moments when the older participants were touched by emotion. Dick, for 
instance, still grew tearful when talking about his dead friend at the Medevac site and of his time 
visiting the Memorial. In two separate interviews, he had to take a break from our private library 
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room and take a walk to recompose himself. Ken was still moved when speaking about his dead 
Mama-san in the wire and of the close calls he encountered with death. It was clear from these 
moments and others that certain memories were deeply imprinted on their psyches. There was 
certainly a moral component to such experiences, as they were also the memories that seemed to 
make both men question the war and its purpose.  
Agent Orange 
The most significant temporal distinction between generations, however, was around the 
physical ramifications of warfare and the moral injury which accompanied both Vietnam vets’ 
experiences of exposure to Agent Orange. Ken and Dick were aged beyond their years by the 
complications of this horrific poison, and each suffered tremendously in their day-to-day lives 
due to its continuing consequences on their physical health. Dick’s symptoms were complicated 
by his combat wounding and near death experience. Ken was utterly ruined by the diseases 
brought on by exposure, and there is no question that his pessimistic attitude toward life and his 
general unease with social interaction are in direct relation to a continuous level of pain and 
frustration brought on by the relentless course of his medical diagnoses.  
 In many ways, Agent Orange was the physical manifestation of the government’s 
betrayal of its warriors during Vietnam. Trapped in an ambiguous war without a clear and 
distinct rationale for engagement, with the majority of soldiers serving as unwilling conscripts, 
an entire generation of young, poor Americans was tasked with carrying the heavy mantle of 
mistakes made by wealthy (and extremely safe) politicians and generals in Washington. The 
ignominy of the Vietnam conflict was perversely carried forward through time by the unending 
agonies of the veterans themselves in relation to PTSD, moral injury, substance use, 
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homelessness, and the long-term consequences of Agent Orange that was deployed with the full 
knowledge of its deleterious impact on human health.  
I found it impossible to engage either Vietnam veteran without constant reminders of 
their precarious physical condition, due in large part to Agent Orange. Both men could hardly 
walk, both were forced into early retirement due to their disabilities, both were constantly 
visiting the VA hospital over an hour away in Madison, and both relied on their spouses to help 
with basic household tasks such as laundry, cooking, and using the bathroom.  
While Dick responded to these setbacks with cheerful aplomb, and Ken reacted in sullen 
silence, I made a point to remember that neither man had asked for this suffering which plagued 
them through the majority of their days. I am sure Ken did not wish to take several minutes to 
answer his door or to be incapable of standing without help. Dick surely did not enjoy taking the 
handicapped ramp instead of the three small steps into the library everytime we met, or having to 
wind his way through lawn chairs in the garage as a means of relearning how to walk. I was and 
still am struck by the precariousness of these men’s health at a time when many of their peers are 
still able-bodied, working, and active. The legacy of Agent Orange will continue forward well 
past the marker of Dick and Ken’s lives as one of the most treacherous and callous forms of 
moral betrayal ever perpetrated against American service members by their government.  
For these two Vietnam veterans, the passage of time has wrought a morbid tradeoff: they 
remember less from the war and are less impacted by what they do remember, while at the same 
time are handed increasingly severe physical symptoms as a constant reminder of the Agent 
Orange that has caused such devastation among their veteran ranks. They are more secure with 
themselves, and with their actions, than their younger counterparts. They are also much, much 
more fragile, and the physicality that both men prized as blue-collar workers was irrevocably 
 127 
seized from them well before the due date demanded by old age. Thus, the conversation naturally 
moves toward the discussion of moral injury not as a constant, but as a phenomenon that is 
capable of fluctuation both before and after combat, and not as a singular event of combat alone.  
Moral Injury Before and After Combat 
 Connected to the Vietnam generation’s exposure to Agent Orange is the significant 
finding that many of the morally injurious experiences (MIE) of the participants were either pre- 
or post-combat. Aaron, for instance, had a sequence of MIE’s before deploying, and one 
catastrophic moral injury (MI) following; the combat itself was not what left a permanent mark 
on his being. Likewise, Joe had an MIE after combat in witnessing his dead comrade and 
immediately spun himself up about not being there for his friends retroactively. He was also 
triggered in police work in ways that could be connected to his wartime experiences, much like 
my own experiences as a police officer. Ken had the experience of an unwanted sexual advance 
prior to his deployment that could have impacted his conceptualization of manhood and military 
service. Dick, Ken, and Rich all suffered post-deployment from the physical consequences of 
warfare, compounded by an institutional failure on the part of both the military and the VA to 
care for the wounded in an appropriate and timely manner. Dick and Ken were forced to toil with 
unexplained physical diseases for decades before the VA admitted they were connected to Agent 
Orange exposure. Rich was given an unending supply of opiate painkillers without oversight 
from medical professionals which led directly to his opioid addiction and subsequent struggles.  
 What these examples suggest is that MIE’s (and subsequent MI’s) commonly take place 
in noncombat scenarios, even among veterans. They may be compounded by the stress of an 
impending deployment or by the physical, mental, and spiritual ramifications following combat; 
but they nonetheless can be designated as MI’s in their own right. This longitudinal 
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interconnectivity of experiences is underrepresented in the moral injury literature on combat 
veterans, and may offer a substantial contribution to the burgeoning field of study that demands 
further inquiry and research. This will be revisited in Chapter VI as part of the discussion on 
future research.  
Memory as an Unreliable Narrator  
 There is no speaking to multiple generations of combat veterans without also recognizing 
the limitations and proclivities of memory, which we now know can be highly selective 
(Woodman, Carlisle, & Reinhart, 2013). In reality, the most obvious and instantaneous example 
of this was in my continued frustrations with booking interviews with Ken, who routinely mixed 
up the day of the week on which I would be visiting. Even after watching him write the next 
appointment on his desk calendar, I found that Ken still confused his days and expected me on a 
Tuesday versus the correct date on a Thursday. This inability to remember basic dates made me 
wary of the veracity of Ken’s wartime claims, and yet for many, it seems long-term memories 
are more easily recalled than the short-term plans one makes week in and week out. My own 
grandfather, for instance, can still recall stories from the 1930’s and his wartime experiences in 
the 1940’s, but he will immediately forget what we’re talking about every two minutes or so in 
conversation.  
 Dialogue about memory amongst present-day veterans is incomplete without 
acknowledging the impact of traumatic brain injury (TBI) on veterans’ ability to recall vital 
information. With increased protective mechanisms such as enhanced Kevlar body armor and 
“up-armor” packages on transport vehicles designed to withstand the power of all but the largest 
IED blasts, the last generation of combat veterans was much more likely to survive the types of 
explosions that would have been designated as “catastrophic losses” (i.e., multiple KIA) in 
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earlier wars. Of course, the downside of this increased technology is that the human brain is still 
susceptible to bouncing around the skull in a tumult no matter how soft the cushioning of one’s 
helmet on the outside. This reality has led to an increase in TBI among OIF/OEF vets, and may 
have significant long-term effects on their mental health and cognition (e.g., Santhanam, Wilson, 
Mulatya, Oakes, & Weaver, 2019).  
My own continuing struggle with memory from TBI is a simultaneous testament to these 
amazing protective technologies but also to the hidden ways in which veterans are wounded, 
sometimes without being certain of it for years. While I adapted to memory loss by creating a 
system of diligent note-taking (aided by my work as a counselor), my long-term memory has 
gaps in it that are as large as 2-3 years, in which I can recall nothing that happened for large 
stretches of my early adult life. If a relation or friend brings up something that occurred, I can 
then remember it, but left to my own devices, it is as if there is a veil over certain times, places, 
and people. Of my marriage, which lasted the first three years after my combat tour, I can 
perhaps recall five or six memories in total. Two of the OIF/OEF participants—Rich and Aaron 
—were diagnosed with TBI related to injuries sustained during their military service. If TBI was 
a known diagnosis during Vietnam, I am confident Dick would have also received confirmation 
that he suffered a TBI when he was literally blown up into the branches of a tree after laying 
prone on the ground in fighting position a moment before.  
 While memory is unreliable, it is nonetheless useful in a narrative study to examine the 
selectivity with which people choose to recall certain moments, forget others, and perhaps 
accentuate or minimize their role at different times and in particular circumstances. It is notable, 
for instance, that none of the participants—at any time—chose to portray their combat 
experiences in heroic terms. This aligns with my own sense of self in relation to wartime 
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experience—there was a job to be done, and you did it despite being alternately scared, angry, 
bored, frustrated, tired, and (almost always) physically uncomfortable. Heroism, on the other 
hand, was not something that ever seemed in the realm of consideration. To be brave enough to 
stand and fight, to remain calm, to not run away or let your voice break on the radio, this was all 
a combat leader could hope to do. My number one priority, aside from protecting my men and 
being fundamentally sound in battle tactics, was to remain calm no matter the circumstance, 
because this façade of calmness bolstered the confidence of the soldiers and was something that 
was expected of line-company infantry officers everywhere I served. These components of 
service, related to memory and selectivity but also to interpersonal relationship, serve as the 
bridge to move into the discussion on Sociality. That is, the human interactions that give our 
stories meaning.  
Sociality 
At the outset of the topic of sociality, it is worth considering whether former warriors are 
more or less forthright when talking with fellow combat veterans in a professional capacity 
versus their civilian clinical counterparts. While a fellow vet may understand in greater detail 
what was experienced and why certain actions were taken, there is also the risk of being judged 
by a fellow military veteran for details a civilian may not notice. A particularity as benign as the 
unit a person served with, their MOS, or the terms of their discharge, to cite several examples, 
can immediately lead another veteran to certain conclusions about the speaker—regardless of 
whether or not the conclusions are accurate, fair, or reasonable.  
As an example, in the officer corps of the Army, all cadets graduating in a given year 
(i.e., ROTC, West Point, etc.) are in competition with each other to “branch” into what are 
largely considered more popular forms of Army service such as Infantry, Aviation, Armor (i.e., 
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tanks), and Intelligence. Cadets are literally ranked from first-to-last across the nation. Each 
cadet fills out a “wish list” of their branch choices (also from first-to-last; a military theme), and 
then the Army fills their quotas for each branch down the line one at a time. When there are no 
more slots available for Second Lieutenants in the Infantry, for instance, they will be dropped to 
the next highest preference on their list and so on. What this means in practical terms is that 
Army officers who branch into components such as the Chemical Corps, Transportation, 
Quartermaster, or Ordnance are often—but not always—the lower ranked cadets from their class. 
Thus, among Army officers, a pecking order is formed, predicated on something as simple as 
branch selection, from before the time these young men and women are even commissioned to 
serve in the military.  
At times, animosity exists between groups within a larger branch of the military. 
Historically, many frontline Army soldiers have resented the Military Police (MP) for their role 
in holding fighting men accountable for “chicken-shit” violations. While this seemed less 
pronounced in the Iraq war, due to the fact that MP units were often tasked with the same 
dangerous convoy missions as all other units, some of these intra-service biases may come into 
play anytime two veterans meet.  
The same holds true for inter-service rivalries between the larger branches of service 
themselves. The Army and Marine Corps, for instance, who together bear the largest burden of 
modern warfare, consider one another with what could be equally characterized as hostile 
cooperation or cooperative hostility. While I personally had only positive experiences working 
with Marines during the war, I have had several experiences with Marine Corps vets outside of 
combat that left me aggravated or annoyed. For better or worse, all the members of the current 
study served in the Army, and the Marine Corps was not represented. However, this was due to 
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happenstance, as all messaging regarding participation in the study was simply directed at 
combat veterans with combat-related military occupations.  
What these examples illustrate are the various ways that being a veteran when doing 
research on veterans or clinical work with veterans can be both an asset and a liability; it may 
simultaneously open certain doors and shut others. What follows is a discussion on the ways that 
vets perceived their relationships to themselves, to each other, to their families and friends, to the 
public, and to me as a veteran-researcher throughout the study.  
Vet-to-Vet Research 
In my professional experience as researcher and clinician, veterans have historically 
acknowledged more willingness to be open with me based on our shared military histories. 
Several members of this study stated flatly that my being a combat infantryman contributed to 
their decision to participate. However, there is (as of yet) no objective way to determine whether 
veteran-to-veteran disclosures are embellished with the intent to impress a fellow combat soldier, 
downplayed to avoid the perception of self-aggrandizement, or given without any alternative or 
supplemental intention. This will be further explored in the Implications for Future Research 
section of Chapter VI.  
Such vet-to-vet disclosure is not limited to clinical or research-oriented relationships. 
Dick described making friends with a fellow in his hometown with whom he bonded over shared 
wartime stories, only to find out many years later that the man was a fraud and had never served. 
Likewise, his former brother-in-law claimed to be a Navy SEAL in Vietnam, only for Dick to 
find out later the man served 2 years in the Navy brig before receiving a dishonorable discharge. 
These incidents, certainly, highlight the way a certain group of outsiders wants to be part of the 
military subculture they find so alluring, but they also demonstrate how Dick shared his 
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experiences with these men—supposed fellow vets—in ways he would not do with other family 
or friends (aside from his dad, a fellow war vet). Using the aforementioned analogy, this sense of 
shared military experience opened doors for communication that otherwise would remain shut.  
Ultimately, what became clear from my experiences conducting this year-long process 
was that veterans were more willing to at least talk to me given my military background, even if 
when we spoke their responses may (or may not) have been altered to align with certain 
perceptions of what I represented as both an interviewer and a fellow combat vet. While 
admittedly biased in my perception of the process, it remains my view that the veterans I worked 
with were honest and straightforward in their accounts of wartime service, even given the 
vicissitudes of time and memory. This was confirmed in their retelling of the same stories, or in 
follow-up questions to the same, none of which altered in detail over time.  
Warrior Identity 
 A major component of the research questioning in this study was related to the specific 
experiences of vets with combat-related specialties in the service, and how this impacted their 
perception of MIE and MI. In other words, how did a warrior identity built around the classic 
conceptualization of the frontline fighter translate to actual experiences of moral injury during 
wartime service. There were two sharp distinctions related to this critical factor in the formation 
of soldier identity among the veterans who participated: (a) active duty versus reserve 
component duty; and (b) conscription duty versus volunteer duty. What follows is a brief account 
of each consideration, vital to the individual’s self-concept as soldier-citizen in wartime, and to 
their experiences of moral injury before, during, and after combat.  
 Active Versus Reserve Duty. To the first distinction, there was an irrefutable similarity 
in the experiences of the two participants—Rich and Aaron —who joined the Army National 
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Guard. This was in contrast to Joe, who joined the active duty Army, where it was his expected 
full-time job throughout the tenure of his contract. Both former National Guardsmen, one a field 
artilleryman and the other an infantryman, expressed dismay at the physical and emotional 
condition of their units upon arrival from advanced individual training (AIT). Both young men 
found it difficult to connect and make friends at first due to the insular nature of the National 
Guard, where members serving together had often known each other their entire lives. Where 
Rich was able to bridge this gap, make friends, and gain acceptance; Aaron was never allowed to 
move into the shared space of wartime intimacy—a fact that continues to influence his life 
trajectory today.  
Furthermore, upon deployment, both Aaron and Rich discovered the shocking liability of 
belonging to a unit that was neither well-equipped nor well-trained for combat. There is truth in 
the adage about military units that the harder their training, the better the fighting will go. 
Unfortunately, the opposite is also true: poorly trained units often experience high casualties. 
While Aaron watched the Twin Towers video with the heavy metal soundtrack as part of his 
combat preparation, Joe described the methodical and pain-staking manner of train-up in the 10th 
Mountain Division, where his Company Commander purposively ran the unit into the ground to 
demonstrate the up-tempo reality of combat. This Company Commander was an unpopular 
leader, but his method may have saved American lives.   
This disparity in training was confirmed in my own wartime experience, where my 
active-duty infantry unit replaced a National Guard unit from Georgia upon arrival in Iraq. This 
unit suffered severe casualties early in their tour due to a lack of basic tactical knowledge and a 
dearth of up-tempo training experience in the States prior to deployment. They spent the 
remainder of their year—approximately 10 of the 12 months—holed up in their base without 
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patrolling their Area of Operations (AO) or taking on the missions necessary to maintain control 
of a hostile population. Our unit was tasked with cleaning up their mess, which cost lives that 
otherwise may have been saved had the National Guardsmen been better prepared for their 
mission and more determined to carry it out.  
 While it may be no surprise to learn that active duty soldiers sometimes consider National 
Guardsmen and Reservists to be a lesser class of the military, it also warrants mentioning that 
their activation and deployment was without precedent in the modern history of American 
warfare. After all, these were the same units that young men in the Vietnam generation—lucky 
enough to have connections—joined in order to avoid deployment to combat. To put that 
sentence in perspective: the American government decided on a wildly unpopular course of 
drafting unwilling men to fight in an unpopular war, rather than deploying their National Guard 
and Reserve units in support of the cause—units already made up of military members,. Thus, 
the role reversal 30 years later, in which the National Guard and Reserve made up approximately 
half of all troops deployed in OIF/OEF, was an extreme departure from the previous role played 
by these units—the role that many of its members had come to expect in return for a steady, 
supplemental paycheck through the 80’s and 90’s in peacetime America.  
 The unexpectedness of this change in role can be seen in the ways that Rich and Aaron 
both described low unit morale upon notice of imminent deployment and of their compatriots as 
being, more or less, “scared shitless.” Clearly, the warrior ethos did not inscribe itself as strongly 
on the hearts of at least some of these part-time soldiers the way it did on those who served in the 
active duty ranks. Joe, the 10th Mountain active-duty man, described himself to me as a soldier 
first, then a father, a man of faith, a partner and friend, and a police officer, in that order. This 
was in keeping with my own self-concept, which will always be that of a soldier, before and 
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above all other roles. Joe told me he’d like to be buried in a veterans’ cemetery with a military 
funeral but not one that was “too fancy”, and he did not want any involvement from his local 
police unit whatsoever. Likewise, Rich, who seemed to have the strongest identity of any 
participant with his military self, spent the duration of his first deployment attempting to get out 
of his reserve component (RC) unit into an active component (AC) unit, where he felt it would 
be a better fit among soldiers who took their infantry training to heart. Once this was 
accomplished, Rich attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) a second transfer to another active duty 
unit when the first redeployed home; it was critically important to him to stay with a unit that 
was firm in its identity as a fighting unit.  
 Conscription Versus Volunteer Duty. The second clear distinction in relation to soldier 
identity was generational, and that was the difference between the two Vietnam vets who were 
drafted into infantry service and OIF/OEF vets who all joined combat branches voluntarily. 
Modern-day combat soldiers do not just volunteer for military service; they volunteer for the 
Army and then for a combatant MOS.  Specialized fighters like those who belong to Airborne 
units, the Ranger Regiment, the SEAL’s, CJ’s, and the Green Berets, volunteer through several 
more layers of obstacles to reach their desired professional occupation. For instance, a Ranger 
will volunteer to: (a) join the military; (b) join the Army; (c) join the Rangers; (d) and then will 
voluntarily submit to the rigorous training process to become a Ranger, to include Airborne and 
Ranger schools, in which there is no assurance of success.  
Ken and Dick, the two Vietnam participants, were not only draftees, but they also made 
attempts to avoid direct-line combat service by joining either the Air Force (Ken) or an 
engineering unit within the Army (Dick). Their lives were altered forever by a failure to gain 
admission to the fortunate club of service members who were not expected to do most of the 
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fighting and dying overseas. Even among service members contributing valiantly and bravely to 
the war effort in other ways, there was a world of difference between firing shells from a Navy 
cruiser in the South China Sea or flying sorties over North Vietnam with what was experienced 
by those walking the jungles below.  
While this was the story of Ken and Dick’s individual lives, it was also the story of an 
entire generation of young men who came from blue collar backgrounds like their own and who 
did not have access to any of the societal mechanisms that could take them out of harm’s way. 
The Vietnam war, it seems, was waged in a strange limbo, whereby it was large enough and 
important enough to demand a draft, and yet not so large and important—as in WWII—that any 
young man out of uniform was immediately suspect of deviance, cowardice, or physical 
deficiency. It was a war in which service was anticipated but only by those in the lower half of 
the social strata, while the other half was free not only to lead their lives as desired, but also to 
play judge, jury, and executioner to those service members who returned to a country ripe with 
animosity and disillusionment toward the cause in which they were unwilling participants. I can 
think of few ironies deeper and more tragic than forcing teenagers into combat and then blaming 
them for being forced into it afterward.  
In contrast, the ethos of the younger generation was summed up by Joe, who said in one 
interview: “If you’re going to join, you might as well make it count”. In other words, why 
become a soldier unless you actually plan to do soldier-like things, such as shooting guns, 
blowing things up and, in essence, acting out the warrior code? This was my own thinking when 
joining the service: I had zero intention of becoming a soldier only to sit behind a desk or do 
another job that seemed only tangentially related to combat. The Army was a fighting force, and 
we all wanted to fight.  
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 What all of this means in relation to experiences of moral injury is difficult to untangle. 
Perhaps the complexity of conceptualizing a warrior identity in the first place is part of the 
reason why definitions of moral injury remain fluid through the present day. What we can say is 
that for many veterans, it meant something different to be a warrior in the 1940’s than it did in 
the 1960’s or 1970’s, and again for the veterans in the 2000’s and 2010’s. It is my belief that the 
course of moral injury development is impacted by this shifting sense of warrior-hood, both on 
an individual and societal level, and the future is ripe for research into the particularities of this 
longitudinal phenomenon.  
Connectivity and Loss 
 Brotherhood. The familial component of military service is well-known in American 
culture. Nonetheless, it was moving to hear the personal accounts of the participants in relation 
to how they felt obligated and connected to their fellow soldiers. Ken, despite all his crude 
cantankerousness, only deployed out of a sense of camaraderie with his fellow Screaming Eagles 
in the 101st Airborne Division. As a draftee on a short 2-year contract, Ken was the rare example 
of a drafted infantryman who had accumulated enough service time to avoid Vietnam due to his 
ongoing training and delayed unit mobilization; the military could not deploy him without a 
voluntary extension, as the “stop-loss” policies of OIF/OEF had not yet been invented. Ken had 
actually won the lottery (figuratively and literally)—he could return home without a blemish, in 
full knowledge that he’d served honorably and to the best of his abilities. Instead, he extended 
his service obligation in what amounted to a kind of sentence of doom, in that very few infantry 
soldiers returned whole, healthy, and happy from their combat tours... especially in 1968. While 
he now regrets this decision—understandable given the many physical maladies that have 
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plagued his later years—no one can deny the selflessness of this initial sacrifice on behalf of his 
compatriots.  
 It was touching to see the parallels between Ken and Rich despite a 40-year gap in their 
combat experiences. Like Ken, Rich’s role in the war was essentially settled, when he was 
wounded in Afghanistan and evacuated to Germany. The medical staff was happy to ship him 
home where he could recover in peace. Instead, Rich refused and insisted on going back in-
country with his unit. Also like Ken, Rich is rough around the edges and still has a sharpness to 
him that the years have proven unable to soften. Yet, when it came time to make a possibly life-
altering decision, neither man hesitated to go where loyalty to their unit led them. In Rich’s case, 
this was not only against medical orders, which may have contributed later to his opioid 
addiction, but was also a “yes” coming from the man who was the sole survivor in a Humvee 
explosion that killed his two best friends and interpreter. Any person who has been in a serious 
auto accident can attest to the difficulty of getting back behind the wheel... how much more 
difficult must it have been for Rich to go willingly back inside the armored box trucks where so 
many of our fellow combatants perished in horrific explosions of fire, metal, and heat... yet he 
did so willingly.  
 Continuing the Legacy. A testament to the needs of veterans to stay connected to a 
cause larger than themselves following military service is evident through the sustained efforts of 
participants to engage in larger forms of social service, especially as related to fellow vets. Joe 
and Dick are both exemplars of this form of societal engagement. The former now co-runs a 
vets’ nonprofit that allows members the opportunity to do small, weekend-long wilderness trips 
to camp, fish, and hunt together. The latter served as the point person (as, indeed, he did in the 
war) for the funding, planning, construction, and upkeep of a top-notch veterans’ memorial and 
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park, all on a voluntary basis. Rich works part-time in the vet’s office on his university campus. 
Ken was formerly the President of his local American Legion chapter and also belongs to the 
VFW. Aaron has served predominantly by becoming a professional healer, working as a 
clinician to combat the effects of trauma and violence with his clients. These facts echo many of 
my other experiences with veterans’ work, especially during two years in advocacy work on 
Capitol Hill, where I was exposed to so many veterans who made the conscious choice to give 
back to the larger military community following time in uniform. The sense of living for a cause 
larger than the individual is a hallmark of military culture, and for many veterans it seems to 
transcend the boundaries of a youth spent in the service and impacts all their remaining days.  
 Lost Connections. I would be remiss not to mention the instances in these narratives 
where connection was lost and unable to be reclaimed. There were seven divorces among three 
participants alone, each of which no doubt had lasting consequences related to sociality and 
relationship for these vets. Aaron, in particular, experienced such a difficult sequence of 
singularly ostracizing events while in the military that it now seems a point of unresolved tension 
in his life’s story. He is caught in a space where pride and resentment have equal footing in his 
recollection of military service due to the manner in which he was bullied and mistreated by his 
peers while still serving honorably in wartime. This experience harkens back to Greene and 
colleagues’ (2010) research, which mentions that the protective mechanisms of military 
camaraderie are only in place for those members who are unofficially embraced by the unit; 
those left on the outside looking in, such as Aaron, are pushed further and further away from 
center where the unique form of military companionship is the strongest. Given his mistreatment, 
it is, perhaps, not surprising that Aaron is the only participant not to become involved in 
veterans’ specific causes at some juncture of his life. Rather, he has focused more on the healing 
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of the larger population, which could be indicative of his own need to heal from the costly 
wounds of military bullying. 
 Aaron is not alone among participants in missing the strong connections of the military. 
Joe explained his rationale for joining the police force as, in part, an effort to recreate the 
powerful sense of camaraderie he felt in his infantry unit before, during, and after the war. This 
sentiment can be connected to Aaron’s experience with a house check from a State Trooper, in 
which he was considered “at-risk” for suicide and a police officer came to check on him in the 
home at the behest of a loved one. In their conversation, the State Trooper admitted to the same 
sentiment as Joe for joining the police: regaining a lost sense of camaraderie. I, too, thought the 
State Police would be the rough equivalent of the military when I joined in 2009. Like Joe, I was 
sorely disappointed to find that it was much different. After all, cops go home after their shifts to 
family and friends, have other interests, and in general don’t spend much time in one another’s 
company. The isolation of roadwork in the police is significant; even if you work with a partner, 
that is only one other individual with you at all times. The majority of police work is done alone 
in a solitary vehicle. In contrast, everything in the military is about cohesion of the unit and 
working as a group; if one component fails, the whole team fails, etc. The classic military unit is 
also brought together through their sense of shared mission, which includes—for combat 
soldiers—a significant level of physical adversity and danger. While police work is 
unquestionably one of the most dangerous civilian jobs in the country, is not a realistic 
comparison to the hazards faced by combat soldiers in warfare; the place in which combat occurs 
is fundamentally different from even the meanest American streets. This leads us to the final part 




 The beauty of Place within narrative inquiry is in its multiplicity: It may simultaneously 
refer to the desk where I am now writing in Virginia; to the office or library or house where I 
conducted interviews in Wisconsin; to the combat zone in which each of the participants went 
through his own singular experience of combat; or to any number of locations connected 
tangentially to those experiences such as the Pentagon, TRADOC headquarters, Ground Zero, or 
the White House. What follows are extrapolations predominantly (but not exclusively) related to 
geographical location as identified by the participants of the study in their numerous interviews. 
Thematically, the three components of temporality, sociality, and place are all interconnected 
and overlapping. Thus, it is important to read this last section with the other two also in mind.  
The Invader Mentality 
 In my first interview with Dr. Edward Tick, he made a curious remark about the fact that 
the North Vietnamese did not suffer from moral injury. Every year, Dr. Tick makes a journey to 
Vietnam with a group of American veterans who meet with their former enemy and do the hard 
but powerful work of reconciliation. In all his decades traveling, Dr. Tick claims he has not seen 
moral injury once among these former Vietnamese soldiers. When I asked him to further 
elucidate what he thought the reasons for this remarkable happenstance were, he responded with 
the following: 
“They really were nationalists trying to defend and protect their country. They've been 
fighting battles against much larger, more powerful invaders for 2000 years. We were 
only the last and most recent one. They said, ‘Our goal was to reunite our country and 
restore peace. We didn't want to hurt. We didn't want to kill. We didn't want to fight. We 
didn't have any aggressive goals’.  
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This is also replicated in other warrior teachings around the world. The Navajo people, 
for example, had two classes of warriors, which we would translate as aggressors and 
defenders. The aggressors went to other tribal lands, kidnapped women and children, 
stole horses and took what belonged to others. They had traumatic wounds from 
infiltrating and penetrating and violating other cultures. The defender warriors only 
stayed around the village and protected against attacks. And they did not develop the 
traumatic wound, because there was no moral injury: ‘We're only trying to stop invaders 
from killing our people’”.  
Whether one believes moral injury does not occur in a population that can be classified as 
“defenders” is less relevant than the following assertion made by Dr. Tick: that when the 
government, the public, and the military are all aligned in viewing a war as a defensive operation 
to save and protect the homeland, it takes on a different moral meaning than the preemptive, self-
escalated military campaigns for which the United States is now known.  
According to Dr. Tick, this distinction plays an important role in the development of 
moral injury. Using Farnsworth and colleagues’ (2017) previous definitions, one might say that 
while the North Vietnamese experienced many Morally Injurious Experiences (MIE’s), their 
level of Moral Pain (MP) did not reach the threshold of psycho-social dysfunction that would 
then warrant a classification of such as Moral Injuries (MI). The level of Moral Pain experienced 
may thus have something to do with the societal expectations surrounding the conflict and the 
subsequent impact on soldiers’ perception of self in relation to identity, function, and experience 
in combat.  
 Questions connected to “invader” status were certainly prevalent in my own wartime 
experience. Most of my soldiers, and many of my fellow officers, knew there was no real reason 
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for us to be in Iraq. The best answer we had was that it was some type of payback to Saddam 
Hussein for gassing the Kurds and, essentially, for remaining in power when we did not want 
him as such following the first Gulf War. Of all the participants in the study, it was telling that 
Ken spoke most poignantly about how he viewed the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns:  
“[The news] shows all the bad destruction, everything else. And then when they go to 
some of these houses and talk to these people, they look normal. [I saw] this little girl, 
she was dressed up real nice. Had a nice dress on and her house was good, and now she 
was up laid in bed. Her and her brother were bombed [by us]. She lost her leg. She lost 
her brother too and she's laying there in bed crying and everything because she had 
shrapnel in her arm. I wouldn’t want to be her. What the hell is any of it for?”   
Truly, the futility of warfare and its unending cost on civilian populations are undeniable, 
especially when moral forces are not aligned cleanly or clearly behind the cause. Ken and Dick 
both referenced in their interviews the famous photo of the naked Vietnamese girl running, 
covered in napalm burns. Images of children suffering through wars in which they have no part 
leave a mark on the men and women who have participated in efforts which indirectly led to that 
suffering. This could be due to Dr. Tick’s theory that soldiers of “invader” armies experience 
greater psychological suffering than soldiers who are simply defending their homeland.  
 If we follow the invader-defender paradigm to its natural conclusion in U.S. history, only 
the Revolutionary War can be seen as a true example of the latter form of warfare, in which men 
were defending their homeland from foreign tyranny, occupation, and overrule. Even the Civil 
War would not strictly fit the necessitated parameters for inclusion, as both the Federal and 
Confederate forces took turns playing invader across state lines, and each side was, at times, the 
aggressor in taking the fight to the enemy. Dr. Tick’s theory raises larger questions for future 
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study, such as if and how generational trauma from wartime service among family members in 
“invader” wars continues to be perpetrated through the decades, or what this cycle of continuous 
foreign invasion does to the societal impressions of military service over the same span of time. 
After all, there is no objective reason why the public pendulum regarding wartime service—
having swung all the way from disgust to overt hero worship in the past 50 years—could not 
swing back to the other side again in the future.  
Foreignness and Otherness 
The fact that all of the wars studied in this research were waged on foreign soil and 
against populations that could ostensibly regard themselves as defenders of their homeland 
cannot be overlooked. Beyond the psychological ramifications of being “invaders,” the soldiers 
in these wars also dealt with unique variables related to deployment on opposite sides of the 
earth. Cultural and racial differences abounded in these circumstances, allowing for the 
dehumanizing of the enemy in all his “otherness” to pervade unit norms. Fifty years later, both 
Ken and Dick still refer to the Vietnamese in the pejorative as “gooks” or “chinks.” Rich referred 
to Iraqis and Afghans—two peoples as ethnically distinct as Canadians and Columbians, for 
instance—with the ubiquitous Middle Eastern moniker of “towelheads.” These terms are part of 
the parlance used in combat veteran circles and are indicative of the perceived foreignness of far-
off lands and the otherness of their peoples.  
The last century of warfare has seen English-speaking peoples almost universally united 
with one another against foreign enemies. At this point in time, it seems unlikely that countries 
thus united by shared cultural customs and language could ever again become enemies. This 
recent history of warfare suggests that an “invader” mentality may be accentuated by differences 
in culture, race, and geographical location. When a student once made a passing reference to how 
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much I must know about Arabic culture from my deployment, I had to correct them. Living in an 
overseas war zone as an American combatant is like being in America, only with a different 
climate and with hostile, foreign-looking and speaking people on the outside looking in, many of 
whom want you dead.  When, in my own experience, you look out at people through a traffic 
control check point, through a Humvee window, through the barbed wire and concrete of a patrol 
base, or even through the “eye-pro” safety glasses you wear on duty, their foreignness by being 
on the outside remained clear. The only Arabic words most soldiers learned were the basic terms 
for “shut up,” “get down,” or “stop.” There was no cultural exchange in warfare: it was the 
subordination of one kind of culture over another, and nary the two did meet.  
9/11 
 No conversation about place is complete without talking about the events of 9/11 and its 
impact on the last generation of combat veterans: “where were you on 9/11?” is a commonly 
asked question even today. Similarly, everyone seems to remember (as my mother still 
remembers) where they were when they heard JFK was shot. When I was 18 years old, my 
grandfather, the only other veteran in the entire extended family, described to me while driving 
together what it was like to bear witness to Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. He said, “David, that 
was the pivotal moment of my generation. I wonder what yours will be?” We had that 
conversation less than a year before 9/11, and my grandfather’s prescience was never more 
impressive, given that the coordinated terror attacks on that singular day in recent American 
history forever changed the trajectory of millions upon millions of lives.  
 Joe had a similar moment of insight, when he told his mother he thought there would be a 
WWIII, and that he would be in it. While, thankfully, the conflagration in the Middle East has 
not erupted into a third World War (yet), there is no doubt that much of what is happening in the 
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present can be traced back to that fateful day on 9/11, and to the particular locations of the Twin 
Towers in New York, and the Pentagon in D.C., two of the most significant markers of American 
power and prowess in the country. Without prompting, all three of the present-day vets 
mentioned 9/11 as being one of the catalysts for their joining the military. Rich, in particular, had 
family friends who died in the attacks.  
While I joined the service before 9/11 (i.e., in peacetime), that day did fuel my desire to 
fight overseas in a cause much larger than myself. As a narrative device, I can weave a cohesive 
story thread from: (a) my 11-year-old self, staring down through glass on the Twin Towers 
observation deck at the tiny ants moving below to;  (b) a 19-year-old Army private watching the 
television as the buildings collapsed, another soldier softly muttering, “Well, it’s on, now”; to (c) 
a 24-year-old Army Lieutenant ordering an artillery strike on a lone child planting an IED in a 
dirt road; to (d) a 29-year-old too afraid to sleep at night for fear of nightmares, to (e) a now 37-
year-old therapist who only two weeks past had an online student whose father died in 
Afghanistan, nearly 20 years after 9/11 and in the same extended conflict for which I was 
originally trained. Clearly, the ramifications of that day, in two cultural touchstones of New York 
and Washington, continue to influence the legacy of the latest generation of veterans.  
The Wall 
 While the Vietnam veterans do not have the singular moment of a 9/11, they do have 
what has become one of the most well-respected and well-known war memorials in the nation. 
As referenced in Chapter IV, Dick was leery of the Wall at first, because it was designed by an 
Asian-American woman. However, he gradually changed his mind, and visiting the memorial in-
person became an important component of his healing process. Likewise, Ken felt he 
experienced closure in the war when he visited the Wall earlier in the 2010’s. I do not believe it 
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was a coincidence that these men had such a strong reaction to a monument so thoughtfully and 
intentionally made as a reflection of their generation’s sacrifice.  
During the two years I lived in Washington, D.C., I walked by the Vietnam Memorial 
nearly every day to and from work. It is located adjacent to the Lincoln and Korean War 
Memorials; the reflecting pool nearby, with the tidal basin full of cherry blossoms in the spring 
just a short walk away. You can drive by it on Constitutional Avenue, watching people disappear 
or emerge from the subterranean walkways to either side of the wall, which gradually dip down 
out of sight. I remember searching for names of KIA I’d read about in Vietnam memoirs, leafing 
through the heavy laminated sheets of the registry books, then scanning the names and dates with 
a finger, trying to find the right location. When you step back from looking at one name, you’re 
immediately struck by the size of the Wall, and of how many small names are stenciled on that 
shiny black rock. The experience is tragically captivating, overwhelming, and awe-inspiring. 
None of the other war memorials, for better or worse, quite captures the same mixture of pathos 
and respect, as the Vietnam Memorial.  
 In our last meeting, Dick brought up the Honor Flights done for vets to visit the Capitol. 
Although he’s already visited, he was still considering going to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
his wounding this May. When asked why he was hesitating, Dick admitted that he thought if he 
accepted the invitation, then it would mean he was signaling that he considered all accounts 
squared from his mistreatment at the hands of the public in 1970. When Dick was loaded on a 
bus full of amputees headed to Walter Reed Hospital outside D.C. (he was still scheduled to lose 
his arm at that point), a long line of protesters took turns spitting on the men in their litters 
through the bus windows as they slowly drove away. Much like the motto of those hoping to find 
friends and family still Missing in Action (MIA: “Never Forgotten”), Dick is loath to let go of 
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his resentment, even after all these years. He cannot bring himself to get on an Honor Flight if it 
means letting go of all the wrongs done to him and the others in the past. That sentiment, as 
much as the Wall itself, is a sad legacy of the Vietnam War-- that even half a century later, a 
broken-down man, crippled by physical and emotional wounds, cannot bring himself to accept 
the goodwill of a public that had wronged him 50 years before. Clearly, the places we are from, 
the places we go, and the places we ultimately connect with our former experiences, all have an 
impact on the healing journey.   
Chapter Summary 
 At the outset of the chapter it was made clear that narrative inquiry is concerned with the 
experiences of telling stories and not with the categorizations, themes, and lists that may 
dominate other forms of qualitative research. Nonetheless, for an endeavor of this magnitude and 
scope, it is worthwhile to follow some semblance of order and sequence to best tell those stories 
as well as the story of telling those stories.  
I believe the three commonplaces of narrative inquiry—temporality, sociality, and 
place—provide a view of participant and researcher experience that is at once interconnected, 
nuanced, and lucid. These many facets of connectivity must be viewed in three dimensions: time, 
person, and place all have a role in the “five W’s” of morally injurious experience, as in all 
human experiences, collectively. What a young man experienced at 19, in a unique time and 
place and society, is fundamentally different than how he experiences the world now at 70. Of 
course, how this older man now reacts to and makes sense of the world also influences the 
manner in which he remembers his past experiences, including his wartime service. The 
messaging he received privately and publicly in the intervening decades has impacted the 
trajectory of his experiences of warfare for better or worse. One of the hopes of this study was to 
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illuminate this longitudinal process around the emerging construct of moral injury, and I believe 
the stories of the participants have succeeded beyond my expectations in offering a fresh 
perspective on the ways in which moral injury occurs across the lifespan.  
The final chapter of this study will focus on my own combat experiences as they relate to 
my participants’ stories, as well as on the present-tense experience of conducting the study as 
researcher, narrator, and author. The value of the study will be examined, as well as several 
future lines of research inquiry that hold promise for further examination. The study will close 
with my personal reflections on the journey of conducting a project of this scope and duration in 
conjunction with my time as a doctoral student. 
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CHAPTER VI: EXTRAPOLATIONS 
Extrapolation (noun): the action of estimating or concluding something by assuming that 
existing trends will continue or a current method will remain applicable. 
The Narrative Experience 
Debating on what term to use for a final heading, I found the definition of extrapolation 
to be delightfully accurate to my hopes of what this last chapter will entail. It is certainly a 
conclusion, and yet it is no less an estimation of what the work will mean to others or to myself 
in the future. Likewise, it does (and I do) assume that many existing trends touched upon here 
will continue, while current methods of engaging with moral injury and warrior-hood within 
American culture shall no doubt remain applicable in the future. After all, we are not the first 
culture to experience this phenomenon, and there remain many constants to the experience of 
moral injury in combat that are sustained through the innumerable records of the generations of 
fighters from the past.  
However, even within the relatively short timeframe of this study, the ground is shifting 
among moral injury researchers in exciting and innovative ways (as detailed in Chapter II). 
Many more breakthroughs remain in the understanding and treatment of this phenomenon that I 
believe will eventually place it on equal footing with PTSD among the predominant concerns 
connected to wartime service. The articles cited in this project will, at some point, have little 
relevancy to the future innovations taking place around moral injury. This is as it should be in 
research; we are all building our understanding of the world together, and each person must 
remember that they are only a link in the chain that stretches backward into the past and onward 
into the unforeseen future.  
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With this in mind, I find solace in a truth I’ve known since I first began to read in earnest 
as a child; stories are immortal because they are also universal. The current story, carefully 
dreamed into being through the narrative inquiry method, is no less universal for its 
particularities to person, place, and time. While it is destructible in the sense that those 
particularities at some point in the future will no longer remain, it is my belief that the 
undercurrents of human experience expressed in these pages (the energy they contain, for lack of 
a more scientific term) cannot be extinguished, even if the human race ceases to exist.  
Related to this notion of story-as-inexhaustible is my belief in the power of sharing 
experiences via the modicum of narrative. This story is, of course, my own experience of 
working with others to help share their experiences with yet even more people, who in turn will 
have their own tertiary experiences of the same. These are the layers of audience for which all 
narrative inquiries must account. And if (as I believe) there is power in the sharing of our stories 
even when no one is listening, how much more power is there in the sharing of them when 
someone is listening with rapt attention, wide eyes, and a scribbling pen? What impact might this 
have on a person’s healing, self-perception, confidence, or perspective? There is no gauging the 
result (as of yet) when a person feels that their voice finally matters in research, even if it is only 
to the other individual in the room.  
To say the men who participated in this inquiry deserve to have their stories told belies 
the fact that all people deserve to have their stories told, and yet no story can contain all 
multitudes of human specificity. What stories can do, however, is tie the particularities of a given 
person, place, or time into larger universalities of the human condition—which is to say, the 
experience of living out the baffling paradoxes of existence. What follows is an attempt to tie my 
own experiences of this study into the larger framework of story and narrative; that is, to add 
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with more intentionality and focus my own thoughts on what has taken place and what it means 
as both a form of research and a form of art. It is predominantly an exploration of my personal 
experiences with these exceptional men, broken down into several categories. At the end of this 
discourse, a broader discussion on the value of the study and its implications for future research 
will be included. I believe this to be the appropriate location in the text for these important 
considerations, as it is also the point at which the reader has the largest amount of data from 
which to draw their own conclusions on the research. Finally, I will attempt to synthesize all the 
information from this project into a cohesive closing statement that pays tribute to the 
participants, to the experience of conducting the study, and to the value of narrative itself.    
Returning to the Military 
 An important question raised during the candidacy defense for this project was: how will 
this study impact you as a fellow combat veteran with your own experiences of moral injury? To 
the best of my recollection (notwithstanding the vicissitudes of memory), I answered in terms 
related primarily to former mental health treatment and not to other aspects of individual 
experience or character. How I was impacted by the study, though, was predominantly through 
an existential lens that: (a) shifted my perspective toward a holistic view on moral injury; (b) 
moved me into a space of deeper gratitude for what I’ve both been given and been spared as a 
veteran; (c) increased the connection with my own military identity, which has lain dormant now 
for almost a decade, and (d) reaffirmed my desire to serve the Military-Veteran-Family (MVF) 
community in the future as part of a lifelong mission.  
The keys to these shifts in perspective were the direct communication and contact I 
underwent with my fellow veterans who, without exception, were selfless in the giving of their 
time, energy, and thoughtfulness to this project; only a single individual accepted payment for 
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their contribution to the study, and that as a one-time-only allowance, not for every time we met 
(as I had planned and suggested to all participants). In retrospect, what was of particular 
importance to me were the moments when I resonated deeply with the participants over shared 
military experiences. These, more than any other components of the study, will be the memories 
that last the longest.  
Resonance with Participants 
 Similarities to my veteran-participants were manifold. Some were related to personal 
characteristics, or to common experience, and others still to worldview and perspective. Each 
member warrants his own subsection to do these recollections justice. After all, what resonated 
with me about each person may very well resonate with the reader on the tertiary level of 
audience, and, within the narrative inquiry process, the researcher’s own story contributes 
significantly to the dynamism of the project.  
 Aaron. Two of Aaron’s experiences resonated with my own; one related to preparation in 
the post-9/11 military climate and the other to the loss of military identity following service. To 
the former, Aaron relayed to me how his Drill Sergeants in basic training continued to pound it 
into the recruits how soon they’d be going overseas, fighting, killing, and dying. Aaron 
expressed to me how this was a constant refrain during his training in a world that was still 
reeling from the impact of 9/11. In contrast, my own basic training, done in the summer of 2000, 
had none of this incendiary language, full of imminent doom. In fact, the targets used for bayonet 
and rifle practice (as well as the subjects of our marching and running cadences) were the 
antiquated evil Soviets replete with red stars on their helmets; the thought of a catastrophe on the 
level of a 9/11 was nonexistent.  
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The massive shift in military language, and targeted animosity toward middle easterners, 
did eventually catch up to me several years later as a young infantry officer. During the first day 
of the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) at Ft. Benning, GA, a full Colonel took the stage in 
front of several hundred Infantry Second Lieutenants, straight from commissioning at their 
respective universities. I will never forget his first sentence: “Look to your right... then look to 
your left... a couple years from now one of the three of you will either be wounded or dead”. Of 
course, my first impulse (as no doubt it was for many) was to have preemptive sympathy for 
whichever guy was gonna get it on either side of me, as clearly it wouldn’t be me. Only after 
hearing Aaron’s story of basic training did I remember this memory in its totality, and how all of 
our training as young infantrymen was endlessly littered with comparable phrases connected to 
fighting, winning, and dying. As it happened, the Colonel was wrong in his estimation of 
casualties. Nonetheless, 2 of the 10 Lieutenants in my officer training squad were Killed in 
Action (KIA) later on; his words were prescient in their own way as a preparatory tool for what 
was to come.  
To the second component of resonance, Aaron and I were able to speak candidly 
regarding the loss of an ideal in leaving the military behind, how deeply we each grieved this 
process, and in many ways, how both of us are continuing to grieve it to this day. Compounded 
with this grief is a fair amount of resentment at superior officers who were incompetent, 
narcissistic, glory-hungry, or sometimes all of those things at once. Aaron, of course, had the 
striking example of his inept company commander attempting to save face by not calling a 
medevac in what could have amounted to Aaron losing his life in the aforementioned training 
accident after the war. I have several of my own distinct memories of comparable situations, 
such as my battalion commander and command sergeant major putting themselves in for a 
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Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB) when the first one of our units struck an Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) in Iraq... on the opposite side of the Area of Operations (AO) from 
where the command Headquarters (HQ) was stationed. Many other instances come up, in which 
officers who were hungry for distinction pushed their units into taking unnecessary risks, often 
with disastrous consequences. For me as much as for Aaron, there is no recollecting my time in 
the military without also touching on these bitter memories.  
Strangely enough, we both chose the healing arts as a form of regeneration and rebirth 
from some of the more destructive aspects of the fighting life. I knew, for instance, that I wanted 
to help and heal after so many years being part of something that most often hurt people 
(ourselves included) in service to the greater cause. Continuing the legacy of living for a higher 
purpose, I wanted to influence the lives of veterans the way my own life was impacted by 
psychotherapy after the war. If I were less connected to my former military identity, I doubt I 
would be writing on this subject or practicing clinically with the intent to treat my fellow vets; 
the loss of everything I had wanted since I was a little child ultimately took me, as it did Aaron, 
to a place where I could continue the mission, only from a different point of view. As will shortly 
be discussed in relation to Rich and Joe, I will always consider myself a soldier... only a soldier 
for a different sort of cause.  
 Rich. The commonalities I share with Rich make me more uncomfortable than they do 
with any other participant. I think this is because they have a tinge of the infantry mentality to 
them, which at times can be prejudiced and disdainful to the point of hyperbole toward all other 
walks of life, including other military occupational specialties (MOS). It is a dangerous 
precedent to set one’s own class of warrior above and beyond all others, and yet that is the exact 
type of mentality the infantry encourages in its soldiers. After all, “fake it till you make it” is a 
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cliché for a reason: if soldiers begin to believe their own hype, their performance may well reach 
a level comparable to such sky-high expectations. From what I gather, this is much the same in 
different fighting groups, such as Recon Marines, Navy SEAL’s, and Army specialists such as 
the Special Forces (a.k.a., Green Berets).  
In Rich’s case, this prejudice was geared toward other military specialties, civilians, and 
especially the academic liberal elite. He routinely used infantry acronyms or words to describe 
soldiers who worked in less hazardous positions, such as “REMF’s” (Rear-Echelon Mother 
Fuckers) and “Pogues” (i.e., soldiers who never leave the safety of a base; a candy bar is also 
known as “pogue bait”). Rich described civilians in terms suited to the conversation on 
hegemonic masculinity in Chapter II, referring to them in emasculating terms. This is the very 
definition of the hegemonic ideal, with its pervasive attempts to minimize and ridicule the 
feminine while asserting dominance. In relation to the liberal university in which he was 
undertaking his own doctoral studies, Rich withheld the deepest of grudges, suggesting— (as the 
majority of military veterans I know seem to agree) that the liberal components of the 
government and the public are responsible for hamstringing the military through budget cuts and 
a generalized lack of support. This popular veteran sentiment, which may seem odd coming from 
a person enrolled in a higher education program, is not without its evidence; budget cuts under 
liberal Presidents Clinton and Obama both resulted in drastic troop reductions, the latter of which 
cost Rich his employment as an Active National Guardsman (AGR). Truly, there were times in 
the military when I considered it unwise, perhaps even bordering on career suicide, to share with 
any other infantryman that I was a voting Democrat from a family of pacifist Quakers. 
Regardless of how justified the reasons, there is no denying that Rich’s military 
prejudices are an irrevocable part of any continuous conversation with the man—especially as a 
 158 
fellow infantry veteran. And, where I found the overt racism of the Vietnam participants to be 
alarming, distasteful, and tragic, I must admit that there is a piece of me that still resonates with 
Rich’s perspective on military service, as black-and-white as it may seem. Deep down, even 
veterans like myself who believe they’ve moved well past military experience can harbor 
feelings of mistrust, skepticism, confusion, jealousy, or animosity toward those who did not 
sacrifice a thing in the wars of the past or those who sacrificed only a little but now receive the 
same share of acclaim. After all, and as mentioned at the outset of the study, only a miniscule 
percentage of Americans have served in an infantry MOS in the military, and this small 
component of citizens has borne the brunt of the battle as well as its continued consequences 
well after the end of the war. Even including all the military members who served overseas, it is 
a slim part of the overall population that carries out the dictates of our government, and by 
proxy, the will of the public. Joe, who was the most stoic of the participants, was actually the one 
to put his finger on this sentiment when he recalled a memory from taking leave during the war:  
“I got to come home for two weeks of leave during the year that I was there. I remember 
getting on the metro and sitting, sitting on the train by myself and just looking around. It 
was like all these kids my age and they were super excited. They were going downtown 
for a [Cleveland] Cavs [basketball] game. And I just remember sitting there, kind of 
resenting them. Like, you guys have no idea what this world is all about”.  
My own experiences were much the same. I remember walking through the mall, expecting 
people to stop me and ask how the war was going, even though I wasn’t in uniform. I came to the 
realization that for most Americans, the Iraq War was nothing more than the ticker tape at the 
bottom of CNN playing in the dentist’s office while you boringly waited for your appointment to 
begin. Thus, Rich was by no means alone in his animosity and mistrust of the civilian world.  
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A less controversial and more noble aspect of this same mentality was similarly on 
display with Rich--namely, the dictate to “live by the sword, die by the sword,” which struck a 
deep chord with me. Likewise, Joe also expressed this sentiment in our interviews. In essence, as 
young men who had volunteered our way through numerous steps to reach the front lines, none 
of us carried much anger or worry at the thought of being killed in the war. It seemed quite fair 
to me at the time, as it did to Rich and Joe, that if we were there to kill the enemy, then the 
enemy was certainly allowed to kill us back. In fact, I had made my peace before deploying that I 
would not return; it was, in retrospect, easier for me to envision dying a martyr to the cause than 
to try and figure out what to do with the rest of my life. Neither Aaron (who primarily joined the 
service for college money) nor the two Vietnam vets (who were draftees) expressed the same 
level of enthusiasm regarding a premature demise in combat. This seemed a unique facet of the 
infantry soldier serving in a volunteer Army, versus those serving under duress or for non-
combat related purposes (e.g., the GI Bill). Irrespective of origin, I found this connection with 
the other infantrymen of my own generation to be a fascinating component of our subculture’s 
mentality toward warfare.   
 Joe.  Beyond the aforementioned examples, and the notable coincidence of us both 
serving in the 10th Mountain Division, Joe and I also shared at least two other striking aspects to 
our time in the military. The first is a matter of spirituality. Joe detailed that when he deployed to 
Iraq, he brought with him holy oil that was a gift from a Lebanese Catholic family friend. He 
would anoint himself and any others who wished with the sign of the cross on the forehead, 
much like in a blessing ceremony, before going on patrol. Along with personal prayer, Joe 
credited this religious ritual with being part of the reason his unit didn’t lose any men KIA 
despite suffering over a dozen WIA in the year-long tour. In an eerily similar experience, my 
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mother, who left the Quakers to become an Episcopalian priest, anointed my head with holy oil 
when I went to the war, saying a blessing over me as she cried in the parking lot. Also, during 
the war I had a “praying tree,” a gnarled old thing that somehow withstood the devastating 
effects of the desert climate (not to mention the war), where I would go and sit and pray, anytime 
I was back on the “big base” and in safety. While I’m less certain than Joe that these things had a 
protective influence on me or my men, I am also not one to dismiss such mystical elements out 
of hand. As the saying goes, there are no atheists in foxholes, although many a person has 
claimed otherwise after the fact.  
 Our second commonality was in police work. Joe is a local cop, while I served as a State 
Trooper for three years following my active duty service (I was still an Airborne Company 
Commander in the Army National Guard on the weekends). Each of us joined the police force 
with the hope that it would rekindle some of the camaraderie we experienced in the military. It 
also seemed a logical fit for former infantrymen who are often good with weapons but don’t 
consider themselves to have many translatable skills to the civilian workforce. Police work is 
virtually the only job that overlaps at all with the day-in-day-out of the infantry world. As we 
each discovered, however, there was a significant difference between the two occupations, with 
much less bonding and camaraderie available to overworked police who were constantly on-
patrol by themselves. In response to Joe’s story about shaking and having PTSD-like symptoms 
on the way to a “shots fired” call, I asked him why that moment shook him worse than all the 
firefights he experienced in Iraq. He replied immediately with: “because I was alone.” That 
statement hit home for me in so many ways. Ultimately, it was the constant bombardment of 
negative interactions with the public, all the political maneuvering, and the lack of real 
companionship on the force that drove me out of policing and into counseling work.  
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In another tangential happenstance, Aaron was visited by a State Trooper on a house-call 
when he was suicidal, and this officer spoke to him about the exact same topic Joe and I 
discussed—joining the police because he missed the camaraderie of the military life. At the time 
I left the Army, this was certainly not one of my main considerations; I think I assumed that 
friends who felt more like brothers would instantaneously pop up no matter what I did, and of 
course I was mistaken. Still, I did have strong friendships in the Troopers, due in large part to a 
live-in training academy which mirrored many of the facets of basic training, and where the 
adversity faced was more group challenge than individual crucible. Ever since, however, and like 
most American men moving into middle age, Joe and I have had to take our friends where we 
can get them and to work hard to maintain the friendships we are lucky enough to still have from 
our youth.  
 Ken. Certainly, the least connected I felt to anyone in the study was Ken. As detailed in 
prior chapters, Ken’s personality was abrasive and his temper was short, which I believe to be (in 
part) the result of the unending agonies and humiliations he experienced from Agent Orange 
exposure. This made it difficult to work together and, oftentimes, Ken seemed like an unwilling 
participant in the study even though he was the only one forcing himself to do it. In retrospect, I 
believe Ken was torn between wanting to share his story and feeling exposed, vulnerable, or 
weak by doing so, and all the while struggling mightily with chronic pain. 
The one point where I felt the two of us resonated was in Ken’s near-death stories. While 
his experiences bordered on what might be considered by some as miraculous, I had relatively 
tame experiences where a bit of luck or a chance moment may have altered my destiny. As an 
example, a good friend and I, both going to the same battalion, were exchanged for one another 
in a sort of “lieutenant swap” between company commanders. It was unofficial policy in the 10th 
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Mountain Division at that time that an officer who had not made it through Ranger School could 
not take on a line platoon; he would only be allowed to work with an attachment unit. These 
were the types of units that worked directly with foreign nationals on a deployment (versus 
American personnel) and were considered less desirable leadership positions. Thus, my friend, 
who failed to complete Ranger School through no real fault of his own, was moved out of a line 
slot and into a position where he would serve as an attaché to an Iraqi Army platoon. I took his 
place as a Rifle Platoon Leader, since I was Ranger-qualified. Sixteen months later, my friend 
Kevin was killed in Iskandaria, the same place Joe was originally stationed during his tour the 
year before, by an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) manufactured in Iran.  
In a second instance, I was walking down a road on patrol when a Non-commissioned 
officer (NCO) waved me over for a discussion about our location on the map. A moment later, a 
HUMVEE drove by and blew up just ahead of where I left the path. I’ll never forget the sound 
that a piece of giant metal made as it flew over my head in that explosion; it sounded like my 
eardrum was pressed to the centrifuge of a helicopter in midflight. Thus, in sharing these small 
stories with Ken, it was a rare moment in which we were able to bond and shake our heads 
together at the seemingly random nature of modern warfare.  
I am indebted to Ken, not only for his participation, but for adding a somber, 
uncooperative note to the proceedings that I believe provided the study with additional richness 
and depth. After all, veterans are not saints despite some of the liberties taken by politicians and 
institutions to suggest we are infallible heroes that cannot be criticized or challenged. Ken is a 
living embodiment of the complicated nature of military service. Indeed, one might say just as 
readily that he is a living embodiment of the complicated nature of life. I would not want any 
other veteran to have taken his place.   
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 Dick. In our first meeting together, Dick shared a memory with me that inadvertently 
stirred up more emotions than all the other comments from participants combined. He spoke 
eloquently, and for several long minutes, about the night that one of his unit’s Kit Carson scouts 
suffered a horrific accident and died. The man, a former North Vietnamese soldier turned 
American scout, was sleeping in his hammock draped in the jungle when a branch fell from 
above and speared the man through the abdomen onto the ground. Unfortunately, the man did 
not immediately die but lasted through the night, crying for help. Dick’s platoon leader spent that 
same sleepless night on the radio pleading for a Medevac. However, the unit policy at that time 
did not allow for the transport of Vietnamese soldiers, much less former NVA. This was one of 
the same scouts that previously stood on the dozer in full view of the enemy and returned fire as 
Dick attempted to build berms at his patrol base. This man’s adopted American unit failed him, 
and he died in terrible pain. Clearly, Dick was still upset recalling the incident, although he was 
able to remain stoic in its telling.  
 Hearing this story, I was instantly recalled to the dimly lit concrete room that served as 
our company HQ in Sadr-al-Yusifiyah, Iraq, where a young mother stood before us with tears 
streaming down her face. I was on the radio, first talking, then screaming at the voice on the 
other end, requesting a Medevac for the Iraqi baby this mother had brought to the patrol base 
who was blue from a lack of oxygen. Our medic had whittled down a Styrofoam cup to try and 
feed the baby oxygen, but the mask was too big, and it wasn’t helping much. As the Executive 
Officer of the company, with the commander gone on stateside leave, it was my job to get this 
child to an American hospital site, and yet all my requests were, again and again, denied; 
apparently, we did not allow Iraqi civilians on our helicopters, even dying infants. I watched the 
hope in the mothers’ eyes fade, along with the baby’s breath. The child died right there. I don’t 
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think the mother ever fully understood the reasons we could not help, and I suppose I did not, 
either.  
 Hearing Dick’s story was like a time portal back to that moment; one of the worst in the 
war for me. I was deeply moved that another American soldier in another war felt the same 
compassion for a foreign national that I felt despite the differing circumstances. Ultimately, we 
are all human beings. I am fortunate that I never lost sight of that fact, and I do not believe Dick 
ever did, either.  
Lessons Learned 
 Undoubtedly, every doctoral student who goes through the crucible of the dissertation 
process learns a sequence of lessons, some more difficult than others, during the campaign to 
finish a terminal degree. In my case, the first and most lasting lesson learned was simply how 
much work it takes to complete this type of project. This was hammered home to me by a 
grueling candidacy process, by which I was not allowed to submit for Internal Review Board 
(IRB) approval for this study before passing several sequences of tests and evaluations that 
demonstrated my expertise with respect to counselor education (i.e., teaching, supervising, 
research, and clinical work), as well as to both the construct of moral injury and the narrative 
inquiry methodology.  
To the last of these, the manner in which I continuously discovered the nuance and 
beauty of the narrative method was an enjoyable learning experience throughout the project. As a 
person who loves reading and writing stories, it was (and will remain) my preferred method of 
data delivery; one that pays homage to the power of the written word and the complexity of the 
human experience as much as to my own proclivities as a research writer.  
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More difficult was interposing a narrative inquiry framework onto the doctoral 
dissertation process, or perhaps vice versa. Due to the necessary and understandable requirement 
to demonstrate considerable expertise and understanding of relevant issues in a dissertation 
study, some liberties were taken with the narrative process, such as writing the fifth chapter on 
common narrative threads, that would otherwise have remained integrated into the larger body of 
the story. This will most likely remain a challenge as I seek to become a more established 
narrative researcher in the future. With few narrative-focused research journals in publication, 
my choices may involve either adapting future research to fit other qualitative paradigms, or 
starting a separate publication entirely that is committed to a pure narrative research experience. 
Regardless of those future outcomes, this project put me in good stead to continue narrative 
pursuits through avenues that are widely accepting of such inquiry as well as those that remain 
skeptical of the notion that narratives can provide valuable research data.  
Challenges 
The major point of concern throughout the initial steps of the project was in securing 
participants. As a counselor, I’m used to being the person who helps and not the person who 
needs help from others; it was a trial for me to ask for assistance on the study from complete 
strangers. Additionally, due to the depth required of a narrative inquiry study, I knew I was not 
asking for people to speak to me only once; our time together would span months and, for most 
participants, at least several hour-long conversations. Lastly, I knew I was looking for a finite 
group of people who could meet my criteria: combat veterans, from different wars, who served 
with a combat-related specialty. Thus, even the relatively small candidate pool of veterans was 
diminished first by the combat requirement and then again by the combat MOS stipulation. By 
mid-summer, when I received IRB approval from my university to begin participant recruitment, 
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I was in a new State (WI), where I did not know anyone and had no contacts whatsoever in the 
veteran community.  
What followed was a broad campaign that included creating and distributing flyers 
outside the Madison VA hospital, posting yet more flyers around town, contacting the local 
branches of the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) for assistance, 
corresponding with the University of Wisconsin Director of Veteran Engagement to gain 
participants, and even speaking at a Veterans for Peace meeting in a local library. Ironically, 
none of these attempts paid dividends, although I did receive several leads from the process. 
Ultimately, it was on the strength of my relationships, professional and personal, that I gained 
access to a select number of participants who were well suited to my study’s parameters.  
Cultivating Relationships 
As it happened, relationships were at the center of this project as they are for so many 
disparate elements of human existence. Strong working relationships with my new faculty peers 
at the University of Wisconsin–Whitewater (UWW) led to a process of snowball sampling that 
helped me recruit four of the five long-term participants. The last participant was recruited 
through my personal relationships with the veteran community I left behind in Virginia, where 
friends spread the word on my behalf and vouched for me as a bonafide vet. Additionally, 
several of the veterans recruited via UWW connections were swayed to participate due to my 
military credentials.  
Equally important was cultivating genuine relationships with the participants once the 
study began. One might say that while my military background opened the door to 
communication, it was my ability to connect with others that allowed me to continue the study to 
its completion. This connectivity was not only about being friendly; it was also about giving and 
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receiving respect, remaining grateful, and conducting oneself professionally at all times. To 
many veterans, there would be no point in having a “friendly” chat if the other person did not 
show respect by being on time, being prepared, etc. This facet of the process was on full display 
with Ken who I had to talk back into participating on two separate occasions when he 
erroneously scheduled our visits for the wrong day of the week. I knew that it did not matter in 
the least that I was correct; this was his perception of what took place, and what mattered at 
those moments was making it right with my participant, not being right. So, each time I 
apologized profusely and promised to make it up to him and, after the second incident, I 
implemented my own policy of contacting Ken at the beginning of each week we would meet to 
remind him of the appointment and to ensure I had the correct date and time down for the visit. 
This component of professional conduct should never be overlooked when working with 
veterans. 
Respect for my participants did not stop at punctuality and scheduling. After the initial 
interview, for which I had a universal list of questions vetted by my committee members, I was 
responsible for sifting through every transcript to formulate a new set of topics for each 
individual based on their unique experiences, characteristics, and responses to the original 
questions. In my mind, it would have been a sign of significant dis-respect had I simply created 
another batch of questions for the entire group of participants. The sacrifice of their time, the 
value of their experiences, and my high regard for each man’s character dictated that I do my 
very best to come to each subsequent meeting with questions and thoughts definitively connected 
to what they previously shared.  
Furthermore, it was critical to the relationship-building process that when a question was 
asked or information was voluntarily given that moved one of the veterans into an emotional 
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space, I did not push my agenda onto them by demanding even more detail about these difficult 
experiences. With every single veteran, in every interview, there were times when I wanted more 
information than they were willing—or could—give to me. It was not simply the ethical 
mandates of research that prevented me from asking certain questions or pulling out more 
information (though these existed, as well), but also my own experiences as a veteran and a 
counselor that helped me know where the boundaries were when sharing such vulnerable pieces 
of oneself with others. I knew the components of my own service that I was unable to articulate 
with words, or that I was too ashamed to bring to light. Any one of the tenuous relationships built 
with these participants could have been irreparably violated by crossing certain unspoken lines, 
known only within the veteran community and, perhaps, among a select number of its allies such 
as Dr. Tick, who contributed to this study as an expert practitioner without a service record of his 
own.  
 The experience of conducting this study has only affirmed my belief in the power of 
personal relationship to transform the world. From a longitudinal perspective on the research 
itself, it was clear that the participants became less enthusiastic about engagement over time as 
the reality of the commitment perhaps sunk in. There were phone interviews where participants 
forgot to block the time out and either had to reschedule or were surly in their responses based on 
the perception, perhaps, that I was playing the role of “time thief” amidst their busy days. As 
referenced in previous chapters, Ken eventually decided he was done talking altogether after 
three interviews. Yet, I am content in knowing that despite the significant drain on their time and 
energy to participate, largely without recompense, these veterans continued to take my calls, 
respond to texts, or schedule visits up to the end point of data collection. I believe this is a 
testament to the selfless character of the American veteran, but also to the power of relationship-
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building that allowed me so much leeway with scheduling, talking, and probing into deeply 
personal affairs.  
Regrets 
No study is complete without a few thoughts on what could have been done differently, 
and this is certainly no exception. The one major regret is easily identifiable: that I had a Korean 
war veteran ready to participate, but he had a stroke right before we met and died several weeks 
later. This was a rare opportunity to work with a veteran from a significantly older generation 
than the Vietnam era participants, with an entirely different set of experiences as a fighter in the 
least recognized major conflict in 20th century American history. The silver lining of this 
experience, however, was that the faculty peer who put me in contact with the man said that she 
had never seen him so excited as when she referenced our upcoming meeting to him after church 
shortly before his death. This was seconded by the veteran’s wife, who told the same faculty 
member she had not seen him that happy in many years. It is a great loss to be unable to tell his 
story in these pages, and for the Korean and WWII generations not to have a voice in this story. 
However, this man, in my mind, is the 6th member of the group and will remain so in my 
memory in the years to come.  
Speaking further on the longitudinal components of the study, I do wish I had been able 
to find a WWII veteran to participate. Sadly, there are so few left, and those who still remain are, 
like my own grandfather, often suffering from memory loss and other conditions that blur the 
mind. Even if I were able to recruit one of these veterans, it is prudent to remind myself that the 
work toll of the study increased exponentially with every additional member; unlike some 
alternate forms of qualitative study, the narrative inquiry process demands a deep exploration of 
experiences that cannot be satisfied in a single interview. Thus, if I were to suddenly have two to 
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three more veteran participants from our oldest living generations, it would likely have pushed 
the date of completion back several months due to the depth of inquiry required by virtue of the 
chosen methodology.  
Lastly, I regret that I was unable to recruit participants from more culturally diverse 
backgrounds. In particular, the experiences of African-Americans draftees in the Vietnam War 
would have added unique depth and perspective to the study. Several factors limited my ability 
to find such participants, including the homogeneous cultural landscape of rural Wisconsin and 
the limited number of marginalized individuals who actively choose combat-related specialties in 
the modern military. To the former, my canvassing in diverse urban settings did not produce any 
participants from other cultural backgrounds as I had hoped it would. This may have had 
something to do with the flyers I distributed that connected the study to academia and 
institutional learning, two factors that marginalized communities may already find suspect from 
years of societal exclusion and prejudice.  
To the latter consideration, in my own experiences there were perhaps only one or two 
African Americans in every 120-man infantry company, with maybe a dozen Latino and Filipino 
members combined, and the rest being lower-class and middle-class white men. It seemed to me 
at the time, and it is sadly no less true now, that teens growing up in marginalized communities 
had already experienced their fair share of violence by the time they joined the military and were 
more interested with a steady paycheck, a respectable job, and future college tuition assistance, 
than they were with more fighting. In contrast, many middle-class white kids grow up in the 
safety of suburban or rural communities where there is little danger, and they seem to seek 
fighting out as part of their genuine rationale for joining the military. Regardless, these are only 
my own experiential observations, and the larger point remains that there are proportionally 
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fewer marginalized members of combat-designated units in the military than there are in the 
greater American population. This made it additionally difficult to recruit members of those 
communities into the study.  
The Value of this Study 
 As might be surmised from previous comments on the value of narrative research, I 
remain in solidarity with the opinion of preeminent narrative researchers that narrative inquiry is 
inherently valuable, in both its consideration of the study of experience as story and its 
consideration of that experience—the one of authorship—a phenomenon worthy of story in its 
own right (Connelly & Clandinin, 2006). Thus, two levels of narrative research bring separate 
value to the forefront: the participant experience and the narrator’s experience of person, place, 
and time throughout the study. However, Clandinin, et al. (2007) remind us that these unique 
facets of narrative inquiry study must still be justified at the personal, practical, and social levels, 
as well as in relation to other research on the topic. While these justifications were given in 
Chapter III, they will be revisited here along with answers to the research questions, several 
other considerations related to the value of the study, and the tripartite criteria by which a 
narrative inquiry study is judged ex post facto: authenticity, adequacy, and plausibility 
(Clandinin, et al., 2007).   
Authenticity, Adequacy, and Plausibility 
To begin with the last of these (working our way backward toward the more specific), the 
results of this study are plausible or, that is to say, reasonable, because the participants : (a) were 
ordinary citizens, (b) met the criteria for inclusion in the study, (c)  shared many common 
experiences of wartime service; (d) were not “outliers” in  job description or performance; and 
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(e) were able to retell many specifics of the same stories numerous times, on different occasions, 
and without divergence in any of the details.  
 The adequacy of the study should be clear to the reader from the depth of the narration 
itself; that the story of each participant warranted many pages of consideration, both in the telling 
of the stories and by virtue of narrative themes elicited to the forefront of the conversation at 
varying intervals in the manuscript. With respect to the stories themselves, care was given to pre- 
and post-combat life and not simply to the wartime experiences which might qualify as morally 
injurious experiences (MIE) or moral injuries (MI).  
 The authenticity of the study—its genuine character and factual basis—may be viewed 
through the specificity of the memories and emotions expressed by the participants. These 
comprehensive particularities were not arrived at by any half-hearted attempt to conduct 
research, but by my passion to do the topic justice; anything less than a full effort is something I 
would have viewed as a failure. In its own way, this passion is a testament to the study itself, as 
it is, among other things, a singular view of the ways in which modern-day veterans make 
meaning of their lives. A large part of my own meaning-making journey was in my commitment 
to this topic and to ensuring participant voices were kept at the forefront of the narrative.  
Uniqueness 
Beyond these criteria, Clandinin and colleagues (2007) also remind narrative researchers 
that they must “offer some sense of what it is that can be known about a phenomenon that could 
not be known, at least in the same way, by other theories, methods, or lines of work” (p. 30). 
Despite its simplicity, the most straightforward answer to this prompt is the following: the 
project is unique because it tells the stories of five individuals who, heretofore, had not shared 
certain facets of their lives with the public. To me, this is no small feature of the study, but rather 
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the most important component of all. This is because all other considerations and learnings from 
the study stem from the simple fact that people were able to gift us with their stories full of 
feeling, insight, wisdom, pathos, and redemption. I am convinced, even more so than at the 
outset of this endeavor, that there is no comparison among other research modalities to the depth 
and breadth uncovered using narrative inquiry. However, to illustrate this point, the following 
sections will focus on answering the three separate blocks of research questions that were part of 
the original project proposal. The hope is that the answers to these questions, while not always 
straightforward or simple, will further illuminate the ways this study brings unique value to the 
fields of moral injury and veterans-focused research.  
Research Questions  
Research questions 1:  How do experiences of moral injury differ according to the 
particularities of the war being fought? How do they differ across generations, and as the 
veterans themselves age? 
 The difference in experiences of moral injury between the two generations involved a 
confluence of considerations: voluntary vs. draftee service, level of training, scale of violence, 
rules of engagement (or lack thereof), exposure to toxins, public reaction to the war, time elapsed 
since combat, perspectives on mental health treatment, and availability of veteran-related 
resources, to name only the most significant. From the narrative accounts of the participants, it is 
my estimation that Vietnam veterans were at greater risk of experiencing moral injury than their 
younger counterparts, although this did not prevent the younger vets from also experiencing their 
own moral injuries.  
First, the status of so many Vietnam vets as unwilling draftees coupled with a reduced 
time in training increased the likelihood that they would be unready for the harsh realities of 
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combat. This was in contrast to the next generation of vets, who willingly sought out fighting 
roles with the hope of getting into combat and underwent much more extensive training, one 
component of which was to desensitize soldiers to killing before their respective deployments.  
Second, Vietnam was an unquestionably more violent and dangerous war than the Iraq 
and Afghanistan campaigns, combined. The jungle terrain (vs. mountains or desert) decreased 
the technological advantages of the American forces and also lent itself to a nightmarish form of 
close-quarters combat As Dick referenced, many times combatants didn’t know where the firing 
was coming from or who was doing the firing. Advances in offensive and defensive warfare 
technology since have only increased the disparities in equipment and capability between a 
dominant nation-state like the United States and the poorer countries of the Middle East and 
central Asia. As detailed by Grossman (2001), killing via technology and distance does not leave 
the same imprint on the psyche as close-quarters combat.  
Third, the time period of the 1960’s and early 70’s was a powerful contributor to the 
development and sustainment of moral injury among Vietnam vets. Remembering Farnsworth 
and colleagues (2017) functional definitions: moral injury (MI) can only take place when a 
morally injurious event (MIE) causes great enough moral pain (MP) as to become unworkable or 
intolerable to the individual. Anti-war sentiment and public disapproval contributed to a society 
that was rife with the opportunity to remind veterans that they should be ashamed for serving--a 
sentiment that seems likely to have increased feelings of moral harm sustained during combat 
(thereby leading from MIE to MI). From the astronomical number of suicides and other 
premature deaths among the Vietnam generation in the years since, it seems plain that the vitriol 
this generation of veterans experienced haunted them and worsened their condition, in contrast to 
the more supportive treatment modern-day vets receive at the hands of the public.   
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Last, the decades that have elapsed since Vietnam allowed two interrelated phenomena to 
increase the likelihood for moral injury beyond any point the current generation will (hopefully) 
ever have to face. These are the connected components of an extremely limited, poorly run, 
Veterans Administration (VA) and the rise of Agent Orange symptoms among vets. Ken and 
Dick both shared incidents where they told VA doctors about their symptoms, only to be ignored 
or told it was an unrelated set of conditions and had nothing to do with the war. As much as the 
VA continues to struggle to serve the veteran population, it is by all accounts of these veterans, 
far better than it was in the early 1980’s. Whatever wrongs Vietnam vets experienced, executed, 
or witnessed in the war, they were substantially inflamed by the continued incompetence and 
indifference of the U.S. government to their plight afterward. One of the major contributions of 
this study is in its deeper exploration of how longitudinal factors such as these influence the 
course of moral injury development. Unseen and untreated wounds of war tend to worsen over 
time—physically, emotionally, and spiritually—when they are not validated by the public or by 
the healthcare system that nominally exists to care for its members.  
Research questions 2: In what ways does a combat MOS impact the perceived 
experience of moral injury among combat soldiers and Marines?  Does a combat MOS make 
such experiences easier or harder to handle in the moment? Does a combat MOS make coping 
with the aftermath of moral injury easier or harder to handle down the line as civilians? Is a 
combat MOS a continuing source of pride for veterans who experienced moral injury? Does a 
combat MOS in any way bolster or limit their ability and/or desire to seek out support? 
 The second block of research questions did not garner simple, clean answers. Again, 
important distinctions between generations were an impediment to formulating universal 
responses to the questions posed. For instance, one finding of the study was that Vietnam 
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veterans who were drafted did not, understandably, feel the same mixture of pride and esprit de 
corps as their volunteer counterparts from the later conflicts; it was not a chosen identity, after 
all, but an assigned one given to the vast majority of conscript soldiers in that war. In contrast, 
the younger vets were part of a select minority within the larger military population (itself a 
select minority of the U.S. population) that made several voluntary choices to move into front-
line combat service. In common parlance, this means the comparison between groups was an 
“apples-and-oranges” scenario, yet also one that perhaps was not recognized as such before this 
study was conducted.  
 In terms of morally injurious experiences (MIE) and a combat soldier’s ability to cope 
with such moments as they happened, the narrative body of the study suggests that a combat-
designated MOS seemed useful in relation to those parts of the war that could be deemed as 
combat specific (e.g., firefights, artillery fire, bomb drops, IED’s, etc.). It was a different matter 
altogether when combat soldiers were asked to do something, or experienced something, beyond 
the threshold of “normal” fighting. For instance, Rich and Ken were each detailed to pick up 
innumerable pieces of bodies, a job that left them deeply affected and resentful, as it was a job 
classically handled by mortuary affairs soldiers. Likewise, Dick (and I) experienced an MIE 
when a foreign national died needlessly and tragically due to the bureaucratic red tape of the 
American military-industrial complex. Aaron suffered MIE’s through both a training accident 
and unit bullying, neither of which had anything to do with his combat-specific job duties. Joe 
was haunted by feelings of guilt and shame after witnessing a friend’s mangled corpse at his 
funeral; a sentiment I shared, since as the Executive Officer (XO) of my company I had to 
identity our KIA (and suicides) in the morgue after the fighting stopped.  
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 Relatedly, it is difficult to say whether or not a combat MOS impacted these veterans’ 
ability to seek treatment following war, or whether their identity as combat soldiers gave them 
additional resiliency in fighting off moral injury (or both). Again, the generational divide must be 
kept in the forefront of the conversation: the Vietnam vets may not have even known, in that 
time and place, that there was a treatment to seek. While the stigma against mental health 
treatment remains alive and well in the 21st century military, it was certainly more pronounced in 
the past generation, to the point where many veterans did not even know what mental health 
treatment was or what purpose it could possibly serve. As an example, Dick did not seek mental 
health treatment until he became alternately suicidal and homicidal in the mid-2000’s; he thought 
that it was only for “nut cases,” and so did not seek out help until he considered himself part of 
that category. For the younger veterans, it does seem that their warrior identity contributed to a 
greater resiliency in relation to personal and professional setbacks. Aaron plunged into academic 
life with the same fighting spirit harnessed in combat. Rich did the same when struggling against 
his addiction and later again in the pursuit of his business credentials and career. All three 
younger men have exhibited a unique brand of selflessness that I often attribute to frontline 
fighters; in whose circles the ideal of self-sacrifice or martyrdom to the cause can take on 
mythical proportions. However, it is difficult to say what parts of these characteristics are 
attributable to combat training and identity and what parts are simply an organic component of 
character and constitution. 
 What was universal among participants, in relation to this set of research questions, was 
pride in their identity as frontline combatants. While the Vietnam veterans seemingly took longer 
to find and own this pride—as public sentiment against the war subsided and allowed for more 
reasonable opinions to prevail on the roles of the combatants—the modern veterans never held in 
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question the pride they share in service to their country. This was clear throughout the study, and 
it did my heart good to see the Vietnam vets proudly displaying their wartime service 
memorabilia on their walls or letting the public know about their service on specialized license 
plates and Vietnam campaign ribbon bumper stickers. They are role models to the rest of us who 
struggle to recognize our own achievements in the military, and do not display our accolades 
without fear of being viewed as arrogant or boastful.  
Research questions 3: What are the longitudinal effects of combat MOS training on an 
individual across the lifespan, and how do the tenets of the warrior ethos permeate the lives and 
day-to-day experiences of such veterans? How do older generations perceive their younger 
warrior counterparts, and vice versa? 
 As noted in prior sections, the two generations of veterans represented in this study 
experienced substantial differences in the level and degree of their combat-specific training that 
led, among reasons previously mentioned, to different post-combat experiences of the self as 
citizen-soldier. When asked, neither Ken nor Dick deeply identified with a warrior identity. If 
anything, they identified more with being part of the “walking wounded” scattered to the winds 
after the Vietnam war came to its ignominious close. This could be attributed to a number of 
factors: the aging process, time removed from combat, fading memories of training and war, and 
a preoccupation with the ramifications of Agent Orange exposure; all may have played a role in 
this mentality. From a more holistic perspective, Ken and Dick are the proud figureheads of large 
family units spanning four generations of members. Not a single conversation went by with 
either man where a grandchild or great-grandchild was not mentioned with pride and delight. It is 
quite possible that over time the importance of family, community, and connectivity collectively 
outweighed any identity that remained tied to an individualistic perspective.  
 179 
 For the younger men, their military experiences are closer to the present and remain an 
important component of identity. All three, at different times in the research process, identified 
themselves as soldiers first and other roles (e.g., father, son, husband cop, student, etc.) second. 
At the very least, a warrior identity seems to be the “1A” to another role’s “1B” in their lives; a 
perspective I identify strongly with, since it is also the case for me. Among other reasons for this 
permeation of the warrior ethos in the youngest generation of wartime veterans, we may also 
consider factors that include: (a) an increased specificity, duration, and intensity of combat-arms 
training; (b) the shifted public perception of military service, which is once again laudable in 
American society; (c) increased exposure to movies, video games, and TV shows that glorify the 
role of combatants in warfare; (d) a sense of having undergone a “crucible” experience no longer 
accessible to most young Americans who do not join the military; and (e) a belief in the inherent 
specialness of belonging to the select club of veterans who served and fought on the frontlines. 
When viewing these factors in their totality, it becomes easier to see why the two generations 
have had such different experiences of the warrior ethos in their post-military lives.  
 To the final research question, it was clear that respect was conveyed both forward and 
backward to the opposite generation with regard to their combat experiences. Beyond this, 
however, there was strangely more sympathy coming from the Vietnam veterans toward their 
modern-day counterparts, while the OIF/OEF veterans focused more on the awe that was 
inspired in them by considering the experiences of the Vietnam generation. Certainly, the 
younger men understood the sacrifices and tragedies inherent in the experiences of their 
predecessors, yet this only seems to have magnified the ways in which Vietnams veterans now 
appear as tragic heroes to present-day vets.  
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One unique reason for this perspective as it relates to combat-arms soldiers of the modern 
era might be that most of us wanted to fight in a war like Vietnam; full of huge battles, high 
casualties, and opportunities to display courage under fire. Instead, we were given the pocket-
wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, where many soldiers died in explosions without ever firing their 
weapons at enemy combatants. As an historical counterpoint, it might be said that our fathers 
were given the American Revolution, while we were given the War of 1812. The sheer drop-off 
in magnitude and scale between the conflicts leaves modern-day vets with an inferiority complex 
about their own combat service. Ironically, the same struggles the Vietnam generation faced in 
viewing the preceding WWII generation, are alive and well with the current group of veterans 
looking back at Vietnam.   
Personal, Professional, and Societal Value 
 Connelly (2007) noted that researchers must situate their findings relative to the three 
levels of audience: personal, professional, and societal. As already argued, this project has 
personal value because it tells the heretofore untold stories of five American combat veterans 
from two distinct generations who gave the full measure asked of them in time of war. As much 
as it is their story, it is also a continuation of my own; one in which I am able to still live out my 
warrior identity and ideals by attempting to help other veterans in clinical work, as a researcher 
for projects such as this, and as a friend to many.  
 The professional value of the study is in its unique perspective on moral injury, combat 
soldiering, and military identity. To date, it is the only narrative inquiry study done on any of 
these three subjects, much less all of them at once. The study points to the longitudinal 
components of moral injury that are so rarely addressed in more normative forms of research; 
that is, how a soldier can undergo morally injurious experiences (MIE) before and after the war 
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that become moral injuries (MI) over time, or which contribute to the impact of combat-initiated 
MIE’s and MI’s. It shows us that the full impact of moral injuries sustained in wartime cannot be 
known in some instances for decades after the fact, and that there are definitive institutional 
components to moral injury that often accelerate its course and consequences. The study sheds 
light on pieces of combat soldier identity that are rarely discussed: what it means to serve in war 
as a draftee in contrast to as a volunteer; how public sentiment prevents or encourages veterans 
to self-identify with their service history; and how extensive training can reinforce that identity 
for a lifetime. For all these reasons and more, this research has the potential to broaden and 
deepen our understanding of how to treat Military-Veteran-Family (MVF) clients in 
psychotherapy and of certain avenues for further research that will only increase our professional 
knowledge.  
 On the societal level, Dr. Tick once explained to me in our conversations that in the 
traditional continuum of care for warriors returning from battle, it is the societal or communal 
component that is now missing for our veterans today. In other words, the public does not 
acknowledge that it bears the responsibility for honoring, healing, and ultimately returning war 
veterans to constructive societal use. The men and women who do the dirty work of the country 
too often return home to empty platitudes and promises.   
Traditional tribal societies understood that the warrior, while not a victim, was 
nonetheless the person who bore the wounds and scars from the society’s larger decisions to 
protect, sustain, or strengthen its position in relation to other societal groups. It was only right 
that these people should be honored and placed in positions of prominence within the tribe. 
Instead, military service is growing less and less common among our political and business elite, 
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and the role of the military on the global stage is being directed by people without an 
understanding of what it means to serve.  
This study is one small yet powerful window through which to view the civilian-soldier 
experience from the outside, and it can serve as a way for those who do not understand this 
unique subculture to become better acquainted with common struggles and triumphs of the 
soldiering experience. For those serious about finding ways to integrate veterans more fully into 
the decision-making apparatuses of the nation, to harness the leadership qualities vets have 
earned the hard way, or to simply understand vets better as a starting point for more appropriate 
societal care, this study is a good place to begin.  
Future Research 
The value of this study and its implications for future research are interconnected, as 
much of its value is in the unique phenomena unearthed by the narrative method, warranting 
further inspection and study across a broad range of concepts. I will discuss three potential 
avenues for future research below: (a) institutional forms of moral injury; (b) vet-to-vet research 
and clinical work; and (c) longitudinal factors related to combat service.  
Institutional Contributions to Moral Injury 
Many of the MIE’s and MI’s of participants can be connected to institutional failings on 
the part of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, the military, and, in 
particular, the Veterans Administration (VA). Psychological wounds may have been 
compounded by preemptive failures of institutional moral reasoning (e.g., Gulf of Tonkin 
incident, Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.) as well as post-operative failures to care for those 
who bore the burden of the battle (e.g., Agent Orange denial, lack of services, opiate 
prescriptions, etc.).  
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Based on the observations made in this study, my own wartime experiences, and other 
research interviews with veterans done in the past, I am convinced that the longitudinal impact of 
moral injury is either reduced or magnified by the actions (or inactions) taken by institutional 
bodies that are meant to represent the ideals of America. As Dr. Tick described it when I 
explained my own feelings on the Iraq war:  
“I'm picturing dozens of warriors from many different campaigns and wars that I've 
worked with and known over the years who all had similar feelings of: ‘I'm called to 
warrior-hood, but the war they gave me was tragic, unnecessary, illegitimate. And so... 
my calling became stained by the cause” (Italics mine).  
When governments take unilateral action to engage in warfare, sending young citizens 
into harm’s way, there should be unequivocal moral reasons for so doing; the destruction 
wrought by combat demands it. Sadly, U.S. history is littered with examples of conflicts 
escalated for political gain and geopolitical leverage. Even more ignominious, the government 
has routinely failed to care for its veterans on the backend of these wars to the degree warranted 
by such sacrifice. Even now, a phone call to the Norfolk VA complex where local vets are 
ostensibly patients will result in a three to six- month wait for individual mental health therapy. I 
am certain that the macro-level messaging conveyed by such institutional ineptitude and 
indifference impacts the trajectory of moral injury development amongst our warrior caste. This 
is in important area for future research and one of vital interest to the public good. 
Longitudinal Factors of Moral Injury 
This study sheds light on the reality that moral injuries routinely occur in noncombat 
scenarios among veterans which may then be compounded by the stress of an impending 
deployment, or by the physical, mental, and spiritual ramifications following combat. This 
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longitudinal interconnectivity of experiences is underrepresented in the moral injury literature on 
combat veterans, and I believe it is a major contribution to the burgeoning field of study that 
demands further inquiry and research. In comparison, just as the mental health professions can 
no longer view moral injury as an occurrence unique to the military, they can also ill afford to 
view moral injury among military members as a phenomenon that only occurs in combat. 
Longitudinal factors were at play in innumerable ways for all the participants in relation to their 
experiences of moral harm.  
 While it is obvious that experiences of combat differ between generations, it is equally 
important to remember that the ways combatants perceived and processed those experiences 
were also a product of their time and place in the world. The typical Vietnam infantryman would 
have less training for combat, less knowledge of mental health issues, less resources available, 
and less societal support across the board than a veteran of the modern-day conflicts. Might those 
factors have contributed to the long-term trajectory of moral injury among Vietnam veterans? 
My answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Conversely, those same veterans have had decades more 
time to process and make peace with their experiences, to cultivate a wealth of communal and 
familial ties, and to build lives beyond their former military identity. Might that, too, contribute 
to the trajectory (and ultimate resolution) of moral injury? Again, my answer is yes.  
 The larger point is that moral injury, like any other mental health construct, does not 
occur in a vacuum. It matters where it took place, when, and to whom in the sense that people 
change considerably over time, and different versions of ourselves would also have different 
reactions to the same experience. Society changes as well, and what was once anathema to the 
public can become meritorious in the next generation as has happened for these two groups of 
veterans. Furthermore, as we change, and society changes, our perception of what took place so 
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long ago also changes. Memory is malleable, selective, and much at the mercy of the vicissitudes 
of time, after all. All of these factors should be considered in future research on moral injury; it is 
not enough to view it as a phenomenon caught in space and time without fluidity and the ability 
to take on greater or lesser meaning depending on what came before and what came after in an 
individual life.  
Vet-to-Vet Experiences in Research and Counseling 
Following the completion of this project as a veteran speaking with and learning from 
other veterans, I am intrigued by the possibility of delving deeper into this unique dynamic as a 
paradigm seen in both my research and clinical work as a counselor educator. Taken at face 
value, most people assume it is a net-positive to have a fellow veteran on the professional side of 
this fiduciary relationship. It is true, at least in my case, that being a combat veteran opens 
certain doors for me with the Military-Veteran-Family (MVF) population. For instance, Veterans 
seek me out for clinical services, and we seem to build immediate rapport based on a foundation 
of mutual respect for military service no matter what jobs or branches of service were 
represented. Likewise, in the role of researcher I was able to recruit through military connections 
and to offer my military credentials up as a demonstration of authenticity to potential 
participants. As mentioned, at least two of the participants only took me up on the offer because 
of my own history as a combat infantryman. Comparable to my clinical experiences with 
veterans, it has always been easy for me to connect with the same group under the differing 
conditions of research inquiry; we share a common language and understanding of the unique 
military subculture, and often a similar view on military service as a higher form of calling amid 
the many choices available to citizens of the United States that do not involve such sacrifice.   
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Yet, during the evolution of this project I began to consider that there might be ways that 
having veterans working with other veterans may also cause undue difficulties or limit specific 
research and clinical results. I am curious, for instance, whether or not there are certain 
experiences that are more difficult to talk about with a fellow veteran than otherwise would be 
with a civilian. As an example, Aaron was unwilling to share with me the nickname given to him 
by his unit, hinting only that it was emasculating and embarrassing. My intuition is that he might 
have shared that name with a researcher from a different walk of life, opening up greater 
opportunity to discuss its import and impact on his military service and his perspective on it in 
retrospect.  
Considering my own wartime experiences, I do believe there are components that I would 
be more hesitant to share with another veteran versus a non-affiliated citizen; having a fellow 
veteran judge me would be much worse than a person I did not think understood the full 
spectrum of wartime realities. I know many combat veterans (and would-be combat veterans) 
who go through the remainder of their days seeking continuous validation from other vets. There 
is a reason a phrase such as “trading war stories” is now ubiquitous in the larger culture; it is 
indicative of the extent to which veterans of past generations needed to not only share, but also to 
compare their experiences with those of other wartime veterans. Conducting vet-to-vet research 
or clinical work runs the risk of moving conversation into a lane of “one-upsmanship” if the 
person on the professional end of the dialogue does not take care to address these unique facets 
of vet-to-vet interaction.  
I now think there is a rich line of research inquiry available to those of us interested in 
further exploring this unique dynamic. Even something as simple as whether or not MVF 
members are more likely to initiate services with a veteran-turned-clinician warrants its own 
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study given the historical stigma against mental health care in the military. Again, my sense is 
that the data may parallel my own experiences; the vet-to-vet connection opens doors and allows 
easier access, but it does not guarantee that such access will remain unconstrained for the 
duration of contact. Much more work remains to be done to further elicit the strands of 
particularity related to this topic and all of the topics mentioned above.  
Concluding Remarks 
The Messenger of Allah (Peace be upon him) consulted the Muslims on the day of Uhud. They 
advised him to go out for battle, and so he put on his armor and took his sword. When his 
Companions said, "Perhaps we have forced you (to go out) O' Messenger of Allah? Maybe you 
should stay in Madinah," he answered, "It is not for a Prophet to don his armor (for battle) and 
then take it off before Allah makes a judgment between him and his enemy." 
~ Islamic hadith 
 Little known to westerners, there is an entire category of Islamic science related to the 
Prophet Muhammad’s (Peace Be Upon Him) person, character, and life. The specificity of this 
knowledge, carried forth not only in the Qur’an but also in the abundant ahadith (or sayings) of 
the tradition, is jarring to anyone raised in the Christian tradition, where only bits and pieces of 
Jesus of Nazareth’s life and sayings remain for inspection. Where decades of Jesus’ life are 
unknown to his followers, Muslims may easily memorize the most simple and mundane of 
observations related to their Prophet (PBUH). As an example of such things I can remember off 
the top of my head, several years removed from Islamic study, I can still recall that: (a) the 
Messenger of God (PBUH) had a beautiful, moon-shaped face; (b) he walked quickly and with a 
slightly bent frame, as if he were headed downhill at all times; (c) he was of middling build, with 
a strong frame, and exceptionally large hands and feet; (d) he was considered light-skinned or 
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white for a man of Arabia, but had dark hair and beard; (e) he would rise from sitting to greet 
arrivals as a show of respect; and (f) his favorite snacks were cucumbers, dates, and watermelon.  
In the Islamic world, these specificities, and hundreds more like them, are not 
suppositions; they are facts. The ahadith of the tradition have been painstakingly documented, 
generation by generation, all the way back to the famous era of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
himself. For a strong hadith (and there are different categories of veracity, as well), a scholar will 
memorize the entire chain of narrators from first to last up to the time they became an established 
part of the Islamic canon many centuries after their occurrence. Any conflicting reports with 
other verified ahadith, missing chains in the link of narrators, or even character-related issues of 
the narrators themselves could immediately discredit the hadith and put its utility for religious 
and scholarly purposes into question. Combine this fact with the oral tradition of Islam, in which 
many, many followers have memorized the entire Qur’an (thereby earning the title of “Hafiz” or 
“Guardian”), and you are left with a distinctly narrative tradition, replete with the three-
dimensional personalities of its founding constituents, and an immensely detailed chronicle of 
the early Muslims’ rise, fall, and redemption at the hands of their own tribe of the Quraysh.  
Above and beyond all else, this seems to me a testament to the power of the narrative 
form on the grandest scale; that when enough information is conveyed on an important or 
momentous subject, and that information is synthesized into the larger body of a story, it then has 
the power to alter the destiny of billions of lives. In this case, my own life and the lives of the 
younger participants in this study can now be included, in some fashion, to the narrative arc of 
the Muslim world. One might argue, in fact, that all Americans now belong to that arc, given the 
events of 9/11 and its consequences to both our world and those of other peoples.  
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In the struggle to make sense of what seemed, for many years, the broken thread of my 
own story, I leaned into the selfsame narrative arc of the Muslim world to better understand how 
I had come to misinterpret a group of people so thoroughly. I discovered in what turned out to be 
a three-year-long immersive odyssey, that there was a richness and depth to the tradition hardly 
dreamed of beforehand as well as a magnanimity of spirit in its members that reminded me of the 
very best I had seen in the Christian traditions of my youth. I was also privy to the 
dysfunctionality of a religion as vast and heterogeneous as Islam, and to the ways in which 
different factions sought power, privilege, and voice amidst the innumerable challenges of 21st 
century geopolitical realities.  
In the end, as my own narrative thread became intertwined with the larger threads of this 
religion and its varied peoples, my enmity was replaced by sympathy, my confusion by 
consideration, and my derision by a profound respect for the tradition I had previously thought 
simplistic and exaggerated. My narrative—my story—became one of hope again with a 
redemptive arc instead of a prolonged deterioration and downfall. I was able to reengage my 
soldier identity without the baggage of cultural ignorance or hatred of Otherness, and all my 
work since has benefited accordingly.  
I have used the previously cited hadith several times in the past few years to remind 
myself to finish what has already been started. There were at least three times on the doctoral 
journey that I considered moving on, including times I was offered jobs elsewhere that would 
have immediately put my financial anxieties to rest (a common theme, no doubt, for all doctoral 
students). This hadith, again and again, came to my mind when trying to make a decision 
whether to stay or to go. The larger context of the story is that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
had come out to do battle at the head of his army against his own polytheistic tribe that had 
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turned against him in the years past. While waiting, there was a very long delay, and many of the 
early Muslims grew tired, restless, or bored. However, because their Prophet and leader refused 
to take off his armor and stood at attention under the blazing sun, he inspired his followers to 
remain at their posts. The result was ultimately a momentous victory for the nascent cause of 
Islam and one that marked the ascent of the crescent moon banner over the entirety of the Middle 
East in the centuries and millennia to come.  
Likewise, I am happy to have remained at my post in order to finish this journey. The 
encouragement of my advisor and of my family and friends sustained me in the hardest times. 
Keeping my academic armor on, so to speak, has also allowed me the immense privilege of 
working with veterans as a researcher and not only as a clinician. The past year’s work has 
enriched and ennobled my life in ways that were by no means clear at the outset, as is so often 
the case with the journeys we launch ourselves on through the course of a lifetime.   
One final irony of this hadith in relation to this study and my broader passion for working 
with veterans is that we spend a great deal of time asking and helping our veterans to take off 
their psychological armor and put their memories and traumas to rest. Yet, a soldier identity 
remains beneath these destructive elements, and this is the piece of armor we must insist our 
veterans keep; that the discipline, camaraderie, selflessness, and fighting spirit of the warrior 
remain alive and well in pursuits above and beyond military service. Veterans must be 
recognized and recognize themselves as civic assets with important work to do in the present. 
This project represents my own attempt to put this sentiment into action. I will continue to honor 
the veteran experience through narrative, and—as was the case in the past, and will be the case in 
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